Aunohita

Political Crisis Threatens Democratic Institutions

2011-10-09T05:34:00.000-07:00

Almost lost amid an unfolding banking scandal in Afghanistan, a confrontation between President Hamid Karzai and the country’s parliament is coming to a head, threatening to paralyze the government at a crucial juncture.

Two recent developments concerning Afghanistan – the hastening of the US military drawdown and a financial scandal that has embroiled the former head of the country’s Central Bank – have helped obscure the seriousness of Karzai’s power play. And the banking scandal continues to capture local and international media attention: in the most recent twist, Afghan authorities issued an arrest warrant for the former Central Bank chief, Abdul Qadeer Fitrat, who earlier resigned his post and fled to the United States. Officials want to question Fitrat about possible malfeasance in connection with the collapse of Kabul Bank, a privately held institution.

The brewing executive-legislative conflict has the potential to be even more destabilizing for Kabul than the banking scandal. Afghan officials will be expected in the coming 18 months to assume greater responsibility for maintaining the country’s security. Yet the current trend suggests that the government is coming apart, rather than coming together.

At the heart of the dispute is a power struggle between parliament and Karzai's administration, in which the president's chief objective is to weaken the legislative branch. Five months after he swore this second post-Taliban legislature in, and nine months after elections, Karzai authorized his own investigation into electoral fraud during last year’s polls, a process that led to the disqualification of a roughly a quarter of the deputies.

The decision of the Karzai-backed Special Election Tribunal, announced on June 23, is a direct challenge to the autonomous bodies that have constitutional mandates to oversee elections. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) both investigated and eliminated fraudulent votes after the polls last September. Karzai set up his own tribunal in December in a move that some critics see as unconstitutional.

“That nine months after the elections [and] eight months after the final results were announced by the IEC … MPs still can be changed by a body established by the president is a sign of the sad state of Afghan institutions,” said Thomas Ruttig of the Afghan Analysts Network, an independent research organization.

In Afghanistan’s party-less electoral system, the legislature – the first sat from 2005-2010 – has repeatedly acted to check Karzai, trying to prevent the president from amassing too much power in the executive branch.

While the political affiliations of the 62 of 249 deputies who have been tapped for disqualification do not form a significant pro- or anti-Karzai pattern, the implementation of the special tribunal’s action could provide a boost to executive authority by making the legislature more pliant, critics fear.

When announcing the Special Tribunal’s decision, judge Sidiqullah Haqiq said the body had been set up “in response to complaints” about the vote and had “functioned transparently.” But FEFA (the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan), the country’s only independent election watchdog, said the process was characterized by “disorganization and lack of transparency.”

“After all the post-election chaos, no one will ever be able to say who really won or lost a seat in September. The legitimacy … of the ‘new democratic’ Afghanistan has been destroyed for good. It is a very bad example for the transition because the 2009-10 election cycle [which included controversial presidential polls in August 2009] was the first major political process handled by the Afghan government alone,” Ruttig told EurasiaNet.org.

The IEC has challenged the right of any other institution to announce final results of the elections, saying in a statement that it regards “the interference of any other organization in this issue as an explicit violation of the constitution and the Electoral Law.”

Waliullah Rahmani, director of the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies (KCSS), a think-tank, warned that the events pointed to a “constitutional crisis” that could evolve into “a political-security crisis.” If the president does not recall the tribunal, Afghanistan could witness “institutional weaknesses jeopardizing the legitimacy [of the government], which is destructive for the political future of Afghanistan and the survival of democracy in this country,” he told EurasiaNet.org.

MPs have grouped together in opposition to Karzai. On June 22, a group of over 100 legislators announced the formation of “The Coalition for Support of the Rule of Law,” promising to prevent “powerful individuals from usurping the rights of others.”

Parliament has appealed to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to intervene. But Karzai has warned the international community to stay away. His spokesman Waheed Omar told reporters during a June 27 news conference that no external interference would be allowed and that the president was working to resolve the issue.

Despite earlier support for Afghanistan’ autonomous electoral institutions, it is unclear whether the international community can or has the political will to intervene. “Afghanistan's peaceful future lies in the building up of robust democratic institutions based on the rule of law and the clear respect for the separation of powers,” the UN’s Staffan de Mistura and Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union’s special representative to Afghanistan, said in separate statements.

“We cannot impose democracy from outside. It is up to Afghans to nurture the seeds of democracy that have been planted,” Usackas told EurasiaNet.org.

Whatever the outcome, the political maneuvering seems set to be highly contentious and debilitating. “The winner – again – is Karzai. But it is a Pyrrhic victory,” said Ruttig. “The losers are those Afghans who need a functioning state. Reestablishing the balance between the executive and the legislative would require new elections. But how should this work under Afghanistan’s current security conditions and the state its electoral institutions are in?"

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

Dealing with the Trauma of War Onstage

2011-10-09T05:29:00.000-07:00

May 25, 2011/Eurasianet

The stage is just a couple of large dining tables covered with white cotton sheets pushed together at one end of the room. The “commandant,” played by a young woman, has an elfin face and shy smile behind oversized dark glasses. On the surface, the scene appears lighthearted, but the emotions in the tiny room run deep: a group of Afghan women, scarred by the brutality of war, are using acting to address their pain.

“Every Afghan is a victim of the conflict,” says Neak Mohammed of the Afghan Human Rights and Democracy Organization (AHRDO), a non-governmental organization managing the theater project. Mohammed should know. His father was tortured and six of his brothers perished in the violence that has plagued Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet occupation. Several of his siblings were “disappeared” by the various regimes that rotated in and out of power after the Red Army left Afghanistan in 1989.

Taking its cue from the “Theater of the Oppressed,” an initiative developed by Brazilian activist Augusto Boal, the Afghan participatory theater encourages actors and audience members alike to come to terms with their suffering by getting them to open up.

“The first time I talked [onstage] I cried so much I don’t know what I said,” says 25-year-old Shilla Qiam. “I realized here that it was not just me. Everyone has a story. Someone has lost a brother, a father, a sister.”

“I had never talked before,” said Qiam’s friend Waseema Amiri. “There are things you cannot talk about with your family because later on it is held against you. Here I could open up my mind and heart. I see these other sisters [female participants]. I didn’t even know the extent of the problems many women in the provinces have to face.”

The scene presented on the stage during a recent performance at AHRDO’s suburban Kabul office was one familiar to many in the audience: An underage girl was being forcibly married to a commander, an older man, by her father who hopes to get a good bride price. The girl protested, the father beat her and the mother was unable to intervene. When the scene froze onstage, audience members were invited to show how they would handle the situation.

One by one, women from the audience went onstage to role-play. One woman became the daughter. Another played the mother and another, the father. The mother offered to find a job so her daughter did not have to be married against her will; the daughter tried to soften the father through emotional arguments. The idea behind the exercise is that efforts to transform the situation onstage mirrors attempts to transform their own lives, the real situations the audience members have to deal with. “The audience gives the solution through which they can change their own lives,” explained AHRDO’s Mohammed.

“Afghans embraced this [concept] from the beginning,” said Hjalmar Jorge Joffre Eichhorn, an AHRDO founder and Bolivian-German theater activist who has developed acting-therapy programs in several countries. It is especially well suited for Afghanistan, which has a long tradition of oral expression. In addition, a theatrical venue offers a safe space for women to share stories that cultural stigmas, familial restrictions and the continuing conflict do not easily allow elsewhere. Just the act of narration is in itself an empowering act, said Eichhorn.

“The theater creates the safe space – both emotionally and physically – and brings people together. No one has listened to their stories before. Telling lifts a burden. Sometimes it is like a volcano erupting,” he added.

Outside the theater, little is done to help Afghans deal with the consequences of over three decades of conflict. Mental health facilities are virtually non-existent in Afghanistan, even though 60 percent of Afghans are estimated to suffer Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, according to government data. An action plan on transitional justice that the government adopted in 2005 has not been implemented largely due to the resistance of powerful figures who fear the possibility of being called to account for war crimes. Moreover, the conflict’s stark ethnic divisions have prevented a common understanding that would be the starting point for any justice and healing process.

“Afghanistan is still a country in conflict and there is no agreement on the macro-narrative. It will take a lot of time until we are at a stage where we can agree and each group doesn’t feel it is the most victimized and that some other group is the worst oppressor,” said Sari Kuovo, the head of the Afghan program of International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), one of the organizations the funds the theater project.

Law student Zahra Yagana has moderated many of the workshops. “In the beginning it was difficult. Some women would not take off their chadori [full burkha],” Yagana said. “Some would not speak. But day-by-day it gets better. We want the women to change their tears into energy.”

For Hadisa, a 20-year-old participant, this is already happening. “Before I thought there was no one to listen to the voice of women. Now I know we can raise our voices together. Our voice must be heard by decision-makers.”

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

India Woos Kabul as Influence Wanes

2011-10-09T05:26:00.000-07:00

May 17, 2011/Eurasianet

A few years ago, the Indian Embassy in Kabul entertained a curious request. Afghan counter-narcotics officials, despairing that poppy-eradication efforts weren’t working, came up with a novel idea. They proposed to hire an Indian soap opera star, Smriti Irani, to record anti-poppy public service announcements for television and radio.

Given Afghans’ obsession with Irani’s character, Tulsi, on the show ‘Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi’ (The Mother-in-Law Was Once the Daughter-in-Law), Afghan officials believed the public service spots could have broad appeal. At the time, viewing the show was a national obsession: Even wedding ceremonies were sometimes suspended so that guests could watch the daily telecast. In the end, the proposal never took off, but it did demonstrate the depth of Indian soft power in Afghanistan.
These days, Afghans have many more television options. India’s influence, meanwhile, remains strong, but the dividends of the feel-good relationship are wearing thin. The ebb in relations was evident during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s May 13-14 visit to Kabul. Singh pushed for more security and political cooperation, including a clear role in Afghanistan’s reconciliation process, but his gestures yielded nothing concrete.

India has the chips to be a major player in Afghanistan. It has aid commitment that makes it Afghanistan’s sixth-largest donor (New Delhi has spent $1.5 billion on aid projects from 2001-2011). In addition, there exists plenty of goodwill among Afghans toward Indians, and there’s a history of friendship between the two countries. But India, according to Afghan analysts, has not made efficient use of its assets. New Delhi has not, for example, cultivated relations with an assortment of Afghan political players in the post-Taliban era. “They are missing from the political space,” said Waliullah Rahmani, the Director of the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. “This is a major shortcoming in the Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan.”

In a search for explanations, critics point to the understaffed Indian Embassy in Kabul, where only one officer handles aid programs. Another lone diplomat looks after the political and media portfolio, as well as chancery issues. In sharp contrast, most Western embassies in Kabul are brimming with diplomats. The British Embassy, for example, has around a dozen officials in the political section alone. The reason for the discrepancy, the critics say, is India’s naïve expectation that good relations with both Kabul and Washington means both will protect and promote Indian interests in Afghanistan.

India has traditionally acted as a counterweight to Pakistani-Pashtun influence in Afghanistan. Most notably, New Delhi became a strong backer in the 1990s of the ethnic Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, which battled the predominantly Pashtun Taliban. In the process, New Dehli helped check Pakistan’s efforts to project its authority across all of Afghanistan.
Though it initially continued supporting the Northern Alliance after Taliban militants were driven from Kabul in late 2001, India has shifted in recent years to a policy of strong support for President Hamid Karzai’s administration, says Kabul-based analyst Haroun Mir. In doing so, India backed itself into a diplomatic corner, and, as a result, its influence with Karzai waned. Sensing that India has no other diplomatic options, the Afghan president has become a hard bargainer. At the same time, the Indian government has lost credibility with the opposition, which includes members of the Northern Alliance.

India’s position could erode further in the event that a reconciliation iniative brings pro-Pakistan figures into government, Mir explained. “It was a mistake for India to invest so completely in the government of President Karzai. They have to balance their activities and aid to Afghanistan. They kept away from their natural allies, the Northern Alliance, for fear of how President Karzai might react,” said Mir, a former Northern Alliance associate, currently director of the Afghan Center for Research and Policy Studies.

Of late, the Karzai government and its supporters have kept up pressure on New Delhi to sever ties with his political opponents. “India needs to cut its ties to all groups and have relations only with [Karzai’s] government,” Abdul Ghafoor Liwal, president of the Regional Studies Center of Afghanistan, a government-affiliated think-tank, told EurasiaNet.org.

New Delhi has caved too easily, says Mir. “India should not have given a blank [aid] check without conditions. Other [donors] have conditions. It is not as if India is not familiar with this culture. It has the same culture,” he told EurasiaNet.org, critiquing India’s inability to leverage its massive spending.

“They [Indians] have completely failed to cultivate individuals with political power, as all the other countries have done, and it is those individuals who are making decisions now,” said an analyst close to the government who asked not to be identified.

Meanwhile, India’s relationship with the United States, while strong, has not produced the returns New Delhi had hoped for in Afghanistan. Despite fears of a pro-Pakistan government appearing in Kabul, for example, India has found itself sidelined in reconciliation talks. India’s cozy relationship with the United States also has taken a toll on ties with traditional allies Russia and Iran, two countries that have stakes in Afghanistan and which could have expanded India’s leverage. As it is, Iran, according to a source close to the government, “has been complaining about India’s role in Afghanistan and the region to us.”

Even though the discovery that Osama bin Laden hid for years near the Pakistani capital suggests some members of the Pakistani establishment supported the terrorist-leader, the terrorist mastermind’s death may not be the game-changer that India hopes for. “We could go down the other route of just having a flaming great row with Pakistan over this. I think that would achieve nothing,” British Prime Minister David Cameron said in response to allegations some members of Pakistan’s intelligence service protected bin Laden. His comments support fears in India that the West will overlook any Pakistani betrayal.

Prime Minister Singh used his recent Kabul visit to announce $500-million in additional Indian aid for Afghanistan. The premiere also expressed a desire to broaden a strategic partnership. The details have not been worked out, but they seem, as do most aspects of Indian-Afghan relations these days, up to Kabul to dictate.

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

It’s over to officials after PM Manmohan Singh broadens ties with Afghans

2011-10-09T05:16:00.000-07:00

May 14, Economic Times

Both the unsaid and the said defined the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, to Afghanistan over Thursday and Friday, opening up the opportunity for a significant shift in India's engagement with Afghanistan.

The visit, less than a fortnight after death of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, confounded expectations of high rhetoric against Pakistan. Singh's second visit to Afghanistan, after a gap of nearly six years, also sought to plug the gaps in India's engagement with Afghanistan, announcing the intent to establish a strategic partnership that could provide for engagement across political, security and economic fronts. India also substantially increased its aid to Afghanistan from $1.5 billion to $2 billion, a bulk of it ($100 million) for a massive expansion in small development projects.

Though neither Afghan President Hamid Karzai nor Prime Minister Singh shied away from pointing to terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the language remained muted. Despite a provocative media, both maintained their cool. Pakistan was described as a "partner", and the Indian PM went out of his way to provide assurances that India was not out to target Pakistan, either politically or militarily.

While the announcement of a strategic framework signalled India's political intent to depart from a narrow engagement that has, at times, appeared shaped as well as restricted by Indo-Pak tension, its impact will be determined by the political will of both countries to actualise the agreement, including the timeframe for its adoption.

A rapidly shifting political environment within Afghanistan coupled with India's past failure to cultivate and expand its political engagement in Afghanistan suggest the new partnership is a possibility rather than a fait accompli.

Despite an enviable start in its post-2001 bilateral engagement when overwhelming goodwill for India combined with the powerful position of the pro-Indian Northern Alliance, India failed to capitalise on its leverage. Initially limiting its engagement to the Northern Alliance at the cost of neglecting other key political players, India subsequently swung to wholesale support of President Hamid Karzai, making no attempt to broaden its political base or increase its participation in the political space.

The eye of the storm

2011-10-09T05:14:00.000-07:00

04 May 2011, Himal Southasia

While almost the entire world reeled from the shock waves emanating from the news of the death of Osama bin Laden, Monday remained a routine day in Kabul. Afghanistan, which is still paying the price for having hosted bin Laden, carried on its business as usual. In fact, apart from the flurry of meetings and security alerts within the international organisations, Kabul city did not even appear perturbed. It exhibited none of the signs of anxiety usually evident in reactions to emotive events, such as the burning of the Koran. The eye of the storm was uncannily still.

The Afghan government reacted quickly with President Hamid Karzai welcoming the operation leading to the killing of bin Laden. Later, the Afghan media joined in reporting on perhaps the biggest news story since 9/11. Most Afghans, however, reacted not emotionally as did most Americans, but much more cautiously. ‘I don’t know whether it is good or bad,’ says Hashim, a Kabul taxi driver, referring to bin Laden’s death. ‘Some say it is good and some say it is bad. What do you think?’

Many like him weigh their words before expressing an opinion, unsure whether it is appropriate to celebrate or mourn the man whose name had become synonymous with the centre of global terrorism. They seem to be waiting to see where the dominant opinion is headed. And while they wait, they weigh the pros and cons of bin Laden’s death and the impact it might have on their country. Whatever he may have once meant to Afghans, bin Laden had long ceased to be an issue in Afghanistan. Instead, Afghans had been (and are) more concerned with events and personnel more pivotal in shaping lives and deaths inside their country.

Separate, but connected
Although the image of bin Laden is most closely associated with the rugged mountain terrain of Afghanistan, the links between the Taliban insurgency and the al-Qaeda’s global jihad are not as symbiotic as often portrayed in a large section of the western media. Bin Laden was able to use Afghanistan as well as his Taliban hosts to consolidate his movement and also launch attacks which eventually brought the Taliban crashing down. Yet through it all, the Taliban has been able to maintain autonomy over their movement as well as ideology, which has been largely confined to Afghanistan. In 2001, it was not the support to the cause of global jihad, but the Pasthunwali code of honour which speaks of safe-guarding guests – and which the Taliban had referred to – that made the Taliban refuse to hand bin Laden over to the US.

‘It has to be emphasised that the Afghan Taliban - apart from a few individuals - have never said and, more importantly, shown in their [actions] that they follow the al-Qaeda strategy of worldwide jihad. Instead, they have concentrated exclusively on Afghanistan and those parts of Pakistan where they have their logistics and fall-back positions,’ says Thomas Ruttig of the Afghan Analysts Network, a non-profit, independent policy research organisation.

Many Afghans share this view. ‘Though the Western media sees the Afghan conflict as an internationally-led one, it is led by the Taliban… The Taliban is an independent movement within Afghan borders,’ says Borhan Younus, a freelance researcher and journalist.

Of course, while the motivations and goals of the Al Qaeda and Taliban are different, no one denies there are links between the two – there are, however, differences on the extent of this relationship. ‘I do not expect that Osama bin Laden’s death will have a large impact on the Afghan war,’ says Ruttig. ‘The war in Afghanistan is not fought with al-Qaida. Even the US military admits that there are only very few al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan. The war is fought with the Taliban who, without doubts, have links with al-Qaida, but are mainly a force of their own. The Taliban are not an al-Qaida affiliate. I doubt that they need al-Qaida fighters, trainers etc; they have their own war experience. The older Taliban generation has been fighting since the 1980s. Even the weight of al-Qaida’s financial role has lost importance for them because they can rely on domestic funding: raising taxes, the drugs trade and the big-money western contracts. I am not sure which of them is bigger.’

Mehbouba Seraj, a political and civil society activist, who contested the last parliamentary election as an independent candidate unsuccessfully, also feels that there are clear links between the two militant organisations. ‘Taliban has nothing to do with the Al Qaeda is a bunch of lies,’ she says.

Interestingly, the Taliban are also reserving their ‘reaction’ to bin Laden’s death. They argue that they have no confirmation of the information, but do not deny the news outright as is often the case in a conflict where a warring faction does not want to lose its psychological advantage. ‘This news is only coming from one side, from Obama's office, and America has not shown any evidence or proof to support this claim,’ says Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid in a statement e-mailed to journalists. ‘The other side: our sources close to Osama bin Laden have neither confirmed nor denied the news. Until there is news from sources close to Osama bin Laden, it will be too early to provide any reaction,’ Mujahid continues.

The reticence observed in the Taliban may have a lot to do with opinions divided within its leadership on how far it should go in claiming bin Laden as one of their own. This ownership reluctance might be the result of the fact that bin Laden does not resound strongly within the Afghan population, the main constituency of the Taliban.

In fact, as a symbolic figure, bin Laden had far more resonance within the US and other western countries. Within Afghanistan, however, speculations on the next al-Qaeda leadership and the time it will take to reach that decision are more pertinent. Fahim Dashty, editor of Kabul Weekly and a former associate of the Northern Alliance who was with Ahmed Shah Masood when he was assassinated two days before the 9/11 attack, agrees. So does Seraj, ‘The al-Qaeda is not one person. This may be a big blow, but it does not mean they will change what they are doing.’

Those who see closer linkages between the two organisations fear retaliation in reaction to bin Laden’s death. ‘They will want to prove themselves’ says Seraj. ‘There will be some repercussions and the main place for that will be Afghanistan.’

‘The disappointment, the loss of credibility will push the al-Qaeda and the Taliban to react strongly. There will be a push to raise the level of violence in Afghanistan as much as they can,’ says Dashty.

Danish Karokhail, the managing director of Pajhwok, Afghanistan’s first independent news agency, feels the revenge attack might be an excuse for the Talibans to step-up violence, which will result in more civilian casualties.

Fear of abandonment
In the next three to five months, a spike in violence is expected for several reasons and it may be difficult to separate whether it related to bin Laden’s death or not. The ‘fighting season’ associated with the ease of movement in summer months has already begun. On 30 April, the Taliban announced the beginning of their ‘spring military operations’ named Badar, a day ahead of the US military operation resulting in bin Laden’s death.

In fact, the timing of the US operation lends itself a great deal of speculation. Obama’s bid for the second term; his domestic travails, including the doubts about his birth certificate; and the quagmire that US troops continue to be mired in in Afghanistan – all lend themselves to theories of a planned timing rather than a sudden discovery. It is not lost on any Afghan that the bin Laden operation came weeks ahead of the scheduled drawdown of US troops in the country, slated to begin in July. The successful operation has, in fact, re-raised fears of abandonment that Afghans have carried within them since the 2001 intervention. These fears are not just the result of past experiences of being used and dropped, as in during the Cold War, but also of the stated strategic goals of the US in their current war against terror.

‘I hope the international community will not abandon Afghanistan saying “mission accomplished”,’ says Shahmahmood Miakhel, chief of party of United States Institute for peace (USIP). Amir Foladi, a political analyst, echoes similar fear: ‘I have concerns that the United States may think that their mission is done and that there is no need to be heavily involved.’

Their concerns are not misplaced. As reported earlier by Himal, the US has been clear about its limited interests in Afghanistan with President Barack Obama saying: ‘From the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.’

So far, debate over the ‘withdrawal’ of US troops has been largely framed in black and white, with one section swearing by the US interest in permanent bases and the other predicting a complete withdrawal of troops. The more likely scenario, however, is a drawdown of some troops in July while will meet the promise Obama made to his domestic audience. The initial reduction in numbers will be followed by more gradual ones and then a switch to non-combat operations, rather than an exodus of all American troops from Afghanistan.

As far as the future role of the US in Afghanistan is concerned, it will most likely be shaped by the former’s complex relationship with Pakistan. This is also where the multiple theories on Pakistan’s role in bin Laden’s capture come in. Was Pakistan complicit in providing safe haven to bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad or was it collaborative in yielding him to the US forces? It is difficult to conceive that the Pakistan’s state apparatus, which is strong as opposed to in Afghanistan, did not have an inkling of the set-up so close to an important military installation. On the other hand, it is also inconceivable that all components of the Pakistani state structure, fragmented as it is between the civilian and the military, were in full knowledge of their most hunted guest. Hamid (name changed on his request), a young and politically aware Afghan working in an international organization, thinks that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies kept bin Laden alive until his survival was no longer useful. That may be closer to the truth than the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ theories currently dominating the debate. It could also help explain a number of seeming contradictions in the Pakistani position, as well as in the even more confusing details given on the US operation. It could be that towards the end of his stay, bin Laden may indeed have been ordered to be a ‘guest’ rather than accorded sanctuary by the Pakistani establishment.

‘[The operation] could not have happened without the cooperation of the Pakistani government,’ Younus says. ‘The timing coincides with Pakistan’s own intent to carry out operations against the Pakistani Taliban, who have very different goals from the Afghan Taliban.’

Speculations on whether the US will now use Pakistan as a proxy in Afghanistan to help itself disengage from an unpopular war are rife. So are opinions on whether Afghanistan is now willing to abandon its former allies in return for a closer relationship with Pakistan. Much depends on the reading of Pakistan’s role regarding bin Laden’s stay and death within its borders. Pakistan has formally denied any knowledge about bin Laden. However, if it is able to demonstrate that it was actually able to track down and control the whereabouts of the terrorist, it might establish its credentials to ‘manage’ the insurgency in Afghanistan. As Ruttig says, ‘After Sunday night's events, it is the link between al-Qaeda and the ISI that needs to be explored, not so much the one between al-Qaeda and the Taliban’.

While conspiracy theorists, analysts, pundits will all have their say in the coming days, the reality will be far more complex and containing too many variable factors for anyone to present and predict a concrete scenario. Judging by their reactions to bin Laden’s death, however, ordinary Afghans seem to have grasped this; for as long as they can remember, their realities have been, and are being, shaped by uncertainties.

Aunohita Mojumdar is a contributing editor (Kabul) to this magazine.

Fear is Constant Companion of Kabul Journalists

2011-10-09T05:12:00.000-07:00

May 3, 2011/ Eurasianet

No Afghan journalist died in direct connection with his or her professional duties in 2010 while reporting on the Islamic insurgency. On the surface, that is welcome news. But media advocates in Afghanistan say the statistic is also cause for concern.

Overall two reporters, both of them foreign, were killed while covering Afghan combat operations in 2010, according to a recent report prepared by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). The decrease in journalist casualties in comparison with recent years was not the result of enhanced security measures for combat reporters, but was a byproduct of heightened cautiousness. “While the war intensified, the number of combat-related media deaths did not rise in proportion, a reflection of cautious coverage tactics,” the CPJ report stated.

In a few, small ways, conditions are improving for Afghan journalists: the number of news outlets in the country is growing, meaning journalists enjoy more employment options; in addition, public appreciation for the value of an independent press is slowly rising. Even so, fear is the constant companion of just about every Afghan journalist. Rather than take risks, many journalists forego reporting. Some succumb to the temptation or rewriting PR releases and passing it off as news.

“Security is the mother of all challenges,” said Farhad Peikar, an Afghan journalist working for an international news agency. “We cannot go everywhere and report.”

In the absence of a safe operating space, journalists increasingly rely on self-censorship. “I think twice before reporting on drug lords or warlords and try to be very cautious, weighing whether my report will put my life in danger,” Peikar said.

Local power brokers and officials often act on their own to stifle unflattering reporting. In the month of March alone, Media Watch, a regular newsletter published by the Afghan media non-governmental organization Nai, documented several instances of harassment and intimidation, including the roughing up of a Kabul-based reporter by traffic police, and illegal “orders” given to a radio station in the Western province of Badghis to stop broadcasting for allegedly insulting President Hamid Karzai. Media Watch also reported on efforts by Karzai administration officials to bring independent media outlets under government control.

In general, Afghan journalists seem to have a prickly relationship with Kabul officials. In particular, many complain about a lack of access. Despite working for an international news agency, Peikar, for example, expressed frustration that Afghan officials prefer talking to Western correspondents than with representatives of local media outlets.

Writing in the February 5 issue of the Killid Weekly magazine, journalists Farukhlaqa Sultani and Gulkohi, who uses only one name, highlighted the issue of Afghan journalists being treated like second-class citizens in their own country. “News and information about Afghanistan often [first] appear in the mainstream Western media and then get translated by the Afghan media,” they wrote. Afghan officials like to be quoted in the international media “because they care more about US and NATO governments and Western public opinion than the Afghan public.”

“The international media are more influential and can change policies. Why should they [government officials] talk to local journalists?” one Afghan journalist remarked cynically. Speaking on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak for his international news organization, the journalist alleged that bias began at the top -- in President Karzai’s office.

“Though I am known very well to them and work for a recognized media organization, the president’s office refuses to even put me on their mailing list, let alone invite me for press conferences,” said the journalist. “They think I am not a friendly journalist because I am critical.”

Meanwhile, representatives of Killid, which also operates a well-established radio network, say they have tried for several years to obtain an interview with Karzai. Their efforts have not been successful, even though the president regularly finds time to sit down with international outlets.

Elsewhere, in connection with World Press Freedom Day on May 3 the democratization watchdog organization Freedom House released its annual Freedom of the Press 2011 survey. There were no surprises concerning countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Georgia was the only Caucasus country in which the media environment was rated as “partially free.” Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were rated as “not free.” All five formerly Soviet Central Asian states also received “not free” media designations. Only North Korea ranked lower than Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Freedom House’s media survey.

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

Osama dead: Afghans see it as another chapter in conflict

2011-10-09T05:04:00.000-07:00

May 3, 2011/Economic Times

It was the explosion of sms messages and phone calls that alerted many Afghans across Kabul city that Osama bin Laden, the man who had made Afghanistan coterminous with the centre of global terrorism, was dead.

But here in Afghanistan, the response to his death was not the visceral show of emotion that was evident among Americans gathering spontaneously outside the White House and on Ground Zero. In Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan, Afghans reacted more analytically, pondering the impact of the death and seeing it as yet another chapter in their endless conflict rather than as a closure.

While Afghans seem divided between hope and concerns for the future, they were united in their assertion that the operation had provided proof of what they had been saying for several years -- that the centre of terrorism was not in their country, but in neighbouring Pakistan.

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The sentiment was articulated most clearly by Afghan President Hamid Karzai who said: "The world should realise, as we said many, many times, and continue to say every day, the fight against terrorism is not in Afghanistan's villages, the fight against terrorism is not in the houses of poor and oppressed Afghans, the fight is not in bombing women and children. The fight against terrorism is in its sanctuaries, in its training camps and its finance centres, not in Afghanistan, and today it has been proved we were right."

Karzai was tapping into a widespread feeling echoed by a cross-section of society. "Afghans are sure that they have been targeted without any reason while the centre of Al Qaeda has been based in Islamabad," said Danish Karokhail, the managing director of Afghanistan's first multilingual independent news agency, Pajhwok. "Why have we lost so many Afghan lives in the last few years? It is better that the international community focus on the real place now."

"It should help Obama and NATO realign their strategy," said Halim Fidai, the Governor of the province of Logar, which has seen an escalation of violence over the past two years. "They should focus and expedite their efforts to disrupt leadership of the terrorist cells."

Karzai also called on the Taliban to "learn from what happened yesterday and stop fighting". While the Taliban had not reacted to the event at the time this went to press, there was a widespread feeling that the successful operation would help anti-insurgency operation by denting the Taliban's feeling of invincibility.

Although US President Barack Obama expressed appreciation for the help from Pakistani counterparts, Afghans were not forthcoming with praise. "If they had known there would be an operation, they would have helped him escape," said Fahim Dashty, the editor of Kabul Weekly, who had been with Ahmed Shah Masood, when he was killed by a suicide bomber days ahead of 9/11. Masood played a leading role in driving the Soviet army out of Afghanistan and was also at the forefront of the battle against the Taliban.

Bin Laden's removal achieves one of the strategic goals of the US, something that has left many Afghans with a sense of foreboding. "I hope the international community will not abandon Afghanistan saying 'mission accomplished' and leave behind an unstable government," said Shahmahmood Miakhel, the chief of party for the United States Institute for Peace.

(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist based in Kabul)

Osama’s Death Stirs Uncertainty and Apprehension in Kabul

2011-10-09T04:58:00.000-07:00

May 2, 2011/Eurasianet

There were no scenes of spontaneous celebrations in Kabul on May 2, as news of the death of terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden spread among residents of the Afghan capital. Rather than fostering feelings of vindication or satisfaction, bin Laden’s demise filled many Afghans with a sense of unease, amid a sprinkling of conspiracy theories.

Afghans had lots of questions relating to the sudden turn of events for which there are no immediate answers: Will bin Laden’s death provide the US military with cover to accelerate the pace of its withdrawal from Afghanistan? Will the international community turn away from the nation once more, as it did after Soviet forces withdrew in 1989? And will al Qaeda retaliate?

“I don’t know what I feel,” said Ahmed, a young waiter at a glitzy Kabul restaurant frequented by internationals and well-heeled Afghans. “What do you think about it? Is it good or bad?”

President Hamid Karzai responded quickly to US President Barack Obama’s late-night May 1 announcement that American special forces had killed bin Laden during a raid on his compound, located not far from the Pakistani capital Islamabad. News agencies quoted the Afghan president as urging the Taliban to talk with his government: “We call on Taliban to learn from what happened yesterday and stop fighting.”

Karzai also used the occasion to trumpet that terrorism is centered across the border inside Pakistan, a case that his government has been making for years. “The world should realize as we said many, many times, and continue to say every day, the fight against terrorism is not in Afghanistan’s villages, the fight against terrorism is not in the houses of poor and oppressed Afghans, the fight is not in bombing women and children,” Karzai was quoted as saying by The New York Times. “The fight against terrorism is in its sanctuaries, in its training camps and its finance centers, not in Afghanistan and today it has been proved we were right.”

Among Afghan analysts, the sentiments expressed by Karzai are widely shared. Bin Laden’s death in Pakistan offers “proof that most of al Qaeda’s senior leadership is not in Afghanistan,” said Shahmahmood Miakhel, the chief of party for the United States Institute for Peace. “Hopefully Afghanistan’s neighbors, with the help of the international community, will cooperate to weed out the root causes of terrorism from Afghanistan, the region and the world.”

Miakhel was among several analysts in Kabul who expressed concern that bin Laden’s death would cause Afghanistan to take an undesirable turn – at least from the Afghan perspective. Specifically, Miakhel wondered if the news on bin Laden was a prelude to abandonment by the United States. “I hope the international community will not abandon Afghanistan, saying ‘mission accomplished’ and leave behind an unstable government,” Miakhel told EurasiaNet.org.

Political analyst Amir Foladi echoed that concern. Bin Laden’s death “demonstrates that no one can hide for the rest of their lives to escape their misdeeds. It is a lesson for the Taliban. At the same time, this should not be seen as game over. I have concerns that the United States may think their mission is done and there is no need to be heavily involved. The al Qaeda network is not dead,” he said.

Observers were split over how the death of the al Qaeda leader might influence the Taliban’s insurgency. “This may be a big, big blow, but it does not mean they will change what they do,” said civil society activist Mehbouba Seraj, referring to the Taliban. “They may step up efforts to prove themselves and the main place they will do that will be in Afghanistan. I am really concerned that they [the Taliban] will step up their attacks.”

While accepting the notion that the death of bin Laden might damage the Taliban’s image, Borhan Younus, a researcher and writer, emphasized that the Taliban, unlike al Qaeda, is a national movement. Thus, bin Laden’s death does not stand to alter significantly the Taliban strategy in Afghanistan. “Al Qaeda has global ambitions, the Taliban is an independent movement within Afghanistan’s borders. It is only using land and sanctuary [inside Pakistan] for their own fight,” Younus told EurasiaNet.org.

Many Kabul observers questioned the timing of the operation to kill bin Laden, noting the United States is set to start its drawdown in a matter of weeks, in July. “I don’t believe in coincidences. I think there was a link between the recent changes in the US leadership in Afghanistan,” said Seraj, referring to the April 28 announcement of the appointment of a new US ambassador and a new general in charge of US and NATO troops on the ground.

Younus was blunter: “This has happened at a time when the United States is seeking justification for withdrawing troops. This operation will provide it.”

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

UN Says Political and Humanitarian Concerns Don’t Mix

2011-10-09T04:53:00.000-07:00

April 18, 2011/ Eurasianet

Humanitarian agencies working in Afghanistan have been saying it for years. Now the United Nations is also admitting it: Humanitarian aid workers are facing increasing risks in many conflict zones where assistance is most needed and not much is being done to protect them.

A new report, released on April 12 by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), says the UN has failed to maintain neutrality by playing both a political and a humanitarian role in Afghanistan, a fact that the UN’s political leadership may find an embarrassing admission, and says Taliban militants now see the UN as a legitimate target.

“Due to the dual nature of the UN as both a political actor and a humanitarian actor, UN aid agencies have more difficulty projecting a neutral image than many other humanitarians. The UN’s political role in many of the most-contested environments has placed it squarely in the Western camp, where it is viewed as a legitimate and prominent target (Al Qaeda along with national-level jihadist elements in different countries have named the UN as an enemy target on more than one occasion),” says the report, To Stay and Deliver: Good Practices for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments. “Humanitarian action is under attack, but neither governments, parties to armed conflicts, nor other influential actors are doing enough to come to its relief.”

Certainly, the April 1 attack on a UN compound in Mazar-i Sharif highlights the challenges of operating in Afghanistan’s increasingly dangerous environment. Seven employees died in that assault. The crisis for aid agencies is likely to deepen with the escalation of international military operations and the counterattacks expected ahead of the international forces drawdown, slated to begin this July.

“Compared to 2010 there is a multiplication of military operations by the international military forces or those initiated by the AOG [armed opposition groups],” says Laurent Saillard, director of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid programs in Afghanistan. “It is an extremely hostile environment, politically speaking.”

“Access is a huge challenge for all of us,” says Manohar Shenoy, Oxfam’s Afghanistan country director. “It is becoming more complicated as the insurgency is spreading and for the belligerents it is difficult to distinguish between who is impartial and who is not. The impartial and humanitarian lines have become blurred.”

“In provinces like Kandahar and Helmand, as the fighting intensifies, the space for civil society and non-state actors is decreasing,” Shenoy adds.
The threat to humanitarians is widespread, now impacting organizations that have managed to maintain neutrality even in the eyes of Taliban commanders, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. In a March 15 operational update, the ICRC described the situation as “untenable,” warning that it is relying more on local partners in remote areas.

“People tell us that they are caught in the middle of the conflict and they don’t know which way to turn,” the ICRC’s head of delegation, Reto Stocker, was quoted as saying in the update. “We need to remain close to the people if we are going to be able to do our work.”

“Only half the country is accessible to humanitarian organizations,” said a quarterly report on Afghanistan released by the UN Secretary General in March. “The deteriorating security situation has been hampering safe access to people in need.”

That lack of access is, in turn, hurting the people who need aid the most, wrote Tufts University’s Antonio Donini in the January issue of The Humanitarian Exchange.

“This is particularly true of the UN, whose international staff can only move around in armored vehicles in all but a few more stable areas in the center and north,” Donini writes. “The one-sidedness of aid agencies, real or perceived, is affecting both the reach and the quality of their work. With the exception of the ICRC and a few others, mainstream international agencies, UN and NGO alike, are becoming more risk-averse and loath to rethink the way they work.”

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

Afghanistan: UN Losing PR Battle in Kabul

2011-10-09T04:35:00.000-07:00

April 6, 2011/ Eurasianet

The United Nations is struggling to remain relevant in Afghanistan. At the heart of the UN’s challenge is a growing perception that it has lost the trust and respect of Afghan leaders, as well as considerable segment of the general public.

The UN’s delicate position was highlighted by the April 1 attack against a UN compound in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, an incident that left three UN staffers and four UN security guards dead. In an effort to defuse tension and restore its image among Afghans, UN officials quickly blamed Islamic radicals for the violence. The tragedy was the outgrowth of a mass demonstration against the burning of a Koran by Terry Jones, an extremist pastor in Florida. According to the UN version of events, a small group of militants, numbering no more than 15, infiltrated a mob of about 3,000 and somehow redirected its fury toward the UN compound. In singling out militants for responsibility, the UN apparently wants to downplay the possibility that widespread public anger with the UN played a role in the tragedy. At least four Afghans, in addition to UN personnel, died in the April 1 incident.

Other accounts, including those of eyewitnesses, as well as an article published by The Wall Street Journal, have clashed with the UN version. These accounts suggested that the violence was the product of a spontaneous outburst of anger among protesters, rather than the result of well-targeted action by militants. If accurate, such a view has ominous implication for the future of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Relations are already severely strained with the Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai. If the popular mood also has turned against UNAMA, then its ability to promote Afghanistan’s stabilization would appear to be thoroughly compromised.

Popular frustration with UNAMA has been building steadily in Afghanistan. As a coordinating agency for foreign assistance, including civil-military aid, UNAMA has come to be associated in the public eye with problems, including civilian deaths. At the same time, UNAMA’s lower public profile during the past year is complicating its efforts to reverse the slide of its image.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s disenchantment with the United States is relatively well known, but his dissatisfaction with UNAMA’s role is less documented. Karzai’s main complaint, it seems, is that both the United States and the UN won’t accord the Kabul government a level of freedom of action that he thinks it deserves, even though corruption is rife in Afghanistan, and the government has not demonstrated it can meet the basic needs of the people.

In a March 22 speech that announced the beginning of the security transition that would bring areas under the control of Afghan national security forces -- including, ironically, Mazar-i-Sharif -- Karzai singled out the UN for criticism. “There are numerous UN institutions operating in Afghanistan, of which the government is not aware, and their spending and performance is questionable to us,” Karzai said. “We have begun talks with the UN on this issue and hope the issue could be resolved in the course of this year.”

President Karzai’s remarks came as the UN Security Council extended UNAMA’s mandate, a process that had grown strained after Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul shot off a letter to the UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon calling for a curb on UN activities in Afghanistan. Diplomatic sources described the letter, dated March 1, as written in “language that was not diplomatic at all.” It reportedly listed 10 specific demands for changes in UNAMA’s mission to ensure that its “future mandate should correspond with the principles of Afghan leadership and ownership.”

While some demands merely called on the UN to meet pledges, such as a commitment to support the routing of a greater share of international assistance through the Afghan government, others demanded that the UN curtail its efforts to promote democratization and good governance. Afghan authorities specifically asked the UN not to include mention of electoral reform or sub-national governance in UNAMA’s renewed mandate and to “limit its offices to the six recognized zones throughout the country.” The renewed mandate dropped earlier references to the UN’s leading role in electoral reforms, but it emphasized a need for a stronger UN presence. It also included a concession by agreeing to an Afghan government demand for a comprehensive review of the UN mission in the coming months.

Since the April 1 incident in Mazar, the UN has been careful not to point a finger at Karzai, even as the Afghan president faces international criticism elsewhere for using inflammatory rhetoric that helped spur protests across Afghanistan against the Koran burning episode in Florida.

The source of the Karzai administration’s antipathy for UNAMA seems rooted in the fallout from Afghanistan’s 2009 presidential vote and parliamentary elections the next year, both of which were marred by widespread fraud. UNAMA lent its support to independent electoral bodies that substantiated fraud claims and whose authority later came under attack by various government institutions.

In 2010, UN officials attempted to reinvigorate its relationship with Karzai, installing Staffan de Mistura as UNAMA’s special representative, following the departure of Kai Eide. De Mistura lowered UNAMA’s visibility inside Afghanistan, curbing its contact with the public and reducing its political involvement to concentrate on the delivery of health and education services. Such efforts, however, did not produce the hoped-for results.

In recent months, UNAMA has sought to carve out a role as a neutral mediator in the reconciliation process between the government and Islamic militants. If popular anger, not militant scheming, was behind the Mazar-i-Sharif attack against the UN compound, UNAMA’s mediation aspirations would seem dashed, as it would show that all the major actors in the peace process – the government, the Taliban and the Afghan people – have serious doubts about the organization. Already, the government has emphasized in a letter to the UN secretary-general that UNAMA could play a role in the peace process only “if requested by the Government of Afghanistan.”

Disliked by Karzai’s administration, it seems that UNAMA will have limited influence over Afghanistan’s political course for the foreseeable future. It likewise may encounter growing difficulties in playing a humanitarian role, if it is viewed as a partisan entity in the ongoing conflict.

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul.

Af-Pak-man

2011-05-06T09:44:00.000-07:00

Himal, April 2011

Early in March, Marc Grossman, the newly appointed US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, completed a tour of several countries. Dropping in on Jeddah, Kabul, Islamabad and Brussels, this was his first tour of the countries the US considers crucial to the ‘Af-Pak’ portfolio. This was also Grossman’s first tour since he took over the post left empty by the sudden death of the US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, on 13 December. The most notable public outcome of the visits was a back-and-forth exchange with Pakistani journalists on the issue of Raymond Davis, the US contractor charged with murder in Pakistan and released after paying ‘blood’ money (see accompanying story by Urooj Zia). The other notable aspect during this trip was Grossman’s near-verbatim repetition of policies described earlier by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a recent speech to the Asia Society, during which she announced Grossman’s appointment. Though early days yet, it seems unlikely that the new incumbent, a diplomat brought out of retirement, will be making the waves his predecessor did.

With his forceful personality and penchant for persuasive bullying, Holbrooke grabbed headlines wherever he went. Prior to his appointment, he had been given credit for pushing through the US policy in the Balkans, by getting Slobodan Milosevic on board for the Dayton Accords. In Kabul, however, this headstrong approach proved less helpful. Among the notable contributions Holbrooke made to American relations with the Afghan leadership was his infamous showdown with President Hamid Karzai following the August 2009 presidential elections. The fallout, which is purported to have involved a shouting match, was over Holbrooke’s criticism of the rigging of polling booths by Karzai supporters, and his insistence on the need for a second round of elections to establish credibility. Seen from the Afghan authorities’ point of view, this was nothing short of betrayal; Karzai’s supporters felt the US, which had no compunction in dumping democratic principles whenever it suited them, was using the charade of democracy to weaken him.

Holbrooke was not solely responsible for this state of affairs. But he did exemplify the falling-out between President Karzai and the US administration that had been set in motion even before Barack Obama took office, when, as a visiting senator, the future president expressed doubts on Karzai’s leadership. Afghan leaders are extremely sensitive to perceptions about loss of face and public humiliation. While Holbrooke’s bullying tactics might have worked with weaker bullies such as Milosevic, his handling of the Afghan leadership backfired. Though the US-Karzai relationship recovered to some extent, it never regained the previous warmth. In retrospect, the appointment of Holbrooke to the position was a miscalculation on the part of the Obama administration. The latter should have been forewarned by the fate of British leader Paddy Ashdown (another Balkans hand), whose appointment as a special envoy in Afghanistan was scuppered once tales of his heavy-handed approach preceded his appointment.

Yet even now, in the aftermath of Holbrooke’s death, the Obama administration does not seem to have grasped the need for a more politically sensitive approach. The current US ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, a straight-talking former army general, is known for his dismal opinion of President Karzai, made public through leaked embassy cables as far back as January 2010. In the cables, Eikenberry said that President Karzai ‘is not an adequate strategic partner’ and ‘continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden’. Nonetheless, Eikenberry has been kept in his position, a sensitive post that requires working closely with the Afghan leadership. While tough diplomacy might be thought of as a requirement in Afghanistan, it is through these episodes that the US has lost on the swings what it gains on the roundabouts. Public fallouts have been followed with private capitulation, a fact that many Afghan leaders have caught onto quite quickly. Many Afghan leaders have honed the act of public outrage into a fine art that maximises their own political capital, usually allowing them to extract greater concessions from the US administration.

While Holbrooke’s personal style might have tripped him up in the complex political waters of Afghanistan, it seems unlikely that even his more low-key successor will be able to make much progress. The concept of Af-Pak itself is of nebulous value, and the role of the Af-Pak representative encapsulates much that is wrong with US policy towards the area and the wider region.

Unsound conjunction
Whether weighed in terms of looking for a common approach towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, or a solution to the Afghan conflict, the US approach falls short. Undoubtedly the role and concerns of Pakistan are a major factor in Afghanistan. The role of a section of the Pakistani state in providing support to forces of insurgency, the contiguous areas on the Durand Line where much of the military battle is taking place, and the political entwining of Afghanistan and Pakistan, make it imperative to pay attention to and deal with Pakistan for any future stability in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan, while a dominant player, is not the only one shaping the political canvas of Afghanistan. The complex balance of power in the region – which, apart from Pakistan, includes Iran, the Central Asian states, Russia and India – requires a far more holistic approach than can be encapsulated in the ‘Af-Pak’ strategy of the US.

Beyond describing a geographical region, ‘Af-Pak’ has little coherence as a concept. Insurgent groups operate in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, challenging the authority of the state apparatus in both countries with differing degrees of success, and the use of terror as a tool by many of these groups is also taking a heavy toll on citizens in both countries. However, Pakistan and Afghanistan, with very different sets of political and social factors as well as very different state and governance structures, require almost diametrically opposite approaches – whether militarily or politically.

In Afghanistan, US policy has centred on the ‘transition’, which will allow the US to withdraw troops from active combat and frontlines and disengage with nation-building. But in Pakistan, the problem is one of intrusive US political and military diplomacy. In Afghanistan, the US is attempting to shore up a weak state structure, often by empowering individuals rather than institutions. Pakistan has a strong state structure, with the problem there being one of balance of power, both between the military and the civilian authorities, and between the army and the ISI. The Afghan state currently lacks the ability to deliver governance, whereas in Pakistan the issue is one of priorities set by the state.

The genesis of the term Af-Pak is commonly attributed to Holbrooke himself. Holbrooke, who earlier had ambitions to become the secretary of state under President Obama, settled subsequently for the role of special representative. Soon after he took the office, in 2009, he explained the construct:

First of all, we often call the problem Af-Pak, as in Afghanistan-Pakistan. This is not just an effort to save eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theatre of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located.

The term certainly had its genesis in US politics rather than the politics of the region it encompasses; neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan have had much use for the term, with its reductive connotations. As former President Pervez Musharraf said:

I am totally against the term ‘Af-Pak’. I do not support the word itself for two reasons: First, the strategy puts Pakistan on the same level as Afghanistan. We are not. Afghanistan has no government and the country is completely destabilized. Pakistan is not. Second, and this is much more important, is that there is an Indian element in the whole game.

Holbrooke himself was forced to admit that the term had backfired, describing it first as a ‘bureaucratic shorthand’, and later saying, in January 2010, ‘We can’t use it anymore because it does not please people in Pakistan, for understandable reasons.’ Though the term was officially dropped, ‘bureaucratic shorthand’ continued to inform policy, and the approach of equivalence was not set aside. In December 2010, the Obama administration came out with its ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan annual review.’

The combination of the two countries in a ‘theatre of war’ approach might well be understandable from the point of view of military commanders. But it is difficult to see why it was embraced as a politico-diplomatic concept, not just by the US but by other Western countries and alliances, who also rushed to appoint their own ‘Af-Pak’ envoys. Two years later, it is still difficult to see what the concept has to offer apart from an increasing proclivity for Western troops to cross the border in violation of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. The initial crossings have been followed by unmanned drones, with each trespass followed by token apologies.

The ‘Af-Pak’ approach, however, does allow the US to narrow down its goals to immediate short-term aims: the downgrading of the al-Qaeda threat to the US and its allies, rather than the broader and more long-term aim of regional stability. Although the ‘region’ came up for mention in Hillary Clinton’s speech to the Asia Society, her elaboration of US policy left little doubt as to the narrowness of this vision. In its hurry to ‘transit’ out of Afghanistan, the US is looking for a ‘political settlement’ that will involve bringing some of the insurgent groups into the government, a step the US hopes will ensure that such groups will no longer pose a threat to the US. If there is any regional aspect here, it is to try and ensure that regional powers such as India do not become spoilers in any such settlement.

More of the same
The clubbing together of Afghanistan and Pakistan also has another attribute. It disguises the lack of coherence within the US administration towards Afghanistan – not only politically, but also within the State Department, the Defence Department and the CIA. Within Kabul these differences are clearly visible in the day-to-day operational arena. There is little unity of command or purpose in the US approach, and the US ambassador and the US commander based in Afghanistan have often had divergent approaches in policy. These differences were most sharply articulated during the tenure of General Stanley McChrystal, but have not disappeared since his abrupt departure in June 2010. The direct reporting by Kabul-based US officials to Washington has deprived the US of a focus of American authority in Kabul, and the office of the US special representative is based in Washington, not in either Islamabad or Kabul.

This allows various factions of power within Afghanistan to cultivate their own lines of communication directly with players in Washington. An individual who encapsulates the contradictions of US foreign policy is the brother of President Karzai – Ahmed Wali Karzai, known in US foreign-policy circles as AWK. Long rumoured to have links to the drug mafia – a link denied vehemently by the Afghan government and never substantiated by the US, despite regular reports in the US media – AWK is seen as a problem by the State Department, which wants to cut off links to him. The Defence Department, on the other hand, considers him someone they would rather have on their side than as an opponent, and continues to do business with him. The CIA likewise considers him an asset, and has, according to reports in the US media, kept him on their payrolls. The approach, a Western diplomat points out, is ‘not very different from the confused US approach towards Pakistan, its army and the ISI’. However, while such differences have a limited impact on Pakistan’s functioning and well-entrenched state apparatus, they have a disproportionate impact in Afghanistan, which is both weak and dependent.

Holbrooke himself was neither authorised nor senior enough to overcome these differences in US policy, being better suited to bullying leaders of desperate countries rather than trying to sway US politicos. It is unlikely that his successor will make much headway. Grossman’s last engagement with the Afghanistan-Pakistan region was during the 1970s and 1980s, in his first assignment, as a junior officer in Pakistan. Since then Grossman worked steadily, but not spectacularly, as an American diplomat. As assistant secretary of state for European affairs, from 1997 to 2000 he played a role in the US participation in NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo. He served two tenures in Turkey, the last as ambassador between 1994 and 1997, and held the position of undersecretary of state for political affairs from 2001 till he retired from service in 2005.

Holbrooke’s untimely death presented an opportunity to move beyond the narrow agenda defined by the ‘Af-Pak’ office within the State Department. However, the appointment of Grossman and Clinton’s Asia Society speech show that the narrow approach has been embraced with even greater fervour.

The Risks of Rising Anti-American Feelings in Kabul

2011-05-06T09:37:00.000-07:00

Eurasianet/March 24, 2011

Anti-American sentiment is at record high levels in Afghanistan, a factor that promises to complicate what is already shaping up as a tricky transfer of security responsibilities from Western forces to indigenous military and law-enforcement entities.

Under the existing timeframe, the Afghan government will assume in 2014 primary responsibility for maintaining security in the country. The transfer of authority would involve the withdrawal of the bulk of US troops that are currently fighting to contain the Taliban insurgency. Growing Afghan displeasure with the US military presence means that many are eager for foreign troops to leave. “The people of Afghanistan no longer desire to see others defend their country for them,” Afghan President Hamid Karzai said March 22.

But the unpopularity of US forces could increase the difficulty of preparing Afghan forces to handle security operations after 2014. Foreign analysts widely agree that the Afghan Army and other government security structures are unprepared at this time to take the lead in battling Islamic insurgents. A major risk, given the current dynamic, is that anti-American sentiment can cloud the government’s judgment, leading to a transfer of authority in Kabul that ends up boosting the Taliban’s strategic position.

Karzai’s comments on the public’s perception of US troops came two days after Der Spiegel, a German magazine, published photos allegedly depicting American soldiers posing with the bloodied and naked corpse of an Afghan civilian, killed in what US authorities are investigating as a murder. Though the public’s response to the Der Spiegel photos has been relatively muted, observers fear the possible release of hundreds of other photos could spark a popular backlash.

Most Afghans mention civilian casualties as the major source of their disenchantment. A recent ABC/BBC poll released in December found that, among Afghans, strong support for the presence of US military forces had declined from 30 percent in 2006 to 16 percent in 2010; the number of those strongly opposed to their presence had almost tripled during the same period.

A story recounted by a government official is representative of the experiences of many Afghans, and helps illustrate a major cause of anti-Americanism. The official, in an interview with EurasiaNet.org, said he was traveling through northern Afghanistan with his son, visiting from Europe, who was filming the trip.

An American convoy stopped them. “They said, ‘Give us the f***ing camera. Who sent you?’” the official recalled, speaking on condition of anonymity. “They did not ask what we were doing there, but asked ‘who sent you,’ as if my son needed their permission to be in his own country.” The matter was resolved, but ended on another inappropriate note. “They gave us 500 afghanis [USD 9] as compensation. Were they buying the right to insult?”

Back in late 2001, when an American-led offensive drove the Taliban from power in Kabul, support for US troops among Afghans ran high. Many citizens saw the American presence as a welcome relief from Taliban oppression. They also entertained perhaps unrealistic hopes that American economic muscle would transform their war-ravaged country. The pool of goodwill that once existed, however, has been drained, according to Najib Manalai, a senior advisor in the Ministry of Finance.

“In 2001 and early 2002 there was quite a positive feeling toward Americans,” Manalai said. “But instead of winning hearts and minds, they [US forces] alienated the people through their indiscriminate punishment of the larger population … with blind bombing in certain areas and culturally inappropriate behavior of the ground forces when they came to meet people.”

Many Afghans felt deserted by Americans in the early 1990s, following the end of a decade-long Soviet occupation. Washington had waged what was in effect a proxy war against Moscow in Afghanistan from 1979-89, but as soon as Soviet troops departed the country, US officials lost interest with helping their Afghan allies stabilize the country. Eventually civil warfare erupted, paving the way for the Taliban conquest of much of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.

“The United States left Afghanistan alone after the Soviets. The subsequent problems were a result of the US intervention to bleed the Soviets. We had expected they would help rebuild the country, but we were left alone and factional fighting erupted,” said Akmal Dawi of the Afghan Rights Monitor, a human rights group.

Battlefield actions are not the sole source of Afghan resentment for foreign troops. The United States, prior to the arrival of US forces, was viewed by many, perhaps looking through an idealized prism, as a beacon of stability, justice and prosperity. The reality of the last 10 years has prompted some to grow embittered by what they see as American moral ambiguity. An Afghan working at an international organization, who asked to be called Mariam for fear of losing her job, summed up her feelings this way: “They came in 2001 promising to bring us democracy, and they will go out with negotiations with the Taliban, and after providing millions of dollars to the warlords. … If the Taliban or warlords cut off the ears of girls, they [the Americans] say, ‘it is not my business.’”

Other Afghans say Washington lacks willingness or the understanding to work effectively with Afghans. “They have the world’s biggest institutions for civil diplomacy, but they don’t use the human to human resources,” said Dawi. Contact for the most part “is only between Karzai and the White House or military to military.”

“The United States never tried to understand us,” added Manalai, the Finance Ministry official. “They have played the kind of politics which cannot work in Asia.”

The hasty exit strategy

2011-05-06T09:26:00.001-07:00

Himal/ February 2011
If only you could take the Afghans out of the equation, you might be able to rebuild their country’ – or at least so goes the black humour within a small section of the international community, the long-term residents who have watched with frustration as the country has moved from international-backed plan to plan, proffering new panaceas with seasonal regularity as the situation deteriorates. With each year deemed more critical than the last, the only underlying strand unifying these ‘solutions’ has been a singular absence of the Afghan citizen from the centrality of plans, projects and policies. Like collateral damage, the euphemism used to describe the death of civilians in military operations, Afghan citizens have been corollary to the rebuilding of their country. Unless their interests are allowed to take centre stage, no plan or policy is likely to make a substantive difference, even though other interest groups, including the donor countries or the powerful political elite of Afghanistan, might achieve their short-term or even long-term goals.

Although there is widespread agreement that Afghanistan is a complex country with complicated problems, solutions adopted have usually lacked the necessary sophistication, being reduced to one-dimensional aims. Despite its shortcomings, the 2001 Bonn process spelt out the components of a modern state, implementation of which could have done much to stabilise the country. However the timetable set for its completion was unrealistic, with emphasis on achieving the form rather than the substance of the agreement. While this allowed the international community to claim success in completing its blueprint by 2005, it left Afghans with a Constitution riddled with contradictions and a lack of clarity on the delegation of administrative and political authority, both of which have repeatedly come back to haunt the polity.

Since then, the situation has followed a downward spiral, with the international community adopting and discarding a succession of diagnoses and treatments, each centred on the one big idea that would provide the key. Corruption, President Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, Indo-Pakistani relations have, by turns, all figured as the bogey. Even democracy has begun to be seriously considered in this light – the ‘Afghanistan is not Switzerland’ theme. The accompanying solutions have, however, suffered from a remarkable lack of accountability to the Afghan citizen.

No accountability
The current buzzword is ‘Afghanisation’. This goal sounds both noble and progressive, constituting the handing over of control of decision-making to Afghans, thus strengthening their sovereign status. Yet, the institutions and processes put in place since 2001 have been contrary to the aims of establishing a responsive government and representative polity. Despite the obvious difficulties of creating a strong, centralised state in a country characterised by regional autonomy and the dysfunction of three decades of conflict, the most centralised form of government was chosen. Dominant interests of the Western coalition ensured that the Constitution, rather than reflecting the country’s decentralised polity and pluralistic social fabric, centralised all political and executive authority in the president. Having a one-man show made it easier for many of the donor countries to deal with Afghanistan, but it denied representative and participatory decision-making to Afghans.

While Afghanistan has been called an electoral democracy, political parties were banned from elections under an electoral law that prevents political consolidation through a complex system of multi-seat single-constituency voting (see Himal March 2010, ‘Tattered parachute’). Afghans therefore have neither the advantages of a strong authoritarian government nor the benefits of a political democracy.

Even the limited accountability to the people that might have been possible under this system has been further diluted by denying elected bodies a clear role and authority. The Parliament, the strongest of the country’s elected bodies, uses its leverage to play the spoiler, but is prevented from playing a more positive role in shaping governance in the partyless system. Provincial representatives, meanwhile, although also elected, have almost no role or power, with the provincial governments run by governors answerable only to the president. Even the governors themselves lack power, and moves at introducing effective sub-national governance have yielded little. District-level elections, mandated by the Constitution, have not been held.

While there is a strong body of opinion that feels a Westminster-style democracy might be more suited to Afghanistan, there is scope for much greater political and administrative accountability even within existing provisions. At a time when the armed opposition is being wooed to lay down arms and join the mainstream, it is imperative that ordinary Afghans are also provided the means to participate in governance if their loyalties to the pro-government forces are to be retained. Channels also have to be created to address citizens’ grievances, if they are not to be further alienated.

A critical aspect is the conflict of interest of the Afghan leadership. A significant section of influential Afghans benefit directly from the spoils of war, as the international community pays them for providing militias, land for military bases, goods and services for those bases, all at hugely inflated prices. Whatever the reasons for this, the operational practices of the international community have created a divide between the interests of the Afghan population and a significant section of its leaders, who stand to lose personally and monetarily if peace were to arrive.

Good to go
The disjunction between the concerns of Afghans and those of the Western compact was highlighted starkly in the December 2010 review of US strategy in Afghanistan. The review drew exceedingly positive conclusions of the US security strategy, claiming ‘notable operational gains’, ‘progress across all three assessed areas of al-Qa’ida, Pakistan and Afghanistan’ and ‘significant progress in disrupting and dismantling the Pakistan-based leadership and cadre of al-Qa’ida over the past year’. It also claimed that the security forces had ‘reduced overall Taliban influence and arrested the momentum they had achieved in recent years in key parts’ of Afghanistan. The glowing report card was presented even as civilian casualties increased sharply amidst a general rise in violence, increasing restrictions on the movement of the international community within Afghanistan and an increased threat level faced by the diplomatic community, even in relatively safe Kabul.

Photo credit: Marcin Bondarowicz

The contradictions between the US claims and ground realities are reconcilable, however, if one looks at the divergent goals between the US and the Afghan people. Speaking of the review, President Barrack Obama said, ‘From the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.’

The Western coalition and the troop-contributing countries see themselves as answerable to their own populations – not to Afghans. As early as 2001, the US, reflecting ‘a desire by the American people to not seek only revenge, but to win a war against barbaric behaviour’, in the words of President George W Bush, prevented the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandated by the UN; and co-opted key militia commanders by equipping them in the pursuit of extremists turning a blind eye to their human-rights record and their terrorisation and brutality towards the local population. ISAF itself came under NATO command, later changed to US-led NATO command, and the cooption of militia leaders was carried on by several other Western countries with donor countries providing arms and money to specific commanders in the area, both in Kabul and, more specifically, in areas where their troops are based. By engaging with these commanders, they have also provided them with a degree of political legitimacy they might otherwise lack.

Receiving their wherewithal directly from the Western coalition, these militia commanders have remained unaccountable to the local population. They have also manipulated the considerable firepower of the Western military forces to target their political enemies and settle local rivalries, consolidating control in a situation of political flux. The international community did not deploy troops for the essential task of peacekeeping, and the strengthening of the Afghan army and police was neglected. All the while, the Afghan population was asked to support the Karzai government and its allies, and left at the mercy of insurgents, criminal networks and the drug mafia.

Civilian casualties caused by international forces and the response to them provide a clear example of the divergence of interests and the lack of accountability to the Afghan population. While the Afghan government has been paying solatia, or compensation, to civilians killed by the international forces, it lacks the authority to pursue action, either criminal or disciplinary, against the foreign military personnel. This task has been left to the discretion of the troop-contributing country. Instances of disciplinary action are rare and the civilian casualty figures acknowledged by the international forces remain consistently lower than those compiled by the UN. Most civilian casualties take place either due to lack of information or due diligence, but the numbers have almost certainly escalated because of the lack of punitive action.

Transition to what?
In seeking to hand over the responsibility of security to the Afghan security forces, the foremost concern of the Western coalition has been a timetable for pullout of troops to present to their own domestic public, rather than an appraisal based on the security for Afghans (see Himal December 2010, ‘Afghanistan: Too much, too little’). But how convinced is the Western coalition that Afghans are actually ready to begin the transition, now mandated to begin in early 2011?

In answer, panic followed the Karzai government’s decision to put a halt to the operations of private security companies in Afghanistan in October last year. The Western countries, most of whom use such companies, went into a frenzy, and private companies executing their projects said they would vote with their feet if the private security companies were shut down – a threat that most donor governments found both credible and justified. As recently as early January, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was asking President Karzai to increase the number of personnel in the private security companies. Yet the preparedness of the Afghan forces is nonetheless deemed sufficient to begin taking over the security of the country.

To ensure this ‘preparedness’ the international coalition has adopted two policies that are likely to further weaken the security apparatus of the Afghan state and endanger its citizens. The Afghan forces are now being built up at a rapid rate, with the emphasis on churning out numbers rather than ensuring quality of training and command structures. It is clear that an army and police force created in this manner will prove to be more of a threat than a panacea. In addition, since the numbers of personnel still remain below what is seen as required, the international forces are setting up community militias and arming communities. Needless, to say, these are two measures that have proven detrimental in Afghanistan, not just in the distant past but over the past three years, as communities fight each other and militias prey on the
general population.

Until the ‘security transition’ is recast as a transition from the goals of foreign troop-contributing countries to the concerns of the Afghan population, the rising tide of insecurity is unlikely to be reversed.

Donor-drive
The use of international aid to rebuild Afghanistan remains the most glaring example of a policy that is driven by the needs of donors rather than that of the Afghan population. An example of this is the underfunded ‘urgent humanitarian appeal’ launched by the UN for the past three years. Though the international community spends billions of dollars in Afghanistan each year, the humanitarian appeal identifying the most urgent requirements goes underfunded though it amounts to far less (USD 666 million in 2009, USD 775 million in 2010 and USD 678 million in 2011). This is because the bulk of aid continues to be spent bilaterally by donors following political and military objectives (see Himal August 2010, ‘Conferences, calendars and caveats’).

Major donors route their aid to the areas where their troops are based, and to sectors on which they would like to focus. Some, such as the US, make sure that a considerable portion of this money returns to American corporations. The commonly acknowledged rate of money returning back to the Western donor is between 40 and 50 percent. Beneficiary citizens ultimately receive a fraction of the original amount, with the rest going to overheads at each level of the sub-contracting process. The money leaks out in inflated salaries as well as inflated costs. The sub-contracting culture also means that the money reaches the final implementer very late, due to delays at each stage of the contracting process. Based on the donor’s annual budgetary cycle, the money is then required to be spent quickly, resulting in projects executed in a hurry, often shoddily.

Most donor countries have a system of accountability, but again, they answer to their own governments and elected representatives, not the Afghan beneficiaries. There are almost no mechanisms that allows the beneficiaries to have a say in aid projects, or how they are executed. The sight of private contractors executing projects while using hired guns to keep the ‘beneficiary population’ at bay is a common sight in Afghanistan. The system ensures that information about failed projects or misappropriation of money comes through only intermittently. Instances of companies being penalised because of complaints of beneficiaries, whether for badly constructed school buildings or inoperable water canal project are unheard of.

In fact, establishing accountability is not that hard, even within the existing remit. For example, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), an Afghan civil-society organisation, started a project in 2007 that empowers local communities to monitor projects being executed in their name with donor or government money. The community selects trustworthy members who are trained in the task of monitoring, to ensure there are no compromises in the quality of the projects. IWA also enabled the local monitor groups to go up the chain of contractors, to obtain information from the donor as necessary. The popularity of the process is evident from the growing demands on IWA to train communities throughout the country. Nevertheless, such initiatives are rare and receive inadequate support from the donors.

Peace before justice
The absence of the Afghan citizen is most starkly evident in the current mantra of ‘reconciliation’. As the Western coalition seeks to exit, it is compromising on the small political, civil, democratic and human-rights gains made by and for the Afghan population since 2001. While rhetorical homage is being paid to the Constitution and the so-called ‘red lines’ that will prevent compromise on the most fundamental of rights for the Afghan people, the actual rollback of these rights is taking place even now on the international community’s watch.

In 2005, for example, the international community, led by the UN, had extended robust support to a Transitional Justice Action Plan. It focused on prosecution for war crimes, reparation for losses, and acknowledgement of the suffering of victims as a means of reconciling citizens and bringing a sense of closure to the past. In 2007, the international community opposed the adoption of a law that sought to provide blanket amnesty to all participants in the conflict, pointing out that the law was against the principles of justice and human rights and violated international humanitarian principles. In 2010, however, with the focus shifting to reconciliation with the armed opposition, the concerns of citizens received short shrift. The amnesty law has indeed been adopted by Kabul, with scarcely a murmur from the international community. In fact, the UN itself has put peace before transitional justice, not only delinking peace and justice but also suggesting that the two were mutually exclusive in the current context.

Meanwhile, there is escalating violence against women, reversing the trend of the initial post-Taliban years. Opinion surveys show support for women’s work outside the home has dropped, as has support for women in Parliament. The parliamentary elections of 2010 – which dragged on messily for over four months - demonstrated the international community's changing posture. In the name of ‘Afghanisation’ of the electoral process, the international community decided to step back from its stated goal of strengthening the electoral institutions and processes. Though at the time Himal went to press a resolution under international pressure looked likely, it was not before the democratic process had been put through the wringer, setting a bad precedent for the future. To stem this deterioration, the international community needs to do more to support the efforts of Afghan civil-society organisations, which have been voicing demands for a spectrum of rights – rights that are being marginalised in the hasty exit strategy.

Rather than treating human rights and democracy as inconvenient principles that need to be shelved or circumvented in the short term, the international community needs to look at the country’s long-term stability by supporting policies that would reflect the country’s complex and pluralistic social and political fabric, and by strengthening democracy, rule of law, justice and an inclusive polity. By proffering ‘Afghanisation’ as the reason for not playing its part, the international community is being disingenuous. For better or worse, it is international aid money that is the current dominant determinant in Afghanistan. By picking and choosing individuals, institutions and forces it wants to fund, it is the international community that shapes the Afghanistan of today – and moulds the Afghanistan of tomorrow.

Karzai visits Moscow as Russia eyes greater role in Afghanistan

2011-05-06T09:18:00.000-07:00

Christian Science Monitor/January 21, 2011

President Hamid Karzai is in Moscow this week for the first bilateral summit between the two countries in two decades. The last Afghan president to visit Moscow on a state visit was Mohammad Najibullah, the final Soviet-backed president during whose term in office the Soviet Union withdrew forces.
The Soviet Union disintegrated soon after. Russia then kept a safe distance from involvement in the messy politics of Afghanistan, although it kept a watchful eye on the country.
Now, Russia is keen to play an increasingly larger role in the country and is gradually expanding the range and intensity of its engagement.
During Karzai's Moscow visit, Afghanistan and Russia are likely to sign agreements on political, social, economic, and defense cooperation initiatives, including the possible revival of some key infrastructure projects that had been implemented by the Soviet Union. Russia is keen not to only provide aid and training to Afghans, but to secure a piece of the aid pie for its businessmen in exchange for technical expertise.
Rehabilitation of the Salang tunnel, the main artery connecting northern Afghanistan to the south, for example, could be done with Russian expertise and international aid, say Russian officials.
Russia sees opportunity
Last year, the Russian government donated 20,000 AK-47 rifles to the Afghan government and trained some 250 Afghan police. This year it hopes to deepen its involvement and expand the number of military officers it trains in Moscow, says Andrey Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan.
“The general situation during the past year has not developed in the way I could call safe and secure," he told the Monitor in an interview at the new Russian embassy in Kabul. "We now see constant fighting in the north, which worries us a lot because it is almost on our borders, [and] since our borders with the central Asian republics are absolutely open"
Two main threats emanating from Afghanistan are drugs and terrorism, and it's clear, he says, that they must be dealt at least at the Afghan border. "We are willing to support [Afghanistan] in any possible way, except direct military involvement in Afghanistan. No Russian soldier will ever be on Afghan soil."
Making the increased role of Russia possible
Russia has shed its concern about the presence of NATO and US troops in its backyard, and sees the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan as a top priority. It also now sees an opportunity to maximize its leverage with the US and NATO by using its influence on Central Asian countries.

Fahim Dashty, the editor of Kabul Weekly, points out that NATO itself changed its tune on a Russian role in Afghanistan because of its “need for a northern route into Afghanistan and the growing threat of the Taliban in the north.” The southern supply route of NATO that runs through Pakistan has been severely compromised by the growing number of attacks by insurgent and criminal groups. If NATO were to fail in Afghanistan, it would cost both Russia and NATO, he said.
“Military assistance from Russia will be welcome,” says Mr. Dashty, a former close associate of Ahmed Shah Masood, who led the armed resistance against the Soviet troops.
“The goals of the Russian Federation are quite different from that of the Soviet Union,” he says, although he was quick to reject the possibility of any Russian troops on Afghan soil.
A recent joint counternarcotics raid with Russian counternarcotics officials highlighted both the possibilities as well as limitation of a Russian role.
The raid last fall led to the recovery of a large quantity of heroin, but was criticized by President Karzai, who lashed out at Russian interference. Observers say Karzai was possibly preempting any political fallout.
However, senior government official and political analyst Najib Manalai says that while “there was a strong response from the government, there was no apparent reaction from the public. There have been many changes since the departure of the Russians. The emotional baggage of the past has been swept away by the misdeeds of the mujahideen.”
While Karzai’s anger was in keeping with his frequent outbursts against the international community, the subsequent conciliatory overtures were unusual.
Less than a week later, Karzai called Russian President Medvedev, and the two emphasized Russia’s role in Afghanistan including counternarcotics cooperation. As Western powers ready themselves for an exit, “the relationship with Russia is going to be key in the future,” says Candace Rondeaux of the International Crisis Group.

Moscow Wants to Supply More Arms to Kabul -- Russian Envoy

2011-05-06T09:14:00.000-07:00

Eurasianet/January 20, 2011

A EurasiaNet Q&A with Russian Ambassador Andrey Avetisyan

Afghan President Hamid Karzai is in Moscow for a two-day official visit that underscores the Kremlin’s growing political role in Afghanistan. The visit, which began January 20, also coincides with a deepening constitutional crisis inside Afghanistan, stemming from a dispute concerning the legitimacy of parliamentary elections [6] in 2010. While drugs [7] and terrorism top Russia’s agenda for Karzai’s visit, Russian Ambassador Andrey Avetisyan tells EurasiaNet.org in Kabul that Moscow would also like to benefit from a share in the defense pie as a commercial supplier.

EurasiaNet: Can you frame for us your concerns about the current situation in Afghanistan?

Avetisyan: We see constant fighting in the north, which worries us a lot. It is almost on our borders because you know we do not have proper borders with the Central Asian republics; they are absolutely open. Two main threats to Russia emanating from Afghanistan are drugs and terrorism. They must be dealt with here, or at least at the northern border of Afghanistan. So we try to encourage a regional approach to the Afghan issue including the Central Asian republics, which, like Russia, are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization [8].

The regional approach is something that is badly needed for the Afghan settlement. We know better than anybody how needed and how important peace in the region is, … but national reconciliation is the only way out of this. The international community’s role must be to support them [the Afghan parties to the conflict], not to find solutions for them, not to impose our visions of western democracy.
EurasiaNet: In what way are you prepared to support them?

Avetisyan: In any possible way, except through direct military involvement in Afghanistan. No Russian soldiers will ever [again] be on Afghan soil. Apart from that, everything is possible and we are doing many things already, for example, cooperating against drugs. There are plans for multilateral cooperation in this sphere.
EurasiaNet: Are you happy with the counter-narcotics policy being followed by the United States and NATO?

Avetisyan: With NATO and the United States we only have differences on eradication. … We are in favor of physical eradication like Afghan police do now. We are discussing the possibility of supplying the Afghan side with tractors and other means. We are absolutely not in favor of aerial spraying. We understand that this is a way of living for Afghan peasants. Even if we encourage and support eradication, we must substitute it with something.

We are absolutely certain that terrorism and drugs are inseparable. You fight drugs, you fight terrorism. You cannot fight terrorism without fighting drugs because that’s how they get their money.

EurasiaNet: Is the current military strategy employed by NATO and the Afghan government comprehensive enough?
Avetisyan: This war can’t be won. Everyone understands that now. I think the focus must be on training the Afghan national security forces -- serious training. It is not happening yet. Short-term training is not enough. To train a decent officer takes several years -- three, four or five years. Military academies must be set up here and military officers must be sent abroad for training. We have started with the police. We took 225 police officers to Russia [in 2010] in addition to running special courses for several hundred counter-narcotics police.

Apart from training, the strengthening of the national security forces includes ammunition, weapons, and all things necessary for an army to fight, so we support the approach of President Karzai when he asks allies to provide the army with real fighting capability. We recently supplied the Ministry of Interior with 20,000 AK-47 rifles. We are also discussing the possibility of providing the Afghan army and police with transport helicopters. If the Afghan army or police have other needs, we will consider it.
EurasiaNet: Are you also keen to sell your defense equipment to Afghanistan?

Avetisyan: Yes, of course we are, because we are a big producer, and at some point it will be on a commercial basis. In Lisbon [at a NATO meeting in November], there was an agreement with NATO to set up a trust fund to service and maintain Russian helicopters and to train technicians. We are in discussions on the purchase of Russian equipment [for the Afghan army] with members of the [NATO] coalition.

Donor Funding Missing Mark

2011-05-06T09:08:00.000-07:00

Eurasianet/December 28, 2010

Aid workers in Afghanistan say the expanding scope of the Islamic radical insurgency is fueling a humanitarian crisis. Emergency aid agencies say they need several hundred million dollars to address the threat of widespread hunger. But foreign donors who have troops in Afghanistan are reluctant to admit the situation continues to deteriorate, aid workers complain, leaving the humanitarian needs consistently under-funded.

Half of Afghan children less than five years old are underweight and 16.7 percent face acute malnutrition, according to the United Nations' new Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan. Approximately 7.8 million of the country's 26 million -- or more than a quarter of the population -- will need food assistance in 2011.

After donors funded last year's annual appeal by only 66 percent, the UN has been more specific and restrained in its request, despite the increasing need. The appeal, launched on December 5, is for $678 million, nearly $100 million less than last year, even though it records Afghanistan's "dramatic increase in humanitarian need for its chronically vulnerable rural population."

"We have a more specific focus on life-saving activities that are critically important," David Del Conte, the Senior Field Coordinator for the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan, told EurasiaNet.org. "Afghanistan has gone through so much suffering. We are trying to ameliorate and prevent loss of life and loss of livelihood and meet the most basic needs."

By focusing on the purely humanitarian needs, the Consolidated Appeal hopes to foster a better response from donors. "This is a more effective marketing tool," said Resident Humanitarian Coordinator Robert Watkins, the UN's Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan.

The appeal is the largest worldwide. Yet, compared to the amount of development money poured into Afghanistan by donors annually, the humanitarian aid request "is peanuts," admitted Watkins.

While, in principle, humanitarian aid must be delivered in a neutral and impartial manner to anyone who needs it -- including combatants -- development aid in Afghanistan is largely tied to political and military objectives such as strengthening the Afghan government. Development aid is also delivered in large part by private commercial contractors or through the international military forces' provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Non-governmental organization (NGO) activists have long complained that humanitarian aid is being neglected because donors are unable to use it to score political points.

"The US government alone spends around $4.4 billion annually" on development, estimates a senior UN official. Donors are unwilling to provide consolidated figures but "the international community spends between $6-$8 billion annually" on development and security for development projects, said the official on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of criticizing the donors.

The lack of interest in funding humanitarian aid is also political, says Farhana Faruqi-Stocker, the managing director of Afghanaid, an NGO that works with rural communities. "It is difficult for donors who have spent billions in aid in Afghanistan to admit to their domestic public that the situation in Afghanistan is going from bad to worse, that the basic indicators of human security and well-being are getting worse in large parts of the country."

A recent paper by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit points out that while the 2008 Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) paid "considerable attention to the goal of poverty reduction," the topic had slipped off the agenda at donor conferences this year. "Reconciliation, reintegration and anti-corruption" measures took precedence. Development projects focusing on the economy emphasized job creation rather than poverty reduction, the AREU report notes.

The dire humanitarian predictions contradict donor and military claims that they are making the security, governance and development gains necessary to allow them to exit Afghanistan. The UN estimates that 177,169 people have been displaced due to conflict this year. 400,000 children are at risk of losing access to regular education. The food security situation is likely to worsen during the lean winter season, December to April, the Consolidated Appeal predicts, adding that the "number of people lacking the minimum daily kilocalorie intake has steadily increased since 2005."

The humanitarian and security situations are linked, a recent investigative report in Kabul's weekly Killid magazine illustrated. The unemployed appear to be joining the Taliban out of pure economic necessity. One youth who had joined the Taliban said, "I was fed up with being jobless. People despised me. I couldn't find any work so I had to pick up a weapon to fight the government. I had to join the Taliban as a last resort. Now that I have a weapon, I have both work and food."

In the "most likely scenario," the UN's appeal predicts "increased conflict leading to a deterioration of security, displacements and expansion of conflict to currently stable areas. That situation would hamper development progress and increase the demand for humanitarian interventions." The displaced will have less access to aid, moreover, as the increasing conflict makes it progressively more difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach affected areas.

Any residual hope for Afghanistan has faded into an emergency, it seems.

"Over the past three years we have seen an increase in violence and a number of natural disasters. Now the needs are growing ... compounding the impact of chronic needs and increasing the vulnerable population," said OCHA's Del Conte.

Mothers – the hidden addicts of Afghanistan

2011-05-06T08:57:00.000-07:00

The Independent/December 12,2010

Mariana lies on her bed in the Sanga Amaj clinic in Kabul. She shares a small ward with 12 women enrolled in the clinic's 45-day residential drug rehabilitation programme. At 22, she is five months pregnant with her fourth child. Her one-year-old son lies in a separate room of the clinic. He is also addicted to opium.

Mariana is one of an estimated one million Afghan adults addicted to illegal drugs, according to the latest survey from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). At 8 per cent of the adult population, this is twice the global average. Mariana's opium dependence was not a result of recreational experimentation. She is one of the estimated thousands of Afghan women dependent on the outlawed and highly addictive painkiller because they cannot access medicines or medical help. In Mariana's case, it started four years ago after she gave birth. "During the birth of my first child I lost a lot of blood. There was no doctor. After that I had a lot of pain in my legs and my back, but we couldn't afford medicines," she says.

Opium paste, though banned, can be bought under the counter at small shops in most bazaars here and throughout Kabul. The opium latex is boiled and distilled into a thick sticky paste the consistency of putty and chewed like tobacco. "I started taking some opium paste with my tea," says Mariana. "Without the opium to dull my pain I could not clean, cook or look after my baby. Over the past year I have become deeply addicted and need to take the opium every day."

Afghanistan produces more than 90 per cent of the world's opium and heroin. About 123,000 hectares are given over to farming the poppies used to process the drugs, according to UNODC's 2010 survey. Years of efforts by the UN, the US and other nations to wean Afghan farmers off opium cultivation have failed. Output fell this year after the crops were hit by disease, but UNODC has warned output is likely to rise again.

Southern Afghanistan, the most volatile part of the country, accounts for 87 per cent of production. The bulk of this comes from Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where international military forces have been engaged in intense battles to oust the Taliban. "These regions are dominated by insurgency and organised crime networks," said the UNODC executive director, Yuri Fedotov.

Mariana explains that, unable to cope with the demands of three children, she began giving the opium to her youngest child to lull him to sleep. As a result, her baby son also became addicted and was enrolled in the programme. "There is traditional use of opium to calm children," says Gilberto Gerra, chief of the drug prevention and health branch of the UNODC. "It is difficult to distinguish between traditional use and addictive use. Many people are not aware of becoming addicted and they go from the grey area to the black area."

The latest statistics show a huge leap in the rate of addiction since the last survey in 2005. While opium use has increased by about 53 per cent, the proportion of heroin users has increased by 140 per cent due to the cheap availability of both drugs. UNODC says the true numbers of women addicts is likely to be much higher. Only 3 per cent of those interviewed for UNODC's survey were women.

"Cultural constraints also prevent access to women," says Sarah Waller, a drug demand reduction consultant with the UNODC. "Women tend to use drugs in their homes. They are an extremely hidden population."

Mariana is unusual in that her family allowed her to enrol in a residential clinic. "It is very difficult to convince families to let them complete the course," says Dr Latifa Hamidi, a co-ordinator at the Sanga Amaj clinic. The clinic does not advertise its location to ensure its security, and visits by outsiders such as journalists are carefully monitored.

While much investment has gone into trying to curb production, there has been less attention on the problem of addiction. "The treatment gap is enormous," Ms Waller says. There are only 40 treatment centres with a maximum capacity of 760 beds, though they can cater to 10,000 addicts, including through outpatient facilities as well as home-based care.

Robert Watkins, deputy special representative of the UN Secretary-General, points out that the causes of addiction require as much attention as treatment. "We also have to spend a lot of time looking at the root causes, and those are much more challenging and difficult to overcome, strongly rooted in poverty and the inability to access treatment not just for addiction but other ailments."

"Short-term funding for up to a year is not really a solution. Sustainable, longer-term funding solutions have to be sought," Ms Waller says. The risk of relapse is very high if patients go back to the same conditions which led to the drug addiction in the first place, points out Gilberto Gerra. Sustainable livelihoods need to complement drug reduction programmes.

Solutions in Afghanistan need to be tailor-made to the situation. They have to include not just medical treatment for physical addiction, but also for dealing with mental health issues of a population traumatised by a conflict that shows no sign of ending.

An inflated claim of health success in Afghanistan exposed

2010-12-09T05:47:00.001-08:00

The Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com
By Aunohita Mojumdar, Correspondent
posted December 8, 2010 at 5:08 pm EST

Kabul, Afghanistan —
Nine years and billions of dollars into the Afghanistan war the US government is eager to show progress.

The US government estimates 6 million refugees have returned to the country and some 7 million children are back in school. And then there is the widely cited claim that 85 percent of Afghans that have access to healthcare, as in this recent report from the US Agency for International Development: “USAID and other donors have worked so that now more than 85 percent of the population has access to some form of health care, up from 9 percent in 2002."

There's just one problem, say healthcare officials in Afghanistan. That claim, also peddled by the British government’s aid agency, the World Bank and at times by the Afghan government, isn't true. And healthcare workers say it's created a false sense of accomplishment that's actually undermining efforts to improve health services for Afghans.

Though it's been repeated over and over, it's not hard to see how unlikely it is. If 85 percent of Afghan's did have access to healthcare, Afghanistan would be ahead of every country in the region after three-decades of almost non-stop war.

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Both the Afghan government’s Minister of Health as well as the Representative of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Afghanistan say that the claim is misleading. According to the Ministry of Health, which provided the initial data, the claim stems from a misunderstanding of the fact that 85 percent of Afghanistan's districts have at least one basic health facility.

However a district can cover vast tracts of mountainous terrain, leaving district health facilities inaccessible to millions of Afghans.

“It does not mean 85 percent of Afghans have access or easy access or avail themselves of health facilities,” says Peter Graaff, the head of the WHO mission in Afghanistan.

Essentially, that would be akin to saying that just because every state in the US had a hospital, 100 percent of Americans had access to healthcare.

“The coverage of the basic primary health services in Afghanistan falls perilously short of the requirements of the population, leaving millions of Afghans with no or limited access to basic healthcare” read a UN statement Dec. 5, adding that according to its tally, “only 52 percent of the rural population have access to a health facility within one hour walking distance.”

To be sure, accurate healthcare figures are difficult to come by. The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment carried out by the Afghan government with international support last year is the most accurate sampling of access to healthcare and came up with an estimate of 60 percent access.

Afghanistan’s acting Minister of Health Suraya Dalil insists that continuing to cite the 85 percent as harming efforts to improve health services. “According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment around 60 percent of the population has access to health,” says Dr. Dalil. “I have questioned the 85 percent figure since I came into this office.”

Graaff says he implores aid officials not to use this statistic, “it is not wise to use these figures as a success story,” he says.

The false statistic has prevented adequate attention on the health sector from donors and the Afghan government says Dalil. The Afghan Finance Ministry, which channels much of Afghanistan's development aid, said: “You don’t need the money, you are well off. Donors tell us ‘you are so successful. You have reached 85 percent of the population. You don’t need additional resources,’ ” according to Dalil.

With a $10.92 per capita expenditure on health, Afghanistan is still way below a target of $15 to $30 per capita expenditure recommended by the WHO, especially for a country affected by protracted crisis. Other Afghan health indicators remain dismal.

“Although maternal mortality rates have been reduced from 1,600 deaths for every 100,000 live births in 2002 to 1,400 deaths in 2010, Afghanistan still has the second-highest maternal mortality ratio in the world after Sierra Leone” a joint statement issued by UNICEF, WHO, and UNFPA said at the Geneva Conference on Millennium Development Goals. "The same holds true for soaring infant and child mortality figures, although there has been a slight improvement in these numbers as well.”

Karzai Security Contractor Ban Could Assist Humanitarian Aid Work

2010-12-03T08:37:00.001-08:00

Eurasianet, October 28, 2010

President Hamid Karzai’s plan to shut down private security forces in Afghanistan has many military contractors and assorted peace-builders in a panic. But some humanitarian aid workers in the country contend that a ban isn’t such a bad idea.

For years, non-governmental organizations operating in Afghanistan have condemned the militarization of humanitarian work, and have struggled to define a role that is distinct from the armed, for-profit development contractors in the conflict zone. Yet usually, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contractors, humanitarians and development entrepreneurs have all been lumped together under the generic “aid worker” rubric. The Afghan government’s planned prohibition on private security companies (PSCs) could change that, helping to differentiate the humanitarians from other forms of development work.

Foreign for-profit development contractors have threatened to pull out of Afghanistan, since the August decree issued by Karzai would prevent them from relying on private security companies for protection. Instead, they would have to depend on the Afghan National Police to provide security. The only exceptions would be for military bases and diplomatic missions.

The ban was originally scheduled to take effect on December 17. But on October 27, Karzai agreed to push back the implementation deadline by two months. Karzai’s administration has come under intense pressure from Washington to relent on the ban.

Representatives of various humanitarian aid organizations are not worried by the looming ban to anywhere near the same extent as are the for-profit contractors. Many have long been living with high risk in order to deliver their services. Some even say the demise of private security companies would be beneficial.

“To the extent that it [the ban] helps to de-militarize the environment and to the extent that it reinforces the government’s monopoly on the use of force, I think ultimately it would be a positive thing,” Nic Lee, director of ANSO (Afghanistan NGO Safety Office), a non-profit humanitarian project that monitors safety conditions for the NGO sector, told EurasiaNet.org.

“There is no type of armed action that is conducive to humanitarian activity,” Lee continued. “So the less armed activity you have is always going to improve humanitarian space and humanitarian access.”

Many aid workers say they have a moral duty to work without armed protection in order to maintain their neutrality in a conflict zone. Of the 2,000 Afghan and 360 international NGOs operating across Afghanistan, “less than six use the services of a PSC, most commonly to provide unarmed guards at offices and homes,” according to ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief), an NGO umbrella organization.

In a joint statement issued with ANSO on October 25, ACBAR sought to distance the non-profit NGO community from for-profit contractors, emphasizing “the ban on PSCs will have no negative impact on aid delivery by the vast majority of humanitarian NGOs.”

While NGOs rely on the communities where they work to ensure their safety, the for-profit “development contractors” often depend on PSCs. Donors support their work as part of NATO’s counter-insurgency strategy, thus bringing them between the military and Taliban militants, and also muddying the waters between non-profit humanitarian work and for-profit development.

These private development contractors receive the bulk of donor money flowing into Afghanistan largely from the US government’s development arm, USAID. Thus, major donors like USAID have been scrambling for a way to keep their “implementing partners” in the country. Some large USAID contractors like DAI (Development Alternatives, Inc.) have said they would have to close down some projects, if the ban is implemented. Other private development companies have complained to the US Embassy that their employees “will vote with their feet.”

Donors suggest that their ongoing discussions with the Afghan government will lead to a compromise. But Karzai, despite delaying implementation of the ban, still seems determined to lock private security firms out of Afghanistan, calling them a menace to stability.

Employing development contractors is a fundamental part of Gen. David Petraeus’ much-touted counter-insurgency strategy. Petraeus, the commander of all NATO forces in Afghanistan, is said to be lobbying Karzai’s government for an exception to the ban that covers a wide array of peace-building activities.

Even the United Nations is reviewing its programs to assess the ban’s potential impact. With UNAMA (the UN’s umbrella organization in Afghanistan) playing an overt political role, the mission has suffered increasing attacks. An attack on a UN guesthouse in Kabul last October left six international UN workers dead. On October 24, UN security repelled an attack on a UN guesthouse in Herat, killing four armed insurgents. The UN hopes its own security forces will be exempted from the new rule.

Not all donors use private security companies. The Indian Embassy, which has suffered two massive suicide bombings in the past three years, uses a combination of ITBP (Indo-Tibetan Border Police, an Indian government paramilitary organization) and Afghan National Police to guard the embassy, as well as its projects.

The Canadian government also indicated that a ban would have a minimal impact on aid operations that it sponsors. “Most of our development assistance implementing partners do not use private security firms,” a spokeswoman for the Canadian Embassy said, adding that Ottawa had sought an implementation plan that would allow the international community to remain in Afghanistan while respecting the goals of the presidential decree.

Karzai Puts Peace Hopes in Hands of Warlords

2010-12-03T08:34:00.000-08:00

Eurasianet, October 12, 2010

The High Peace Council, Afghanistan’s new vehicle for promoting reconciliation between President Hamid Karzai’s administration and Taliban militants, is set to convene on October 13. But even before its first session gets underway, civil society activists in the country are condemning the council as a charade.

The council comprises 70 members -- all appointed by Karzai. The president has indicated that the council will have broad authority to engage Taliban representatives in the search for an end to the Islamic militant insurgency. The council’s specific powers and duties have not yet been defined, although members on October 10 chose a chairman, former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani. An ethnic Tajik, Rabbani is closely associated with the Jamiat-e Islami faction, which gained fame for its resistance to Soviet occupying forces during the 1980s.

It is unclear whether the High Peace Council will act as an advisory body or whether its decisions will be binding and subject to oversight. “The commission will develop its own rules and procedures,” presidential spokesman Waheed Omer said during a September 28 news conference, referring to the body’s powers of enforcement. The council’s only clear function is to administer the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund, some $500 million in donor money earmarked to reintegrate Taliban foot soldiers. Western donors announced the fund in January.

Like Rabbani, many of the council members played prominent roles in 1992-1996 factional fighting that followed the collapse of Afghanistan’s Moscow-backed Communist regime. Several council members are suspected of having carried out human rights violations, but have never been convicted. Most members also were involved in efforts to resist Taliban attempts in the mid-1990s to establish control over all of Afghanistan.

The fact that the Peace Council is packed with past fighters does not inspire confidence among non-governmental organization (NGO) activists in Afghanistan. In an unprecedented show of unity, over 300 NGOs publicly criticized the composition of the council, saying a number of the members had “better experience in war rather than peace.” The composition of the council could “not only slow down the progress of the peace process but will ultimately result in its failure,” the NGOs said the October 4 joint statement.

“We have the usual faces,” said Nargis Nehan, Director of Equality for Peace and Democracy, a civil rights group. “We have been calling them warlords, and now they are on a list to bring peace and democracy. The list does not have any of the people who are working for peace and democracy.”

Defending Karzai’s selections, Omer, the presidential spokesman, said that council members “have their own importance and influence on the peace process.”

Of the 70 members, nine are women and only a handful come from the non-governmental sector, critics say. Perhaps the most notable figures omitted from the council are reconciled Taliban leaders, including Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil and Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef.

Publicly, the international community has welcomed the High Peace Council. Only Norway has noted concern about its “narrow composition.” But many foreign observers and diplomats stationed in Kabul are quietly dismayed.

“The composition […] reflects the group of people who President Karzai thinks are power brokers and is a reflection of the current set-up of the ‘Karzai Coalition.’ It is Kabul and government-centric,” Thomas Ruttig co-director of the Afghan Analysts Network, an independent think-tank in Kabul, told EurasiaNet.org. “Most of the people are those he [Karzai] is consulting anyway.”
The council “is an effort to placate the international community with the names they know,” Ruttig continued. “It is not good enough.”

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a European diplomat said the High Peace Council was comprised simply of “the usual suspects and that, in itself, is not encouraging. These are the people who have been in charge for the past nine to 10 years. They fought the Taliban. Why would the Taliban want to talk to them?”

Is UN’s 'Collective Ambiguity' Just Another Term for Surrender?

2010-12-03T08:33:00.000-08:00

Eurasianet, October 16, 2010

Inside the United Nations’ Kabul offices, senior officials have coined a phrase for how they are approaching Afghanistan’s September 18 parliamentary elections and the ongoing vote count: “constructive ambiguity.” The term, critics of the UN’s stance say, indicates that the organization is giving up on the Afghan democratization process.

By all appearances, the September 18 parliamentary elections, just like last year’s presidential vote, were tainted by ballot-stuffing and other dirty tricks. Since polls closed two weeks ago, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) has received over 3,000 complaints. Roughly half of them, according to election officials, could potentially impact the outcome of MP races. Preliminary results are expected on October 8 and final results by the end of the month.

Prior to the election, foreign political observers held up the parliamentary vote as a crucial democratization test. Now that it’s clear that this legislative election didn’t mark much of an improvement over previous votes, the international community seems satisfied to merely acknowledge the “achievement” of the vote being held, given the growing level of violence in the country associated with the Taliban insurgency.

A diplomat familiar with UN thinking lauded the “constructive ambiguity” approach, saying it gave the UN needed flexibility. It allows the UN to quietly prod the Afghan government to act more responsibly and transparently, while enabling the organization to keep its hands clean in a messy process, the diplomat explained.

The term can also be used to justify a hands-off approach to the ballot-counting process. For the first time in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban history, the UN is not taking responsibility for the vote’s credibility, or the conduct of an independent assessment. This position on the parliamentary vote tally stands in sharp contrast to the presidential elections in 2009, when the international community focused on the extensive ballot fraud (1.5 million votes out of a total of 3.6 million were cancelled in the end). Ultimately, disagreement over the seriousness of the electoral fraud during the presidential election prompted a shake-up of the UN’s top leadership in Afghanistan.

The fallout from 2009 also soured relations between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the international community. The president, according to insiders, is said still to be holding a grudge for being forced by donor states to prepare for a second round of polling. (The second round never actually took place, as Karzai’s challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew before polling day).

This time around, the UN, which leads the international community’s involvement in Afghan elections, apparently thought it expedient to be quiet. Back in April, the new head of the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Staffan de Mistura, certified the merit of Afghan government plans for making elections more credible and transparent and recommended to donors to release funds for the electoral process. However, this time -- unlike the comprehensive monitoring it carried out in 2009 along with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) -- the UN declined to involve itself in monitoring the parliamentary balloting.

“There is a very strict rule which exists,” de Mistura told EurasiaNet.org on September 14. “If you are part of organizing elections and supporting the organization of the elections you cannot be part of the monitoring and observation. In other words, we start having what is called a conflict of interest.”

Asked about the monitoring role in 2009, de Mistura said “that was a mistake last year. The rule is if you are part of organizing it, supporting it, you are not part of observing it.” De Mistura also suggested that other international observer missions were ineffectual, adding, “By the way, foreigners do not speak the language.” Domestic observers are more appropriate, he stressed.

Most donor nations took a hint from the UN. Long before the process began this year, Western diplomats based in Kabul made it clear that their governments would not say anything critical of the elections. In particular, the EU, which deployed a high-profile 10 million-euro observation mission during the 2009 presidential election, merely sent an election assessment team (EAT) this time around. The EAT was widely seen as under-prepared for its task and is not expected to make a public assessment on the conduct of the voting.

Moreover, immediately following the controversial presidential election, the international community conditioned its financial assistance for the parliamentary elections on the implementation of electoral reforms. But as the legislative voting approached, this demand was shelved and donor nations provided approximately $150 million in support.

In the eyes of Afghan democratization advocates, the UN’s constructive ambiguity stance is a disaster. The most respected domestic election observer mission, FEFA (Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan) urged the international community to play a robust role in the post-election process.

Specifically, FEFA said in a statement that the international community needed to “denounce identified acts of fraud, regardless of their perpetrator, and provide technical assistance to the ECC and IEC [Independent Election Commission] in verifying the results of the elections and carrying out investigations.”

While the donor community is providing these electoral bodies with technical and financial support, this assistance has not enabled adequate transparency in counting and fraud mitigation, making it difficult even for independent observer groups to gauge the credibility of the process, say analysts. De Mistura has tacitly sought to downgrade expectations by repeatedly stating the elections are likely to be imperfect because “we are not in Switzerland. We are in Afghanistan.”

Some non-governmental activists have equated the UN stance with an act of surrender. Commenting in the Afghan magazine “Killid” on October 2, Thomas Ruttig, co-director and senior analyst at the Afghan Analysts Network, an independent think-tank in Kabul, suggested that the popularity of the “Switzerland mantra” is “because the West is mentally on its way out of Afghanistan already” and the elections “were its farewell performance; it has decided to play a role in the wings only.”

At a September 16 news conference, Abdullah Abdullah, the defeated presidential candidate in 2009, hinted that the international community was trying to distance itself from a job poorly done. “They are aware of the shortcomings and they don’t want to be associated with it,” he said.

But Abdullah added that history would not forget the international community’s bungling. “To show a hands-off attitude will not lessen the responsibilities which the international community has toward the people of Afghanistan, or of member states towards their own citizens, because, after all, this election is also being funded by the money from the international community,” Abdullah said.

Parliamentary Elections a Critical Point for Kabul

2010-12-03T08:31:00.000-08:00

Eurasianet/ October 17

Afghanistan’s parliamentary election on September 18 is shaping up as a critical democratization test. Over the past five years, parliament has acted as virtually the only check on President Hamid Karzai’s authority. Experts are wondering whether the legislators who are elected in the upcoming voting will keep on acting as a counterweight to executive authority.

Karzai has steadily accumulated influence over the Afghan political process during his years in power. But the controversial way in which he secured reelection in 2009, amid allegations of widespread fraud, weakened his political image and heightened concerns about persistent government corruption. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].

MPs for the better part of the year have been impeding Karzai’s political agenda, most notably by withholding confirmation for many of his picks for cabinet positions.

At stake in the September 18 voting are 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. Almost 2,500 candidates are registered. Not surprisingly, Karzai has been working diligently to increase the chances that the elections will produce a legislative branch that is more pliant to his wishes. Political observers are worried that such a result could have damaging consequences for the democratization process.

“While pre-election politicking […] has generated a prominent (and very public) chasm between the Wolesi Jirga [lower house of parliament] and the Karzai administration, under the surface exist connections between MPs and the executive that threaten to strip the parliament of any monitoring or oversight capacity that it currently has,” writes Anna Larson in a recent report on the elections published by the respected Afghan Research and Analysis Unit (AREU).

The country’s unwieldy electoral system impedes political parties from contesting polls. The result is a fragmented polity, in which parties have a hard time coalescing into nationwide political forces. As a result, Afghan politics since the ouster of the Taliban from Kabul in late 2001 has been characterized by loose and shifting coalitions, hampering parliament’s ability to check the executive branch.

Despite the obstacles in the way of political parties, factions do exist. But some prominent leaders of major factions, such as Uzbek strongman General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Hazara leader Mohammed Mohaqiq, are floundering. Having supported Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections, they now find themselves largely sidelined, with few of Karzai’s political promises having been fulfilled. As a result, their political leverage in the parliamentary election campaign has been greatly reduced. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].

In addition, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, in contrast to a year ago when he emerged as the de facto leader of the opposition by challenging Karzai for the presidency, has seen many of his supporters drift away, co-opted by Karzai’s shrewd political maneuvers. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].

First-time candidate Haroun Mir is well aware of parliament’s limitations and Karzai’s ongoing efforts to secure a more biddable legislature. “Instead of strengthening legal institutions, President Karzai has built parallel institutions and processes like the peace jirga and the high council for peace which have no place in the constitution. In doing so he has undermined parliament,” Mir told EurasiaNet.org.

Mir fears that money, muscle and fraud will mar the forthcoming elections. If that happens, Mir added, irreparable damage could be done to the country’s democratization hopes. “They [Karzai supporters] are doing everything they can to get a majority. Fraud will happen no doubt. It will be widespread in the South. But if we don’t take the fight [to parliament], if we leave the spaces empty, we could lose everything,” he said.

“This could be the last chance for Afghanistan,” Mir continued. “If we can not change the situation, bring some hope, Afghanistan could slide into chaos, into civil war.”

Though his political career began with the Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban network of which Abdullah was a key member, Mir is now disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the opposition and has parted ways.

Asked about the weak state of his opposition, Abdullah told EurasiaNet.org that he expects “at least 60 MPs” to form a loose confederation under his leadership, called the Coalition of Hope and Change, after the vote. Within the fragmented parliament, a bloc of 60 (out of 249 seats) could wield considerable influence, if it proves cohesive.

Many experts are skeptical that Abdullah’s efforts to form such a parliamentary faction will work. MPs are expected to remain likely to form coalitions according to expediency, especially when they stand to benefit personally and financially, observers say. Without a powerful party system, MPs are not bound to follow any particular line, leaving them open to pressure and patronage from the Karzai camp.

About 80 percent of incumbent MPs are seeking reelection. Also in the running, noted Noah Coburn in a separate AREU report, “are a group of influential commanders who chose not to run in 2005.” These commanders now see the “clear financial benefits of securing a seat and feeling reassured by a continued culture of impunity.”

Afghanistan’s increasingly dangerous security environment promises to create challenges on election day. Election officials indicate that close to one out of six polling centers are unlikely to operate on September 18 due to the threat of violence. A prolonged ballot-counting process also could create opportunities for fraud, some observers say. Preliminary results are not expected until October 8, and official tallies may not be announced until Halloween.

Afghan vote a foregone conclusion

2010-12-03T08:29:00.000-08:00

Asia Times, September 17

KABUL - As Afghans go to the polls to elect a new parliament, the result is already a foregone conclusion. Far from handing power to one political party, voters will return 249 individuals who must act as a de facto and fragmented opposition with little hope of setting out viable alternatives to the government's agenda.

In the country's party-less system, political allegiances are ever shifting - changing from policy to policy - and groups of MPs have often used their spoiler ability to extract concessions rather than shape administrative agendas. Realizing that the only leverage is their ability to block the government, MPs have come together to oppose sections of the budget, appointments to high office, including the cabinet, and critical legislation that the government wants to pass.

The legislative body has been a thorn in Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai's side. He will be looking for the September 18 polls

to help consolidate his power after reports that prominent opposition leaders have been co-opted by the government in recent months, analysts say.

''While pre-election politicking […] has generated a prominent (and very public chasm) between the Wolesi Jirga [lower house of parliament] and the Karzai administration, under the surface exist connections between MPs and the executive that threaten to strip the parliament of any monitoring or oversight capacity that it currently has,'' Anna Larson wrote in a report by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).

Major government initiatives - such as the move towards negotiations with the Taliban or the cross-border peace jirga - have completely bypassed parliament for a "wider" consultation with the people, inherently implying its non-representative nature.

Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, a key member of the Northern Alliance, which includes Karzai challenger Abdullah Abdullah, have made peace with Karzai. Though Abdullah was sharply critical of the peace jirga held in June, Rabbani agreed to chair it, taking the steam out of opposition to the event. In the week preceding the election, another Northern Alliance member, the current speaker of the lower house of parliament, Younus Qanooni, was forced to deny he had struck a deal with Karzai in return for continuing in the post. Qanooni is a sharp political operator whose skills have honed parliament’s oppositional tactics.

Several key players may be considering their political options since no one is quite sure what the elections will throw up. Insecurity, fraud, and doubts over Afghan voters' eagerness and ability to exercise their right to vote, all present a range of unpredictables.

The country's Independent Election Commission, which has distributed 17.5 million voter registration cards for Saturday's ballot, puts the voting population at about 12.5 million, while the UN says the eligible voters number 10.5 million, based on past voting. Added to that uncertainty is that 15% of voters have been potentially disenfranchised by the pre-polling decision not to open more than 1,000 polling stations which cannot be secured due to the ongoing conflict.

The difficulty of arriving at anything more than a guesstimate of the voting population is not merely statistical trivia but at the heart of the challenge of mounting elections in a complex situation. There is no method of cross-checking a voter registration card against a voter roll to eliminate fraud. This makes it impossible to gauge the real voter turnout, so there is no available measure of participation in the democratic exercise.

Unlike most elections, where the candidate tries to meet as much of the electorate as possible, for many of Afghanistan's prospective parliamentarians, campaigning has meant their going into hiding or leaving their constituencies to safeguard themselves from kidnapping and attacks by anti-election elements. Yet enthusiasm for the election is high, with more than 2,500 candidates seeking seats including tailors, newscasters, singers and businessmen.

A new crop of influential militia commanders has also entered the fray, according to Noah Coburn, writing for the AREU. Having chosen not to run in 2005, they have now seen the ''clear financial benefits of securing a seat and feeling reassured by a continued culture of impunity,'' Coburn said.

According to reports, some candidates have sought support from insurgents or even asked them to target their opponents. Direct violence between one candidate against a rival has also been reported.

Equally problematic is the issue of how free and fair the contest will be, a year after the 2009 presidential elections that were characterized by widespread fraud. Last year, ballot boxes in many areas were stuffed, while areas of high insecurity saw "ghost" polling stations that did not open or see any voters yet returned full ballot boxes.

Electoral fraud was not limited to ballot-box stuffing. The counting stage provided many steps that could be compromised. These included tamper-proof bags to transport votes that were tampered, tally sheets that did not tally, and triggers to alert to suspicious voting patterns that failed to be triggered during counting, according to Martine van Bijlert of the Afghan Analysts Network, who has dissected incidents of fraud in a recent report.

There is a high likelihood of fraud repeating itself due to a lack of any punitive measures put in place following last year's elections. The maximum penalty imposed was the blacklisting of some election officials, so the cost of attempted fraud in the current ballot is extremely low.

The crowning absurdity of the Afghan elections however is the voting system. Neither the preferential list system, nor the single-non transferable vote, it combines the worst of both, preventing political consolidation. The result is a fragmented and weak polity. Supporters of the system say Afghanistan first needs stability, while critics say the fragmented polity is one of the causes of continuing instability as it prevents the growth of a healthy democracy.

Either way, the final result is not political groups, agendas, manifestos or visions for Afghanistan's future within the parliament, but a collection of 249 individuals unbound by allegiance to any group.

Extracting Change in Afghanistan’s Development Quagmire

2010-12-03T08:20:00.000-08:00

Eurasianet/July 29, 2010

The girls’ high school under construction in Jabal Seraj could have turned out like any other development project in the area: crumbling and dangerous. Afghanistan is littered with poor-quality buildings sponsored by foreign donors. The projects are often sub-contracted -- several times -- to a final implementer who maximizes profits using cheap labor and sub-standard materials.

But not the Girls’ High School of Jabal Seraj. This community in Parwan province, north of Kabul, succeeded in getting the building contractor to replace approximately 10,000 sub-standard bricks and double the thickness of the metal sheeting on the roof.

Though sub-standard construction and corruption are endemic to many developing countries, in Afghanistan accountability is almost impossible to establish. Eighty-percent of donor money flows outside the government. Donors are responsible to taxpayers in their home countries and not to their Afghan beneficiaries. Project implementers are accountable to the donors and not to communities. The beneficiaries have few means of pressuring for improvements, and this has meant few checks on the rampant corruption that, literally, eats away at the entrails of projects. Most donors lack efficient monitoring resources to ensure effective project implementation.

In an effort to empower local communities and help them to receive the promised aid, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), a non-governmental organization, initiated a local monitoring project in 2007.

The organization approaches a community to explain the concept, says Pajhwok Ghori, in charge of community-based monitoring at IWA. “The community chooses honest [local] people they trust,” he says. Then, in a workshop, these monitors learn how to determine if a project is being implemented according to the designated specifications, and, if not, how to approach the donor. “The local community then selects which particular project is important to them and needs monitoring.”

IWA provides technical help -- for example, engineering experts -- but no salaries, says Lorenzo Delesgues, the co-director of IWA. “This is to ensure that the monitoring process can be sustainable” even without IWA.

In Jabal Seraj, most of the monitors are schoolteachers, thus ensuring respect. “Often the engineers or the construction company pocket the money and carry out bad construction,” says Mohammed Maroof, a local monitor. “Look at the [nearby] Ishkabad School, for example. That, too, was a girls’ school. The wall cracked and broke after barely a year. The girls still have to use that school.”

“This monitoring project has really helped the people,” says Abdul Matin, another project monitor. “Can you imagine what kind of a school would have been constructed here without our intervention? The bricks they were using initially were crumbly; the walls would not have been sturdy. It is difficult sometimes to ask questions and some project implementers do not like the questions. But eventually they have to give the answers.”

The IWA program has an escalating scale of accountability. If the monitors cannot affect change where needed, the community gets involved. If the implementer still does not respond, the community puts pressure on the next link up the chain and so on all the way to the donor.

Some donors have been responsive. Captain A. Heather Coyne, a United States Army reservist who is the NGO/international organizations liaison with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission Afghanistan (NTMA), has worked with the IWA monitoring project to see how community monitoring can be expanded to NATO-financed police training projects. Her idea is not just to ensure better quality construction, but to use the monitoring method to build a stronger relationship between the police and the local communities.

“We are going to be providing access to IWA for all of our police station construction, so that communities can build confidence [in] police issues, and so that police can see that the community may be an asset to them. We're hoping that communities will use the monitoring process as a way to build more constructive relationships with their police force, as well as making police more accountable and responsive,” Coyne says.

IWA itself has expanded the monitoring from its pilot project in Parwan and has similar projects in Balkh, Nangarhar and Herat provinces. Initially, one of the toughest hurdles was to make communities understand that IWA was not yet another cash-rich NGO handing out goodies.

“We had to tell people, ‘We are not here to pay you; we are not here to build the project,’” says Ghori. “In the beginning, people were skeptical and were not sure they could bring change, but now they are hopeful and more communities are coming and asking for this training. What we want is not just a social audit but social change.”

The monitors’ liaison in Jabal Seraj, IWA employee Haji Ghulam Rasool Khan Gulbahari, says defeating corruption must start at a local level. “We may not be able to stop the corruption at the highest levels by what we do. But even if we cannot end 100 percent of corruption, we can still stop 80 percent. We cannot reach the Arg [the presidential palace], but we can stop the corruption that is happening here in our area.”

Afghanistan: No solution in sight

2010-08-28T06:12:00.000-07:00

Times of India, July 10

The arrival of General David Petraeus in Kabul and the commotion of General Stanley Mc-Chrystal losing his job caused quite a clatter internationally with speculation on whether the new General, who was actually the old General - both in seniority and in terms of the genesis of the COIN and 'surge' strategies - would retain the same policy. Chastened by his predecessor's fate, General Petraeus is going slow on exhibiting his individuality.

What attracted less attention, except from the most assiduous of Afghanistan watchers were the swift changes executed by President Hamid Karzai in the security sector, through a series of appointments that consolidate his hold in key positions. They include the shifting of the powerful General Bismillah Khan to the Ministry of Interior, a new deputy minister in the Ministry of Defence, a new chief of staff of the army, and a new head of the National Security Directorate, the country's intelligence agency.

The local media interpreted them as signs of a greater role for Pashtuns in the security apparatus as well as paving the way for reconciliation with insurgent groups including the Taliban and the Haqqani faction. However the appointments also reflect something wider - a shift in the centre of gravity over the past few months, away from the international compact on rebuilding of the Afghan state and government towards more localised interests , both within Afghanistan and the region.

While the US still dominates in Afghanistan with the sheer size of the military and economic resources that it brings, its leverage has become more fragmented with no clarity of direction. Over the past year US engagement in Afghanistan has been fraught with tensions, as much between Karzai and the Obama administrations as within the Obama administration itself, most clearly visible here in Kabul in the wide divergence between the top military and civilian representatives in Kabul - General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. The reason perhaps, is not, as is often suggested, that Obama can't get it right, but just that his administration's attention is engaged elsewhere.

If Iraq was the distraction during the Bush era, it is domestic issues that absorb a great deal of the new president's energy and focus. In so far as Afghanistan factors into this, it is largely through a preoccupation with how quickly and how neatly the US will be able to exit Afghanistan.

While differences in the American agenda display themselves as dissonances in policy, the Afghan establishment is also working at multiple levels, but in an effort to position itself for multiple realities. These include keeping a working relationship with the international community to maintain a stream of economic and military support, overtures to the Taliban, enhanced political engagement with Pakistan, pacification of India, Iran and the Russia and most important of all, a way of consolidating its own hold on power. How the insurgency grows in the future, how much leverage Pakistan can assert and how quickly the international community wants to exit will be amongst the main factors determining which of these overtures by the Karzai government strengthens or weakens in the future.

The recent peace jirga is an illustrative example of how a single event can work at various levels. On the one hand it fed into the international community's concerns of increasing chaos by projecting reconciliation as a magic panacea, a way out of the morass; to those of the insurgents willing to bite, it held out the prospect of joining the establishment; those fearful of the return of the Taliban were assured by the various and ambiguous caveats limiting insurgent participation that are open to widely varied interpretation. The jirga assured Pakistan of its significance in an eventual political solution and reassured India that a government led by Karzai would not go too far. In concrete terms it also provided the initiation of a 'project' that could attract more donor funding - a new cash cow just when the international community was beginning to ask questions about other sectors it has been funding.

The forthcoming Kabul Conference promises to be yet another such beast. The Afghan government's priorities, which were set in 2006, refined in 2008 and reviewed in London in 2010, are now expected to be reworked in July 2010. Like the proverbial elephant in a room full of blind men, the conference may well end with each taking from it a suitable conclusion. In fact, in the current international mindset which equates a 'full calendar of events' with actual progress, not much needs to happen anyway, apart from the mere holding of the conference.

The acute concentration of attention on new, bright and shining events belies what lies beneath its shadows: increasing despair, impoverishment and estrangement of ordinary Afghans from the process of governance. The poorest segment - one third of all Afghans - do not meet their dietary requirements are getting squeezed further , being forced to sell income-generating assets as the humanitarian crisis deepens. Significant numbers of those entrusted with leadership in the task of rebuilding the Afghan state are those who have private economic interests that benefit directly from continuation of the conflict.

The growth of intolerant ideologies is pushing women back into their homes, obstructing their movement and encouraging violence against them through impunity. Ethnic minorities have started expressing their concerns about marginalisation. Political movements and the process of democratisation are being deliberately weakened. Rule of law and justice are being seen as an expendable luxury in the quest for 'stability'. Meanwhile the support for the Taliban continues to grow, albeit less rapidly than the Taliban itself.

The Taliban now operate in all 34 provinces and have shadow governments in 33 provinces of Afghanistan. Their growing capabilities and the increasing violence in Afghanistan are well-documented. Until now an overwhelming majority of the Afghan people continue to put their faith in the government and the institutions of state. But this trend is changing. People are increasingly turning away to non-state actors in search for help. Less noticeable than the shift of gravity within the political class, the centre of gravity within the Afghan population is also moving.

Taliban attack compound of US contractor in Afghanistan

2010-08-28T06:08:00.000-07:00

The Guardian, July 2

Suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the compound of a USAid contractor in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz today, killing four people including a British national.

The attack on the compound of Development Alternatives Inc (DAI) also wounded 10 people, including a Briton whose condition was described by the British embassy as critical but stable. Initial reports suggested that the dead may have been members of a private security firm guarding the compound.

The gunbattle, which started at 3am local time and lasted for more than six hours, destroyed the compound, according to local officials.

Although the province is the hub of insurgency in the northern areas, the scale and complexity of the attack was unprecedented in the region, marking a new level of capability for the insurgency on the day General David Petraeus, the new commander of the Nato and US forces, arrived in Kabul.

"Maybe they attempted to send a signal," Nato's General Joseph Blotz said, adding "but this is senseless."

Blotz said the attack resembled an assault on a UN guesthouse in Kabul in October last year that killed eight people.

Thomas Ruttig of the thinktank the Afghan Analysts Network said: "It is a first time for Kunduz that such a complex attack has happened there, and one against a non-military target. This is another sign they are getting stronger and have a greater foothold [in this area] and can pull off attacks like this one."

A Taliban spokesman was quoted by the local Pajhwok news agency claiming responsibilty and claiming the compound was that of the US special forces, something denied by US officials.

While development agencies have found it easier to work in northern areas, many of them have reported increasing threats from insurgents moving into new areas.

DAI is termed a for-profit contractor, a distinction that traditional NGOs are keen to emphasise. Many for-profit contractors live in armed compounds, something that traditional NGOs eschew in order to emphasise their neutrality.

Ruttig said: "I have concerns about the privatisation and militarisation of development co-operation which makes people who work in these organisations very vulnerable."

USAid termed the attack "another tragic reminder of the life threatening circumstances that our Afghan and international partners face as they work to improve conditions".

The attack comes at a time when the Obama administration is trying to pump more money into the civilian surge as part of its transition strategy in the face of growing domestic resistance.

In Afghanistan, drug rehab for children

2010-08-28T06:06:00.000-07:00

Christian Science Monitor/ July 14, 2010

Najiba scrabbles through cupboards frantic for something sweet. She claws at her mother, urging her to help. Najiba, though only 13 years old, lives in the Sanga Amaj drug addiction rehab clinic in Kabul with her mother, Zainab – who is also an opium addict, a habit acquired from her husband and passed on to her daughter.
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.“When she was born, she kept crying, so after two months or so I started giving her opium to keep her quiet,” says Zainab. (Her and Najiba’s names have been changed to protect their privacy.)

The result is a drug dependency that Najiba is now desperately fighting.

Yet she is neither alone among Afghan children addicted to opium, nor among the worst affected. For starters, she’s one of a small minority getting professional help.

Opium as a pacifier
Opium is used in parts of Afghanistan to quiet babies and, in poorer households without access to medical help, to relieve pain – trends exacerbated by decades of conflict. Economic pressures and fragmented families have meant that women have less help at home and are more likely to give opium to cranky children, to free themselves up to do housework.

“Opium is sometimes used as a child-rearing method,” says Preeti Shah, a Narcotics Affairs Officer of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in Kabul.

The conflict has also left people with deep physical psychological wounds, which they try to numb with narcotics.

A two-year pilot study by the INL on drug addiction and household toxicity in Afghanistan found that babies as young as nine months were testing positive for narcotics, says Thom Browne, deputy director of the INL’s anticrime programs. It also found that in many cases, the level of toxicity in young children was several times higher than that in adult heroin users. The study, which looked at 30 households in three provinces, will be expanded to cover 2,000 households in 22 provinces next year.

While other countries also face cases of babies born with addiction, in Afghanistan the problem deepens as parents continue to administer drugs to their children. According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), up to half of drug users surveyed gave their children opium. The INL found in their study of Afghan drug users’ homes significant samples of opium in the air, bedding, eating utensils, toys, and other items that children come into contact with.

Treatment as taboo

Treating drug addiction is not easy anywhere, but is especially difficult in Afghanistan because of social and cultural stigmas against females going outside the home. Many families are reluctant to let women come and stay at Sanga Amaj for the 45-day treatment period, let alone the preferred 90-day period, says Latifa Hamidi, the doctor who oversees the clinic. Even surveying women proved near impossible – they constituted only 3 percent of the UNODC’s sample size.

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.Even more helpful would be treat the entire family, says Gilberto Gerra, the UNODC’s chief of drug prevention. Otherwise, “if a woman goes back to a home where her husband is using drugs, the risk of relapse is very high.”

Although cultural taboos prohibit men and women being treated together, the INL hopes to build treatment centers for men and women near one another, to allow family members to visit one another. Sanga Amaj, which opened in 2007, represents a step in that direction, by treating women and their children together.

The clinic’s 33 patients include 15 children, the youngest of whom is 3 years old. Zainab and Najiba have been here for two weeks. In addition to attending group therapy sessions and receiving medical treatment, during they day they exercise, sit in religion classes, and learn skills like sewing and embroidery. At the end of their time, they will go home to Zainab’s husband, who has already undergone treatment. If Zainab and Najiba stay clean, they will be entitled to free medicine from the clinic.

Facilities like Sanga Amaj are few. Kabul only has four, which can handle about 100 patients. Of Afghanistan’s 1 million drug users, at least 90 percent have no access to treatment, according to the UNODC.

Expanding treatment facilities would require considerable foreign aid and expertise, but does not rank high on donors’ list of priorities. These include instead ending the poppy farming and drug trade that make Afghanistan the supplier of 90 percent of the world’s opium.

“Afghanistan is known for being a supply country,” says Ms. Shah. “It is time to recognize it is a demand country as well.”

Afghan citizens paid $1bn in bribes for public services last year, study finds

2010-08-28T06:00:00.000-07:00

The Guardian, July 8

Afghans paid nearly $1bn (£658m) in bribes last year, according to a new survey that reveals that corruption in the country has doubled since 2007.

The study by the monitoring group Integrity Watch Afghanistan showed that the average value of bribes paid in 2009 was $156. The average per capita income is $502 per year.

Almost a third of civil servants said they have been forced to pay a bribe to obtain a public service, while 13% of households said that they had paid bribes to secure their own sources of income

The survey also showed that more than half the country's population feels that corruption is helping the Taliban's expansion.

Equally worrying for Nato forces combating the insurgency is the finding that the judiciary and the police were identified as the two most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan.

While most respondents said they hoped that state institutions would tackle the problem of corruption, there was an increasing tendency to turn to non-state actors to solve their problems, a trend that could further bolster support for the insurgency.

"Corruption is weakening the legitimacy of the state," said Lorenzo Delesgues, a founder and co-director of IWA.

The survey sampled 6,498 people in 32 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces over November and December 2009.

More than a quarter of Afghans (26%) felt deprived of access to justice and security because of corruption. Half (50%) of those surveyed said that corruption within the state was helping expansion of the Taliban either absolutely (36%) or a little (14%).

Weak law enforcement was identified as a major cause for corruption with as many as 28% of civil servants saying they had to pay bribes to secure or retain their jobs. However donor money was also identified as a major cause of corruption

President Hamid Karzai – criticised regularly by the international community for his apparent unwillingness to tackle graft – was seen as the best bet for countering corruption (80% identified the presidency as the best institution to deal with the problem), though more than half the people said he had not performed on this issue.

Sangin pullout: British troops 'have not brought peace'

2010-08-28T05:49:00.000-07:00

Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul, Ali Safi, and Declan Walsh in Islamabad

The Guardian, July 7, 2010

Sangin's residents have criticised the planned withdrawal later this year of British troops from their town, complaining that four years of fighting have failed to bring peace or development.

"The British have failed," said Haji Fazlul Haq, a former town governor, speaking by telephone. "They could not bring security to the town and that is why they are handing it to the Americans."

The blunt assessment was shared by other residents who expressed greater confidence in US forces due to take control in November. "The Americans fight harder. I think the Taliban will be afraid of this change of command," said Haji Abdul Wahab, acting director of the peace commission of Helmand, a government body that promotes reconciliation.

Their reaction offered little consolation to British forces, who have paid a high price in Sangin. More than 100 British soldiers have died around the town since Tony Blair deployed the first troops in June 2006, making it the deadliest battlezone for western soldiers in Afghanistan.

British commanders say the withdrawal is not an admission of failure but rather a routine battlefield reorganisation that reflects the increased American presence in the province. There are currently 20,000 US soldiers in Helmand, twice as many as the British, and more are coming.

But there is little doubt that the British exit is an admission of the difficulty of purging the Taliban from a town in the grip of the heroin trade and surrounded by determined insurgents. While British soldiers have battlefield superiority over their enemy, many of whom are armed with basic rifles, the nature of the counter-insurgency requires them to conduct "presence patrols" in villages.

This makes them an easy target for insurgents who plant roadside bombs by night then melt into the population during the day. The Taliban are also becoming more canny: this year troops reported more landmines with no metal content, rendering metal detectors useless.

Some residents did recognise the British sacrifices. "I don't want to put all the blame on British because they have lost many lives here" said Shamsullah Khan, a candidate for September's parliamentary elections.

In Pakistan, the British move was seen as confirmation of the view that the Nato war in Afghanistan was unwinnable in its present form. "It's like chasing a nameless, invisible enemy," said Rustum Shah Mohmand, a former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan. "This is not about [Hamid] Karzai, or corruption, or the marginalisation of the Pashtuns. It's about the presence of the foreign forces. Until they leave, peace will never come to Afghanistan," he said.

It is not the only high-profile pullout in Afghanistan of recent months. In April, US forces withdrew from the Korengal valley in the east of the country, dubbed the "valley of death" by soldiers, ending years of intense but fruitless fighting. Forty-two Americans died and hundreds were wounded in fighting between 2006 and 2009 in the valley.

Nato has postponed a planned surge into Kandahar until the autumn amid fears of heavy Taliban resistance.

The operations are taking place against a backdrop of regional political intrigues. In recent months Karzai has held a series of meetings with Pakistan's army and intelligence chiefs, ostensibly with a view to negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban.

Riffat Hussain, a professor of defence studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said the Sangin withdrawal was not likely to have a major impact on the Pakistan military's calculations.

"They're more concerned with what General [David] Petraeus is going to do. That's the major strategic concern right now," he said, referring to the US commander who took over from General Stanley McChrystal after comments about the Obama administration to Rolling Stone magazine cost McChrystal his job.

Petraeus has promised to review the rules of engagement governing Nato troops, which many soldiers had complained were too restrictive. But human rights activists and many Afghans worry that a change in the rules will lead to higher civilian casualties.

In Sangin, war-weary residents are bracing for an increase in violence as American troops try to succeed where the British failed. "One thing we know: the violence will increase," said Surat Khan, a brick-factory worker in Bastonzai, near Sangin. "The Americans will not be as defensive as the British. They are serious about conducting operations."

Solaiman Shah, a vegetable seller, was more sympathetic about the British losses. "The Brits have not helped us but they sacrificed a lot.

"It will take a long time for the Americans to build the same relationship with the people."

No escape yet for Bill Shaw, the Briton cleared of bribery in Kabul

2010-08-28T05:44:00.000-07:00

The Guardian, July 4

A former British army officer Bill Shaw was acquitted today of bribery charges by an Afghan court which overturned an earlier conviction and two-year jail sentence.

Though acquitted, Shaw, a senior manager at G4S, the private security company that guards the British embassy in Kabul, still has to wait for his release. At the end of a hearing lasting more than seven hours and spread over two days, he was led back to prison today to await the completion of legal formalities.

Shaw said he was "very, very excited" about the verdict, describing his time in Pul-e-Charkhi, a prison infamous for its overcrowding and squalor, as "a living hell". In a statement from their home in Leeds, West Yorkshire, his overjoyed wife Liz, said: "I just want him home and won't believe this nightmare is over until he's back with us, his family."

In an interview broadcast on BBC Radio 4's The World this Weekend, Shaw described his ordeal as the "lowest part of my life". He said: "They moved me to a place called the counter-narcotics justice centre. That to me was a picture of Guantánamo Bay.

"Everything was taken off me … all your identity is stripped from you completely.

"You put a uniform on, they issue you with one bar of soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste - that is it, no possessions. That is the lowest part of my life, nine weeks spent in there being totally controlled and administered 24 hours a day."

His daughter Lisa Luckyn-Malone added: "We have been deeply concerned about Dad's health and safety, and hope he is released very soon."

Shaw's family has led a high-profile campaign, drawing attention to the former Royal Military police officer's deteriorating health and highlighting concerns about his safety in Pul-e-Charkhi.

The father-of-three and his lawyer, Kimberley Motley, said they have both received threats and that Shaw was put in solitary confinement at his own request.

Shaw, 52, who served in the RMP for 28 years and was awarded an MBE, was arrested and fined $25,000 (£16,400) in March by Afghanistan's national security directorate for paying a bribe to secure the release of the company's bombproof vehicles which had been confiscated by the Afghan security service. Shaw said he believed he was paying a legitimate fine to release the two vehicles.

Motley said today her client had been denied basic rights, including a presumption of innocence in the first trial: "We were proving his innocence rather than the prosecution proving he was guilty." Motley said no evidence and no witnesses were produced before the court.

Motley, who told the Guardian at Shaw's conviction that the court had not followed Afghan law or UN conventions to which Afghanistan is party, said the case ought to be an eyeopener to the flaws in the system. The law, she said "does provide protection, but is not being implemented. Rule of law needs to be improved by different [donor] countries."

Donor countries, including the UK, have given considerable amounts to the Afghan government to develop legal institutions and improve the rule of law.

In a brief statement today, the Foreign Office said it was "pleased for Mr Shaw and his family", adding "the UK continues to strongly support the work of the Afghan government to counter corruption and reinforce the rule of law".

Criticism of Shaw's arrest also centred on allegations that the Afghan government was making him a scapegoat in an attempt to counter criticism of corruption.

International private security firms have also earned the hostility of the Afghan population because of their abrasive behaviour and excessive use of force, which tars even those which may be more disciplined. " We will work with the authorities to ensure that Bill is returned to his family as soon as possible," a G4S spokesman told the Guardian.

Shaw's final release will depend on whether there is a counter-appeal, though his lawyer said both his co-accused as well as the office of the attorney general had said they did not plan to appeal.

Shaw's translator, Maiwand Limar, an Afghan, was also convicted in April but had his sentence reduced today from two years to eight months, six of which he has already served.

In the absence of a counter-appeal, Shaw will be out of prison once the formalities are completed. Even if he is released, however, the court will have to rule on whether he can leave the country before the completion of the 20 days which it has given for a counter-appeal to be filed.

After his acquittal, a tearful Shaw told Sky News: "My thanks to all my supporters, here and in the UK, the British embassy and G4S who have been behind me 100%. I look forward to seeing you soon."

Opium Use Skyrocketing in Afghanistan - UN

2010-08-28T05:39:00.000-07:00

June 21/ Eurasianet

Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium producer and supplier is also a country that is confronting an alarming addiction problem, a new survey published by the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime shows. At least 1 million Afghans, or roughly 8 percent of the population, are drug addicts, the survey found.

At a June 21 news conference to mark the report’s release, Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics Mohammed Ibrahim Azhar said the number of opium users had increased by 53 percent since the last UN survey was conducted in 2005. The number of heroin users jumped 140 percent.

One place where addiction is growing the fastest is within Afghanistan’s security forces. The US Government Accountability Office reported in March that between 12 percent and 41 percent of Afghan National Police recruits (depending on the training center where the survey was conducted) suffered from drug addiction. Pointing to those findings at the June 21 news conference, the UN’s Deputy Special Representative Robert Watkins said drug use among police is a threat to the safety and security of the entire nation.

The UNODC survey also revealed the shocking statistic that as many as 50 percent of drug users provide opium to their children. In Afghanistan, raw opium paste is traditionally used to calm children, or, given the widespread lack of access to healthcare, as a pain reliever. Myriad social and economic problems – including unemployment, poverty and the general stress of over three decades of near-constant warfare – are believed to be spurring drug use among adults.

Experts say that difficulties surveying the habits and attitudes of Afghan women mean the drug-use figures, already double the global average, are likely much higher than what the survey’s findings indicate. Women comprised only 3 percent of the survey sample of over 5,000. Traditional opium-use patterns suggest there could be wide prevalence of drug use among women, pushing the nationwide figures higher.

The UNODC survey did not examine drug use among children. But an earlier study, commissioned by the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Department (INL), found an “alarming trend” of addiction to opium among younger children. “Children of nine, 14 months, and between two and four years” are addicted, the INL’s Thom Browne said during a visit to Afghanistan earlier in June. “This is the youngest age group exposed to drugs that we have seen worldwide. It has never been reported before.”

According to the survey, only 10 percent of Afghanistan’s drug users have received some treatment, though 90 percent have expressed a wish for it. “The treatment gap is enormous,” said Sarah Waller, a drug demand reduction consultant with the UNODC. Waller pointed out that drug demand reduction needs to treat not just the medical addiction, but also mental health issues.
Remedies are limited. There are few treatment centers, creating a “huge deficit,” the UN’s Watkins said. Centers for women and children are even scarcer.

Despite considerable funding of counter-narcotics programs, most attention has focused on the reduction of opium production and export. Programs for reducing drug dependency are severely under-funded.

Afghans talk, Taliban shoot

2010-06-08T04:43:00.000-07:00

Asia Times June 3, 2010
By Aunohita Mojumdar

KABUL - The three-day peace jirga (council) that began on Wednesday is being projected by the international community - at least officially - as a critical moment in Afghanistan's history. The Taliban, it seems, also gave the event priority, launching a three-man suicide squad armed with rockets at the opening ceremony.
Two blasts and sporadic gunfire were heard in the air-conditioned tent as Karzai delivered his opening address, while a third took place just 200 meters from the venue. "Sit down, nothing will happen," said the Aghan president. "I have become used to this. Even my three-year-old son is used to it."
The attackers, armed with rifles and rocket launchers, had explosives strapped to their bodies under the women's burqas they had worn to slip past security staff. Two were reportedly killed and no delegates were hurt, according to local officials.
After calming delegates, Karzai said it was the Taliban's insurgency that was keeping the international occupiers they resent in the country.
"You should provide the opportunity for the foreign forces to leave," Karzai told the conference, according to the Associated Press. "Make peace with me and there will be no need for foreigners here. As long as you are not talking to us, not making peace with us, we will not let the foreigners leave."

Senior officials of Western donor countries have expressed hope that the jirga, the first concrete step in the process of "reconciliation" with armed opposition groups, including the Taliban, would provide the political impetus to bring the protracted conflict to an end. But these pronouncements smack of desperation, as the international community scrambles for the next big solution that will turn the situation around.

The three-day consultative mechanism may produce very little resolution to the insurgency. With between 1,400 to 1,600 participants expected to attend, criticism of inclusions and exclusions of participants and dissension within the government itself, an unclear agenda and threats of boycott, the peace jirga may be little more than a political endorsement mandating President Hamid Karzai to move forward toward the goal.

Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting's organizing committee, said the jirga will aim to ''identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them".

Any declaration would also likely to be shorn of real details in order to accommodate disparate views. Whatever process is set in motion this week, it is also likely that several major sections of the insurgency will remain outside the ambit of any reconciliation since they are ideologically opposed to the values represented by the incumbent government.

However, the real goal thrown up by the "reconciliation" plan is one that appears to have taken place already - rapprochement of the international community and the Karzai government.

Tired of the long military engagement, both have latched onto "reconciliation and reintegration" as the next big plan, and appear willing to subsume their differences to find a way out of the morass.

The panacea, however, is yet another refrain of the old song that a military solution alone cannot work. That song has been sung to different beats for several years now, though earlier versions included development, governance, rule of law and accountability as necessary measures to complement military achievements.

Now, apparently, those goals are being sidelined as the international community chooses to further curtail its ambitions regarding Afghanistan, reconciling itself with existing realities even when they subvert the goals of nation-building.

The goals, now pared down, are to ensure that Afghanistan does not pose a threat to Western nations, either as a staging post of international terrorist strikes or as a sanctuary for anti-Western groups to take hold.

While these aims have always been core to the Western intervention for a number of years, there was an understanding that in pursuit of those aims Afghanistan could and would be rebuilt with a new state structure, since this represented the best bet of making sure Afghanistan became a stable state, and not one vulnerable to being subverted by terrorist groups.

The safety of Afghans and internal cohesion within Afghanistan were therefore seen as being coterminous with the goal of security for the West. However, somewhere along the way the goals have diverged as the costs of the intervention have steadily risen in Western capitals.

These costs have not been inconsiderable. Ever growing casualties among Western forces, billions of dollars diverted to Afghanistan (which seem more questionable at a time of Western recession and job losses) and political prices, ranging from ministers losing their jobs in Germany, to the fall of a government in the Netherlands over the issue of Afghanistan. In the midst of this chaos, reconciliation has emerged as a way to match Western goals with existing realities in the Asian nation.

The reconciliation plan has halted, for the moment, the spectacular unraveling of relations between Karzai and the Western compact. Whatever misgivings Western nations had earlier regarding the viability of Karzai as a trusted partner - and a spate of stories in the Western media testify to this - these have now been shed in the mutual warm embrace of the reconciliation strategy. In a matter of weeks Karzai has gone from being a weak, indecisive, incapable leader burdened by an unscrupulous family to the man who will bring together the disparate interests of Afghans with exemplary leadership.

Along the way the international community appears to have swallowed several of its goals and professed commitments. Whatever the jirga may or may not discuss - it is already clear what will not be included in the discussions.

Jirga czar Farooq Wardak told a gathering of civil society representatives that "justice" and "human rights" were not on the agenda and would not be discussed. Despite the shock of the participants, Wardak was at least being honest. The issues had been sidelined long back.

Earlier this year it became clear that the government had passed an amnesty law that protected all those engaged in hostilities in the past and the present from prosecution. The law makes no distinction about the kind of crimes, whether war crimes, crimes against humanity or rape. It also makes no mention of a cut-off date.

The law was passed with scarcely a murmur from the international community even as it violates Afghanistan's commitments to international treaties, according to the country's Independent Human Rights Commission, and treads on the millions of Afghan citizens who have been victims of brutality and war crimes while also strengthening the culture of impunity.

The same international community had kicked up a fuss when the law was first introduced in 2007, but in the changed climate, the law was accepted since it had been projected as a necessary first step in the process of reconciliation.

Representatives of the millions of Afghanistan's victims have come together with the commission to present a united demand for the implementation of the transitional justice plan, under which the perpetrators of crimes - including those in the government and in powerful positions - would be held accountable.

In its eagerness not to antagonize the government and Karzai further at this juncture, the international community has failed to endorse the plan and also subverted its own proclaimed goals of strengthening Afghan institutions. The same international community, following the controversial 2009 presidential polls, had predicated its support to future elections on the government carrying out necessary electoral reforms.

However, not only were reforms not carried out, but the president introduced a new electoral law that further erodes the independence of the electoral mechanisms. While the international community had sought an independent appointment mechanism for the Independent Election Commission to prevent electoral malpractices, in actuality Karzai's new law also subverted the independence of yet another body, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which was the only institution that stood up against the electoral fraud in 2009.

Focusing purely on the international members of the ECC, the international community led by the United Nations, put all its weight behind securing the UN's right to nominate two members to the commission. This right, won through hard negotiations, was presented as an achievement but no mention was made of the fact that the new law also took away the right of independent Afghan institutions, namely the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court, to appoint members to this body.

Moreover, it institutionalized the right of Karzai, as president, to appoint members to this body, thus compromising an independent appointment mechanism. Despite the clear challenge to the process of institutional building to which the donor nations committed themselves, they accepted this erosion of independence and the forthcoming parliamentary election has received the requisite funding from the international community.

While building of institutions, rule of law, governance and support for human rights are processes which require time, resources and energy, the international community's accommodation of political expediency is not limited to this. Senior officials of the donor nations and international organizations are now saying publicly and repeatedly that they cannot afford to challenge the existing power structures in Afghanistan but must work with them.

Tackling the power structures would necessitate that the international community remain in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization senior civilian representative Mark Sedwill stated last month, while expressing hope that individuals with power and influence would support the endeavors of the government and the international community.

This hope, however, overlooks the fact that the international community, through its practice of delivering aid without adequate checks and balances, has enriched a small section of people by allowing them to acquire power disproportionate to their role, authority and legitimacy within Afghan institutions and within the community.

Sufficient levels of well-documented data have established clearly that commanders, leaders of armed militia and power-brokers have been empowered through contracts worth billions of dollars given by the international community in exchange for security, land, services and goods provided to the international community.

Moreover, the bulk of aid distributed for development and humanitarian purposes has also been channeled without sufficient oversight allowing some of its distribution to be mediated by power-brokers.

In doing so, the international community has created a clear conflict of interest. Many officials and politicians in roles of authority have profited directly from the ongoing conflict and have a direct stake in its continuation, an interest that conflicts with their expressed commitment to building a secure and stable Afghanistan.

This contradiction has been encouraged and even utilized by donor nations who, in their own domestic arena, take a dim view of a conflict of interests and have legal redress.

However, rather than tackling the contradictions, donor nations are now reconciling themselves to the existence of structural and institutional imbalances of power that they have either introduced, allowed or ignored. If that represents a contradiction between their professed word and deed, the reconciliation strategy is certainly a good way of subsuming all inconsistencies.

Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.

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Afghanistan peace jirga's unlikely critics: victims of war crimes

2010-06-08T04:29:00.000-07:00

By Aunohita Mojumdar, Correspondent / June 3, 2010

Christian Science Monitor

As the Afghan government’s peace jirga meets for a second day to discuss how to reconcile with insurgents and end years of violence, an unlikely coalition is lobbying against the effort: victims of previous wars, who say their demands deserve to be heard alongside the belligerents’.

After hours of discussion Thursday, Afghan tribal elders agreed that this peace meeting had to produce an overture to the Taliban insurgents because NATO and Afghan forces weren't able to bring security to the people.

Victims say that they too want lasting peace for Afghanistan, but argue that it requires accountability, not amnesty. The lack of justice only encourages further violence, they say.

But in a country that’s seen countless factions battle brutally and shift alliances for three decades, they acknowledge that any peace deal is more likely to bury the past than try to assign blame for the suffering and deaths of millions.

Victims’ jirga
Still, surviving family members, along with a coalition of 24 NGOs called the Transitional Justice Coordination Group gathered in Kabul last month ahead of the three-day government jirga, or council, to make their point with a “victim’s jirga.” More than 100 attendees from around the country met for two days, where they recounted personal tragedies and war crimes under various regimes, and visited a suspected mass grave at Pul-e-Charki, on the outskirts of town near the country’s largest prison.

“I am like a butterfly hovering over the grave of my sons… I have a broken heart… my children, my flowers, why did you go away from me?” lamented Taj-e-Nissa, reading a poem she had composed.

The middle-aged woman, who goes by one name, lost two sons, a daughter, father, and brother to rocket attacks during the 1990s civil war as mujahideen factions, having beaten back the Soviet Army, now battled one another for power. During the Taliban era that followed, her husband, accused of opposing the regime, was imprisoned and tortured.

Amnesty law
The war victims’ lobby had hope a few years ago that the government would heed their call – in 2005 it adopted a Transitional Justice Action Plan that called for the acknowledgment of suffering, removal of war crimes perpetrators from senior positions, and documentation of human rights abuses, among other requirements. But it was never implemented and instead expired last year.

In January it came to light that the government had adopted an amnesty law in 2007 and kept it under wraps. The law protects all belligerents, past and present, from prosecution. It passed without much comment from the international community.
“Accountability, not amnesia for past and present crimes is a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan,” the TJCG said in a statement criticizing the amnesty.

The law prevents virtually all investigation or prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape, and torture, they pointed out. It has no cutoff date, thus allowing armed groups to continue to act with impunity. Though it allows victims to seek prosecution for war crimes, critics point out that individuals cannot realistically take on a warlord.

Two other independent groups – the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) – have also criticized the law. They point to Afghanistan’s international treaty obligations, which calls for the prosecution of certain serious crimes.

“It is questionable whether measures that ignore the rights of victims, promote impunity and undermine accountability contribute to stability and reconciliation in the long run,” they said in a joint statement in February.

Some survivors, though, recognizing how improbable their call for justice is, say they would settle for simply an acknowledgment of their suffering. Says Arab Shahi, whose brother was tortured to death by government forces under the Soviet regime even though he worked as an official in the Ministry of Education, “We don’t want revenge. We do not want an eye for an eye…. [But] the perpetrators should at least apologize.”

‘Not our reconciliation’
Others, like Engineer Niamat, wish they could find out exactly what happened to their missing relatives.

After his brother disappeared in 1978, Mr. Niamat, a teacher at the police academy, tried desperately to find him. Years later his family learned the brother had been killed, but his body was never found.

Niamat, who lost five other brothers in conflict, gathered last month with dozens of others at the site of the suspected mass grave. For him, that visit held more hope for him than the government’s peace jirga.

Asked about the official gathering, he is dismissive.

“This is the reconciliation of the government,” he says. “This is not our reconciliation.”

ttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0603/Afghanistan-peace-jirga-s-unlikely-critics-victims-of-war-crimes

Afghan Reconciliation Jirga Set to Convene amid Skepticism

2010-06-08T04:26:00.000-07:00

June 1

Eurasianet

The checkpoint at the entrance to the Loya Jirga complex in Kabul highlights the challenge facing President Hamid Karzai as his administration strives to reconcile with moderate Taliban elements. Security at the Jirga is perhaps heavier than at a major Western airport, with all vehicles and equipment being swabbed and checked for evidence of bomb-making residue. The government’s fear of a car bombing appears to be just as great as its desire to win insurgents back over to its side.

The three-day loya jirga, or grand council, which will mull Karzai’s reconciliation and reintegration plan, is scheduled to open June 2. Taliban representatives have not been explicitly invited to participate in the debates, said Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting’s organizing committee. But, Amin added, the Taliban will have sympathizers among the participants who can represent the Islamic militants’ interests. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].

The approximately 1,600 delegates to the National Consultative Peace Jirga will aim to “identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them,” Amin said.

To keep the proceedings manageable, delegates will be divided into 28 groups. Technical facilitators have undergone training in order to keep debates efficient and orderly. At the end of the three days of discussions, it is hoped that the entire jirga will be able to produce a declaration of intent. However, distilling the decisions of the 28 groups into one common position promises to be difficult. Local Afghan media outlets in recent days have highlighted policy differences among the country’s top leaders, suggesting that the jirga could be contentious and have trouble harmonizing disparate views.

Regardless of the jirga’s outcome, its decisions and declarations will be non-binding on the government. The word “consultative” was added to the jirga’s official title after members of parliament criticized what they saw as an administration attempt to circumvent legislative authority. As a result, all jirga decisions will require the endorsement of either the cabinet or the legislature.

On the eve of the jirga, there remained the possibility that a significant number of MPs would boycott the event. Legislators had demanded that Karzai fill out his cabinet before the convocation of the jirga. Already, Abdullah Abdullah, the main opposition leader and unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2009, has announced he will stay away from the gathering, contending that it will not be adequately representative of the Afghan nation. “This jirga started with the government, and will end with the government,” Abdullah said during a news conference.

Since Karzai unveiled his plans during a donor conference in January, the reconciliation idea has faced skepticism from several Afghan constituencies. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Human rights activists have expressed concerns that Karzai was willing to make sacrifices on Afghanistan’s democratization in order to cut a deal with moderate Taliban elements. “Reconciliation should not be a reconciliation behind curtains, just a political reconciliation,” Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, told a gathering of civil society groups who have been working together to demand transitional justice.

An essential factor for securing a stable future for Afghanistan is an honest accounting of past actions during the country’s past 30-plus years of strife. Those who committed atrocities must be held accountable, Nadery has asserted, adding that the implementation of Karzai’s reconciliation plan could become an obstacle toward this end. In early May, some rights advocates organized their own “victims’” jirga, during which they questioned whether reconciliation without justice could bring peace.

Also skeptical about the reconciliation initiative are women’s advocacy groups. Amid intense lobbying in recent months, approximately 20 percent of the jirga’s delegates will be women. Originally, only 30 women had been slated to participate in the debates. While women will still be vastly underrepresented at the gathering in relation to their percentage of the population, observers view the expansion of female delegates as a significant development. How influential the female delegates will be in defending women’s rights remains to be seen. Some advocates worry that the small gains made in recent years in the sphere of women’s rights will be rolled back. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. While reconciliation as a means of shortening, or even ending the war has been supported by most donor states publicly, many Westerners in Kabul express doubts in private. “The Karzai government’s plan does not seem like a political plan at all,” said a Western diplomat. “It resembles a project proposal.”

To many Western policymakers, the reconciliation route seems to be the best option among an array of unappetizing choices. Perhaps the top priority should be improving the Afghan government’s responsiveness to popular needs and concerns. But many international observers emphasize that bringing about such a transformation would take decades. “We can’t reconstruct Afghanistan’s power structure from scratch, so we have to co-opt the power brokers by making clear that their only future lies in becoming part of the solution,” NATO Senior Civilian Representative Mark Sedwill said recently. Sedwill added that an attempt to remake the power structure would require an international community presence in Afghanistan for perhaps the next 20 years.

Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.

Jirgas and jirgas; Reconciliation without the victims?

2010-06-08T04:13:00.000-07:00

June 3, 2010 in NRC Handelsblad

Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul

No one wants to play the role of the Talib. The group of women gathered in a dusty courtyard in the poor neighbourhood of Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul city, are all victims of the years of unrelenting violence in Afghanistan. Successive regimes saw murders, torture, looting and rapes as opposing factions fought their way into power. Most of the women had lost family members- fathers, mothers, brothers, husbands and children. Many had themselves suffered vicious violence. Now, through participatory theatre, (adapted from the pioneering work by Augusto Boal in Brazil), the women are coming to terms with their past. Enacting short skits recreating scenes from their own lives, the women intervene by adopting one of the roles in the skit and play it differently in order to transform the scene, a symbolic gesture that allows them to take control of their lives and change it.

NGOs working with the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population and local human rights groups are using community-based initiatives to address the trauma of years of violence in an effort to empower victims and help them transform their own lives. The success of this initiative stands in stark contrast to the inability of such groups to impact on the political and decision-making processes of the Afghan government and the donor community.

When the three-day consultative peace jirga to opens in Kabul on May 29 to hold inclusive discussions on reconciliation with the Taliban, missing from the table will be representatives of the victims groups who have firmly opposed some of the first steps in reconciliation taken by the Afghan government, including the amnesty law and the quiet burial of the Transitional Justice Action Plan.

Najibullah Amin, the Deputy Director of the Peace jirga is unfazed by the criticism. “We are all victims of war. The 1600 people who will participate in the jirga are all victims. The whole nation is a victim.”

At this moment the peace jirga has 13 categories of representatives including members of parliament, religious leaders, provincial council members, traders, civil society, Kuchis, governors, women and community elders amongst others. While there is no ‘ban’ on the participation of the ‘opposition’ – members of armed insurgent groups- Amin says it appears to be a hypothetical scenario. The jirga has not evolved any mechanism that would guarantee them safe passage for that participation. The jirga, he says will focus on consulting the nation on how to reach peace; the mechanism by which this can be achieved; identify those who are reconcilable and those who are not, and direct the government to take certain steps.

While Amin’s contention of every Afghan being a victim is acknowledged by civil society groups which have come together under the banner of the Transitional Justice Coordination Group(TJCG), they argue that political decisions are being taken by the powerful elite in their own interests, ignoring the larger interests of the powerless majority. An example, they say, is the Amnesty law. The law provides amnesty not just to “all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before the establishing of the Interim administration” (Hamid Karzai’s government of 2001), but it also provides amnesty to those “still in opposition” to the Afghan government. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission(AIHRC) has criticized the law as has the International Centre for Transitional Justice(ICTJ). In a joint paper both argued that the law was bad because: it violated the Afghan government’s obligation to pursue prosecution of war crimes as a signatory to international human rights treaties; it provided a form of self-amnesty being passed and adopted by those who would benefit from it without wider consultation of the population; it also provided amnesty in perpetuity since there was no cut-off date, thus encouraging a culture of continuing violence and impunity.

Adopted quietly in December 2008, the law only ‘appeared’ in the official gazette in December 2009, a most propitious time for its acceptance, with the donor community having identified ‘reconciliation and reintegration’ as the way out of the conflict, a decision that was officially endorsed at the London Conference in January 2010.

Predictably, any international criticism was muted and confined largely to NGOs and non-state actors. Responding to a question on the law, the new European Union Special Representative Vyguadas Usackas says the international community “did not see what we wanted to see” in terms of the Amnesty Law and Transitional Justice. He however argued that it was up to “Afghan people to use their democratic processes in influencing and developing a participatory democratic culture.” That is easier said than done. It is the Peace Jirga, reconciliation process and the Afghan government which is getting the bulk of funding and political backing of the international donor community rather than civil society initiatives relating to this process.

Those arguing for the implementation of the transitional justice plan argue that they are not opposed to reconciliation initiatives, but rather, in support of a reconciliation which is sustainable. “Reconciliation must include the victims” says Nader Nadery, a Commissioner in the AIHRC. “It should not be a reconciliation behind the curtains. It should not be just a political reconciliation.”

Amin refutes the suggestion that the current form of reconciliation is only a means of sharing power. “All Afghans have the right to political power” The peace jirga, he says, is going to address the issues that block peace.

Women’s groups for one are enthused that they have been admitted in large numbers to the jirga. Their advocacy has helped push their numbers up from 30 to over 300, a number that they hope will enable them to voice their concerns, even if they cannot influence the proceedings.

There is widespread skepticism on whether the hardcore insurgents groups can be reconciled at all. Asked why no one took on the role of the ‘Talib’ character in the participatory theatre, women gathered there said it was futile, because “a Talib is unchangeable.”

While women’s rights groups fear that their hard-won rights might be reversed in compromises with an intolerant conservative ideology, victims groups fear the jirga is a means to silence their voices. To prevent this, a ‘victims’ jirga held on May 9, brought together victims from different parts of the country to share harrowing stories of their pain and suffering. One of those who suffered brutal violence and lost most members of his family is Ali Faizi who acknowledged the common past of the victims cutting across ethnic and geographical divides. “We have a common suffering. But if we do not treat this wound now, it will afflict future generations.”

A narrow vision returns meagre gains

2010-05-04T01:04:00.000-07:00

India appears to have become hostage to its own rhetoric on Afghanistan

Times of India, April 17, 2010

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Washington visit is being viewed as a having yielded some gains for Indian foreign policy, having secured an apparent endorsement of the Indian role in Afghanistan. The implication, both overt and covert, has been that India scored a win over Pakistan given the latter’s attempts to curtail India’s presence in the country. The perspective is not new. The success and failure of the Indian role and presence in Afghanistan since 2001 has been largely interpreted through the Indian ability to influence the international community on Pakistan. Bringing pressure on elements within Pakistan and the Pakistani establishment, which are supportive of insurgents with a totalitarian worldview is certainly a valid concern and gains have been made in this area.
However, by restricting its role and influence to this narrow interest, Indian foreign policy is losing sight of the bigger picture. The wider strategic interests of the international community that includes Western countries as well as regional players have been ignored as have crucial decisions impacting on the stability of Afghanistan. By focusing mainly on Pakistan, the Indian government scores brownie points domestically, but ignores the long-term interests of the region and India in particular.
Though differences between the US and India on Afghanistan is now acknowledged, a realisation of these differences remains limited to the difference of perception on how to deal with Pakistan. South Block has repeatedly stressed that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, i.e. stability of the country. While it is difficult to fault such admirable ambitions, a more mature foreign policy position would require looking at the details of the ‘stability’ that has remained elusive in Afghanistan after nine years of a US-dominated policy. There is universal acknowledgement now that security in the country is at its worst since 2001 even as the Western countries are moving towards a disengagement of troops. Beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of ‘stability’ may look very different from that envisaged by India.
Unfortunately for India and the region, Indian policy in Afghanistan continues to be stuck in the past, relying on bilateralism, the historicity of Indo-Afghan friendship and the ‘feel good’ factor, rather than recognising new realities. Though there is plenty of goodwill for India, which is seen, rightly or wrongly, as a disinterested benefactor with no axe to grind, the Indian government appears to be either unwilling or unable to leverage this in the pursuit of larger strategic interests of both India and the region, ceding policy-making on stabilisation entirely to the western countries engaged in Afghanistan, particularly the US. The costs of this myopia are now becoming visible.
The Western troop surge and the accompanying civilian surge is directed towards an exit strategy — now being euphemistically termed the ‘transition’ strategy. This end goal is not without a cost, given the impatience to exit. In the pursuit of its core interests — which have been publicly and clearly defined as degradation of the capabilities of the al Qaeda and the supportive Taliban in order to prevent them from attacking the US, the Obama administration is supporting several steps in the area of security and stability that have
long-term implications for the region.
Since building Afghan national forces is painstaking and time-consuming, British and American forces are rearming tribal and community militias despite clear concerns that such a step, without clear and accountable chains of command and control will rebound with a vengeance. They are encouraging the rapid build-up of the Afghan army and police, a move that is also viewed by some experts as a dangerous acceleration that would erode institutional stability of the armed forces. The recent emphasis on reconciliation with the insurgent groups also has its genesis in the need to bring the ongoing conflict to a manageable level that would allow the Western troops to exit gracefully. Almost all the steps are designed for shortterm stability and may, in all likelihood, lead to long-term instability in Afghanistan and region.
So why are South Block’s astute mandarins and the political leadership in India still viewing their role in Afghanistan through rose-tinted glasses? Not only has India not engaged in decision making on these issues, it is completely absent from policy making on a spectrum of issues in Afghanistan. It directs its efforts in Afghanistan bilaterally on the grounds that it does not have a political agenda in Afghanistan, as if India’s neglect of multilateral strategising would make these multifarious interests disappear. Whilst projecting itself as a key regional player, India has also neglected its relationship with key players Russia and Iran who are crucial to Afghanistan’s and the region’s stability.
It is no wonder then that when decisions are taken by the Afghan government and the international community — on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan or on making compromises with the Taliban — India finds itself out of the loop, unable to exercise its clout, its muscles having rusted from disuse.
Astute international diplomats are aware that little more is required to please the Indian establishment than the occasional rant against Pakistan, enough to keep the Indian government happy. Shrewd Afghan politicians are aware that rhetoric on the mutual goodwill and stroking the Indian establishment’s ego goes a long way, while real decisions are taken in consonance with the Afghan government’s Western allies.
Signs of the Indian establishment’s inability to comprehend Afghanistan’s enormous strategic interest are evident. Despite the presence of five consulates, the Indian embassy in Kabul has less than a handful of staff who can engage at the diplomatic level on the multilateral arena that is Afghanistan, falling far short of requirements in this complex and fast-changing environment. It is true that India will not be able to shape or influence all strategic decisions in Afghanistan given other overweening interests. The pity is that it is not even trying

Afghanistan aid groups say NATO threatens their neutrality

2010-05-04T00:52:00.000-07:00

Afghanistan aid groups say NATO threatens their neutrality
21 April 2010 | Panos

Humanitarian groups in Afghanistan say NATO's involvement in development aid threatens to undermine the neutrality, reputation, and safety of aid workers.

The French aid group Solidarites, has worked in Afghanistan for 30 years. In the dusty streets and weather-beaten compounds of Kabul, Bamiyan, and Samangan, it was common to see signs and boards advertising their development work on water and sanitation. Not any more. "We now maintain a low profile" says Hassan El Sayed, the group's country director.

Intensifying conflict has forced aid groups to spend more money on travel and security. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) says the Taliban and other armed opposition groups exert varying degrees of influence over 80 per cent of the country. This growing insecurity has made it harder for humanitarians to reach vulnerable populations.

Military delivering aid
More worryingly, say NGOs, international military forces are becoming increasingly involved in delivering aid and humanitarian assistance in a bid to win hearts and minds. "When military actors try to do things we do, then actors that would target military would target us. This forces us to be low-profile," says Sayed. Solidarites, like many non-profit groups feels their safety and neutrality is increasingly under threat by the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian aid. "We have no branding or identity on our vehicles," says Farhana Faruqi Stocker, the country director of Afghan Aid, "and no signs on our compounds."

Military forces are spending money on development and humanitarian aid directly, through 26 civilian–military provincial reconstruction teams,(PRTs), the first of which was set up in 2003.These teams of military staff, diplomats, and civilian experts in reconstruction are located on military bases. Each PRT is manned by the troops of NATO countries and led by a single NATO member country.
Robert Watkins, the UN Deputy Special Representative and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator has criticised this mode of delivering aid saying it "gives the wrong signal to communities who then perceive all aid to be associated with the military." "This has led to threats of violence against the humanitarian community and hampered their ability to deliver needed services," he said in a press conference in Kabul last month.

No direct targetting
When one of Solidarites' drivers was wounded by a roadside bomb in July last year, Sayed felt sure it was not a result of direct targeting, since the NGO is well known in the area in which the accident took place. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) NGOs were involved in 172 incidents in 2009, with armed opposition groups behind most of these. Fifty-nine NGO staff were kidnapped even though most were released unharmed. All those killed were Afghan nationals, whom ANSO says, remain more exposed than their international counterparts.

Nevertheless ANSO maintains that "the Taliban and most armed opposition groups still do not systematically target NGOs."When NGOs have been attacked or threatened by armed groups, it has usually been a result of the perception that the NGO lacked neutrality, they say. "NGOs working in all provinces would be well served to adhere to humanitarian principles as AOG are harshly unforgiving to those who do not."

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) says it is involved in humanitarian aid in "extremis circumstances" only. Its spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay says, "humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality."

Lack of neutrality
NGOs however insist that the international military by definition cannot be seen as a neutral actor. Many NGOs have also refused to go into areas that have recently been ‘cleared' through operations by international military forces. In a public campaign over the past year, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children UK and other international NGOs with long experience in Afghanistan have said the militarisation of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict.

"Humanitarian aid has to be independent, neutral and impartial" says Hassan El Sayed of Solidarites. "Can you imagine how we would be perceived if we arrive after US tanks?" Most of the principled NGOs would not be able to go into these areas, he says.

Laurent Saillard, the Director of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella body for Afghan NGOs, agrees. "What gives the NGOs their capacity to work is the quality of their relationship with the community. What guarantees the security is not the military or their operations. This is a myth. It is complete propaganda. NGOs don't buy it and have never asked ISAF or the US army for their security."

The trend of donors routing aid resources to support their military strategy appears likely to continue. The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) recently told the BBC the military and civilian efforts needed to be combined as security is such a huge problem. In its recent document on Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the US government described its desire to have civilians acting as ‘force multipliers", and it emphasised its intention to route its (aid) money through the provincial reconstruction teams in conflict zones.

"I can understand why they do it. The deployment is unpopular and the body bags are coming back" says another NGO worker, who asked not to be named. Donor countries see aid as a means of pacifying the anger provoked by military operations, but NGOs insist that they will continue to try and carve out a neutral space, however limited.

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AMNESTY LAW FUELS DEBATE ON RECONCILIATION PROCESS

2010-04-13T03:07:00.000-07:00

Eurasianet, March 15, 2010

Sakina is angry. "Who is Karzai to forgive the deaths in my family?" she fumes. "Was his home looted? Was his son killed? What gives him the right to forgive on my behalf? He has no right." The source of Sakina’s ire is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s reconciliation initiative.

As part of the reconciliation effort, Karzai is supporting an amnesty law that offers blanket immunity to all parties responsible for atrocities committed in Afghanistan over the past three decades, including Taliban militants. Forgiving the Taliban is not something that Sakina is capable of at this point in time. The middle-aged widow from Dasht-e Barchi, a poor neighborhood of west Kabul, lost her husband and niece in the conflict, and feels that Karzai’s administration is taking away her right to justice.

"He wants to give the Taliban money, land and privileges. [And] to me, a victim, he gives a widows’ pension of 300 afs [afghanis] a month [$6]," continued Sakina. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In Afghanistan’s legislative process, a draft law must be ratified by parliament, signed by the president, and then published in an official gazette before it takes effect. The actual process is sometimes far murkier. Parliament passed a controversial amnesty law - offering immunity to all those involved in past, present and future hostilities, including war crimes or crimes against humanity - in 2007. But the initiative generated considerable opposition from Karzai’s international allies and human rights groups who saw it as an attempt by former commanders-turned-MPs to give themselves immunity. Thus, the Reconciliation and General Amnesty Law was not immediately published.

In January of this year, however, news spread that the law had been quietly printed in December of 2008. With the international community now behind Karzai’s reconciliation strategy, the government is now apparently hoping that the amnesty law will be accepted without creating too much of a stir.

So far, the international community’s muted response suggests Karzai’s timing may have been right on. But growing opposition from within Afghanistan, led by human rights and civil society groups, also indicates that the president’s reconciliation efforts may soon hit a brick wall.

Opponents of the amnesty law contend that it is unconstitutional. According to a paper prepared jointly by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, a body mandated by the Afghan constitution, and the International Center for Transitional Justice, the amnesty law contradicts Kabul’s obligations under international law to prosecute serious crimes such as torture, rape, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Article 7 of the Afghan constitution spells out the country’s obligations to abide by international treaties covering war crimes.

Activists describe as especially problematic the "blanket" amnesty from prosecution, which does not make exceptions for war crimes such as rape, torture and genocide; grants immunity for crimes that may be committed in the future; and benefits former combatants who voted for the bill in their current roles as MPs.

As worded, the law covers "all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before establishing of the interim administration [in 2001]," as well as "those individuals and groups who are still in opposition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and cease enmity after the enforcement of this resolution and join the process of national reconciliation and respect the constitution and other laws and abide them." Without a cut-off date, the law offers those committing crimes impunity to continue doing so until they please.

As a concession to victims of war crimes, the law provides for individuals to make claims against alleged assailants for specific crimes. However, human rights groups point out that the lack of security and rule of law in Afghanistan makes it almost impossible for individuals to gather evidence and pursue criminal cases against powerful parties involved in the war. "It is fantasy to think that an individual can take on a major war criminal alone," Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, said in a March 10 statement. "In practice, individuals have severely limited access to the justice system in Afghanistan," he pointed out, adding that the state should not transfer its obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations to individuals.

The government should immediately suspend the law, argued the Transitional Justice Coordination Group (TJCG), a coalition of 24 Afghan civil society organizations. Group leaders say that, rather than promoting reconciliation and stability, the law, by granting blanket amnesty, "promotes impunity and prevents genuine reconciliation." The coalition seeks "accountability not amnesia for past and present crimes as a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace," the group said in a March 10 statement. "The government of Afghanistan does not have the right to usurp the rights of victims."

The stated purpose of the law is "strengthening the reconciliation and national stability." But the TJCG coalition, human rights groups and analysts view the amnesty law as a political maneuver. "Short-term expediency in the form of reconciliation with the Taliban should not trump the rights of the Afghan people," Amnesty International said in a statement issued in early February. "The legislation is simply an effort to pervert the course of justice under the faulty guise of providing security."

"The existence of this law is as much a test of the principles of Afghanistan’s international backers, such as the United States, as it is of Karzai," said Adams of Human Rights Watch. "Will they stand with abusive warlords and insurgents, or will they stand with the Afghan people?"

"It is not for the government to decide," Azaryuon Matin of Human Rights Focus, a member of the TJCG coalition, told EurasiaNet. "Why have they not consulted with civil society [organizations]? If they sacrifice justice, democracy and human rights, there will be no way for rule of law, for human rights, no way for peace."

Afghan Women Fear Violence in National 'Peace'

2010-04-13T03:03:00.000-07:00

Wenews, March 7, 2010

KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Women's rights activists here fear a "peace deal" brewing with the Taliban may bring more violence into their lives.

To avert that, they are focused on the peace "jirga"--a gathering of traditional leaders--planned for this spring or summer.

Hundreds of women belonging to more than 70 women's organizations are battling for more than quota-style representation at the upcoming jirga.

"Before the jirga we have to make sure the right women get into the process," said Nargis Nehan, director of Equality for Peace and Democracy, a civil society group working with women and young people in Kabul. "Women must not be there just as a women's group, but must be represented through tribal groups, civil society groups, parliament, the private sector and government."

Nehan is also a representative to a regional peace commission set up a year ago by female peace activists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India that has convened twice, once in Kabul and once in New Delhi.

"Will the right women be there?" asked Palwasha Hassan, a founding member of Afghan Women's Network and country director of a Canadian funded pro-democracy group, in a recent interview.

Hassan was recently nominated by President Hamid Karzai to head the women's ministry, but she was rejected by a parliament that appeared hostile to her liberal background.

Since the beginning of this year, architects of national reconciliation have increasingly assumed that negotiations with the Taliban are necessary to end a conflict characterized by intensifying fighting and spreading violence.

However, Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific director, says that's dangerous for women.

"The Taliban established a terrible record of violating human rights during their rule and they have done nothing since then to indicate they will act differently if they return to power," Zarifi said in a statement in January, issued ahead of a conference in London for donor nations and the Afghan government to discuss a new strategy for Afghanistan.

Similar Deals Increased Violations
Similar deals with the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, Amnesty said, led to increased human rights violations. Under successive deals in areas of Pakistan's northwest frontier, ceasefires and government troops allowed Taliban forces to move in and occupy areas where they have banned girls' education, banned music and instituted summary justice like flogging, beating and even executions for those who flout their restrictions.

In addition to planning a peace jirga, early steps toward national reconciliation include the institution of an internationally funded trust fund to pay off foot soldiers of the insurgent movement.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for the inclusion of women in any peace negotiation, but Afghan women fear little, or hollow, enforcement.

More international attention is being paid to whether insurgent leaders will be present at the peace jirga than whether women will find a place. Women, after all, pose no threat to security.

Only one Afghan woman, for instance--Arzo Qanih, a member of the Afghan Women's Network--was invited to attend the London peace-planning conference in January.

"Women's engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery," Qanih told the gathering. "It is a critical precursor to success." In any negotiations, she said, women's rights must be protected.

Increasingly Insecure Environment
Afghan women face an increasingly insecure environment with a growing trend of violence against women in public life, according to a July 2009 report by the U.N.'s human rights office in Afghanistan.

Violence against women, the report found, was being perpetrated not just by anti-government forces, but also by "local traditional and religious power-holders, women's own families and communities and in some instances government authorities."

In a December report, Human Rights Watch also flagged the weakening of women's rights. "The insecurity Afghans face comes not only from the insurgency, but also from abuses by so-far untouchable government officials and warlords," the report said.

The Afghan government has promised that any peace treaty will respect the constitution's guarantees of equality for women.

Since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, women have entered the work force, joined electoral politics and taken jobs in the government.

Under the constitution, Afghan women have the same rights to voting, education and political participation as men. An article of the constitution mandates at least two female representatives from each of the country's 34 provinces.

The shakiness of such provisions was highlighted in August 2009, however, when Karzai, backed by Parliament, signed off on a Shia personal status law that subordinates women. Provisions that required a wife to ask permission to leave the house except on urgent business and a requirement that a wife have sex with her husband at least once every four days were dropped amid local and international outcry.

But the law still permits husbands to deny food and sustenance to their wives if they refuse to obey their husbands' sexual demands, grants guardianship of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers and requires women to get permission from their husbands to work, according to Human Rights Watch.

Fragility of Women's Gains
In February, a presidential electoral ordinance sought to reduce the representation of women in parliament from a minimum of two seats in each province of the country to a maximum of two seats. The final law restored the earlier, minimum, provision, but underscored the fragility of the gains women fought to be enshrined by the constitution, ratified in 2004.

Hassan's rejection by Parliament adds to the unease.

Women's activist circles have been buzzing over what they understood to be hostile questions Hassan faced in parliament, which gets little press coverage and for which there are no readily accessible record of proceedings.

In an interview with Women's eNews, Hassan said members of parliament questioned her knowledge of Islam, whether she would enforce 'hijab' (head covering for a woman) and the need for 'mehram' (male escort for women traveling outside their homes) and whether she repudiated "Western" precepts on the freedoms of women.

She said the hostile questions also came from female legislators, one of whom asked Hassan why she had instituted shelters for battered or abandoned women, which the MP characterized as "places of ill-repute."

When Hassan was rejected by Parliament, the Afghan Women's Network issued a statement calling it "very disappointing."

List of Demands
The Network has drawn up a list of demands addressed to the Afghan government and its international supporters. These include representation by women in the National Security Council and other bodies making decisions on peace and security; a share in the new trust fund for reintegration; and assurances that "reconciliation and reintegration will not take place at the expense of human rights."

Representation by women at these different levels is needed to ensure representation of women's rights in all levels of policymaking, including development issues, the group said in a Jan. 29 statement.

On Feb. 3, the New York-based U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women--CEDAW--expressed regret about the exclusion of women from the London peace conference.

"Afghan women must be full and equal participants in decision-making at all levels in the process of peace building, reconciliation, rebuilding and development of their country," CEDAW said, calling on the Afghan government as well as its international allies to ensure this.

"The numbers of women coming together is increasing," Nehan said. "Seven years ago we were ignored and that's a fact," she added, referring to the 2002 institution of the Afghan interim administration when women were excluded from decision-making positions. "Now we can't be ignored and that's a fact."

Of ‘collateral damage’ and danger of ‘reductionist’ view

2010-04-13T02:58:00.004-07:00

Deccan Herald, March 7, 2010

The weekend calm was shattered by the sound of a blast as the house shook. It was early morning Friday – the weekend here in Afghanistan – and there was no mistaking the sound. This was one of several times it had happened over the past few years – and each time it has been followed by an eerie stillness. Not this time, however. Minutes? Seconds? Later as we tried to determine the direction of the blast, we could hear what sounded like small explosions followed by gunfire.

Though Kabul has seen many explosions over the past years - remote controlled explosions and suicide bombers - the complex and well–coordinated attacks involving bombs and direct engagement have been fewer. However, the frequency of that too has been increasing. Complex and sophisticated attacks were used against the Serena Hotel, several government offices, the two guest houses attacked last week and the UN guest house with which we share our compound wall.

Since 2003 when I have been living here, the city has transformed. While in 2003 and 2004 one counted the number of new shops and buildings which seemed to spring up almost one every day, now one counts the number of new cement bollards blocking off large chunks of the street, new barbed wire fences and yet another Kabul street cut off to ordinary citizens in order to protect the international community or the Afghan elite.

Curfews, armoured cars, door to door armed escorts, safe houses, bunkers, bans on walking and shopping, armed guards - new rules for living in the conflict zone are added with every fresh incident for foreigners working with international organisations. With the intensifying conflict spreading closer and closer, Kabul resembles a city under siege in many ways and the international community assembles itself in ever tighter bubbles of sanitised protection - which prove their ephemeral nature from time to time.

Living here as an Indian woman journalist I seem to straddle several worlds. Yet I have never felt as Indian as I do now living here. The saga of the bonhomie between Indians and Afghans is now well established. Most people in India now know the tales of Afghans’ obsession with Bollywood movies, the film songs blaring from the shops and taxis, the avid viewers of the Hindi serial ‘Saas bhi kabhi bahu thi’ dubbed, in Afghanistan, in the most widely spoken Afghan language, Dari. India is seen as a friend.
Being an Indian means being greeted with warmth, with hospitality, sometimes with a barrage of tirades against Pakistan for its role in having supported the Taliban and having fuelled groups that have contributed to the violence in this country. That, especially, is the discourse in the Afghan government which blames the continuing conflict in Afghanistan entirely on Pakistan’s continuing support to armed groups of insurgents.

‘Collateral damage’

But for millions of Afghans across this country, violence comes in many forms. While armed opposition groups which include but are not confined to the Taliban perpetrate random and targeted acts of violence, especially in the volatile provinces in the South and Southeast, the presence of armed groups and the lack of rule of law cuts much wider and deeper. Afghans face violence at the hands of the groups of militias who are still to be disarmed, at the hands of predatory commanders and war lords some of whom are supported by the international community, at the hands of the government’s security forces who are supposed to protect them. They become ‘collateral damage’ from aerial bombings carried out in civilian areas by international forces. They are abused by the unofficial groups being armed to take on the task of providing stability by an international community eager to exit, and lacking the patience to see through the slow and steady growth of a national army and national police that is well-trained, armed and capable of establishing the necessary command and control structures.

Growing public discontent with the deployment of troops by western nations which see a rapidly rising toll of deaths amongst their soldiers (937 US troops died till the first of this month in Afghan-related operations), threatening even the survival of their governments (the Dutch government of Prime Minister Balkanende collapsed last month on the question of extending the deployment of Dutch troops), has meant that many western nations are now looking for a face-saving compromise: a measure of stability that will secure their own interests and allow them to exit Afghanistan gracefully. To do this they are willing to make some compromises.

Short-term measures for stability: building security institutions without adequate oversight, bypassing the government in delivering governance as well as development, propping up traditional justice mechanisms and, most significantly, questioning whether democracy is suited to Afghanistan.

‘Reductionist’ view

In a recent interview with this correspondent, the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, spoke of his concerns on these issues, and what he termed the “danger” of the “reductionist view of civilian goals in Afghanistan.” “Some in the international community are reticent about sustaining the Afghan Constitution in its present form, or sustaining democracy, women’s rights, embracing a kind of racist view of Afghans that they will never embrace democracy or gender equality,” Prasad said. “Of course whatever we do in Afghanistan has to be done in accord with the genius of the Afghan people and their traditions, by combining the wisdom of the past with a vision for the future. But to say that we abandon the project started in 2001 in Bonn that was pegged to the Afghan Constitution, would be unfortunate.”

Being an Indian here does not provide all the answers. However, it does bring an appreciation of the challenges. We too struggle with the contradictions and congruences of tradition and modernity, of a pluralistic society and the threat of social and political polarisations. We suffer from economic inequities and grapple with ways to imbibe external influences without losing sight of our roots.

Being an Indian here does not give me the right to preach solutions to Afghans. However it does give me the strength to debate issues – whether it is relating to women and their role, media freedoms, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. It allows me to raise questions about what being an Afghan means today, because the same questions of identity and nationhood are being asked and answered in India even today. But much of this remains at the individual level, with the region, including India, curiously content to let the western nations continue taking the lead in strategies that may further destabilise Afghanistan.

I sit here writing this a week from the terrible attack that claimed the lives of six Indians and left at least 10 injured. It is again a Friday and the city is still. But underneath the quiet there is an expectancy that things will unravel further in ways we cannot imagine now. If that happens, we in the region – Indians, Pakistani, Central Asians and Iranians - will pay the price along with the Afghans.

PRESIDENT KARZAI MODIFYING ELECTION LAW IN HIS FAVOR -- A EURASIANET Q & A WITH GRANT KIPPEN, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS COMMISSION

2010-04-13T02:58:00.003-07:00

Eurasianet, March 04, 2010

President Hamid Karzai has taken action to substantially curtail the independence of Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission before parliamentary elections scheduled for this September.

The ECC gained prominence in 2009 after it uncovered widespread fraud during the presidential elections last August. Citing "clear and convincing evidence of fraud," the ECC forced the invalidation of over a million votes cast in favor of Karzai. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Though Karzai eventually secured reelection, the voting irregularities considerably damaged the president’s image, as well as undermined the image of the government-appointed Independent Election Commission. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In February, calling for the removal of "foreign interference" from the Afghan electoral process, Karzai used a loophole in the constitution to force through legislation that allows him to appoint all five board members of the ECC. Prior to the introduction of the new rule, the United Nations had appointed three of the five board members. Thus, the ECC essentially came under presidential control, a development that stands to significantly diminish its ability to play a non-partisan role in Afghanistan’s democratic development.

The Canadian chairman of the previous ECC, Grant Kippen, a veteran of Afghan electoral processes, remained unflappable during the August elections despite "considerable domestic political pressure and interference" from Karzai’s government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Now, in an email interview with EurasiaNet, Kippen, who is now in Canada, speaks out for the first time about his frustrations, describing government pressure and noting that the government-appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC) did not follow the law.

EurasiaNet. What do you think was the contribution of the Electoral Complaints Commission to the electoral process and the credibility of the August 2009 presidential elections?
Kippen: For me personally, I think the greatest contribution to the process was that the ECC did its job properly as it is defined under the election law. We had over 3,000 complaints that were investigated and adjudicated during the elections process, which was no small feat. ? Contrary to how many people perceived the ECC, we were an Afghan electoral body where the vast majority of the staff were Afghans, which should be an enormous source of pride for the Afghan people.

EurasiaNet: The new electoral law introduced by President Karzai has a controversial clause that ends the right of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (the top UN official in Afghanistan) to appoint three members to the ECC and gives the president the sole right to appoint members. What is your view of this change? Will it impact the credibility of future elections?
Kippen: While it is important to recognize and respect the sovereignty of the government of Afghanistan to enact its own laws, it would be misleading to think that "Afghanizing" the ECC will automatically ensure a better quality complaints adjudication process. I think there are few people who would argue with the statement that there were serious problems with the electoral process last year. In order to address these problems, however, there should be an open, objective and public assessment completed about what went wrong. Only after that assessment can we properly identify the changes that should be made. Amending the election law prior to such an assessment is like putting a cart before the horse.

EurasiaNet: President Karzai argued that he was removing foreign interference from the elections in changing the law, pointing to the ECC’s role last August. How do you react to this charge that there was interference?
Kippen: The ECC went to great lengths throughout the entire electoral cycle to ensure that all candidates and their campaign teams, both for presidential and provincial council [polls], were fully informed about the role and processes of the ECC. During the audit and recount, we met or had communications with both President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah’s campaign teams on almost a daily basis, in addition to placing all our information in the public domain through our website and the media. While I can understand President Karzai’s frustration with the ECC decision that resulted in a second round being required, the ECC was not subjected to any international pressure, but did have to deal with considerable domestic political pressure and interference. [One of two Afghan ECC commissioners] Maulawi [Mustafa] Barakzai’s resignation was a direct result of domestic political pressure. Fahim Hakim, the ECC’s other Afghan commissioner, was also subjected to intense domestic pressure.

EurasiaNet: The IEC clearly did not implement all the decisions of the ECC as it was legally bound to do and yet the international community, especially the United States and the UN, signed off on the process, saying the IEC had upheld the constitution and the laws. Didn’t this set the stage for further erosion of these institutions and laws?
Kippen: It is unfortunate that the IEC did not respect the election law by fully implementing the ECC decisions. I would ask why the government of Afghanistan allowed this to happen.

EurasiaNet: There was a lot of talk on the need for electoral reforms following the presidential elections. What major areas did you think needed reform?
Kippen: I wouldn’t want to prejudge such an assessment, but one of the areas for major reform is within the IEC itself, as they repeatedly during the elections last year failed to discharge their responsibilities as defined under the law.

Another area requiring major reform is educating all major stakeholder groups about their roles and responsibilities during the election process. By stakeholder groups I mean candidates, their supporters, public officials (national, provincial and district level; police, border police, governors, army, etc., ministry officials particularly at the provincial and district level). One of the major reasons for electoral violations was that many of the people within these stakeholder groups didn’t have even a basic level of knowledge about the process itself.

EurasiaNet: Much attention has centered on the process of conducting elections and the flaws therein. Would you say that the problems are a result of a larger neglect of the entire electoral process and the lack of support given to the institutions in the period between elections?
Kippen: I completely agree. The four years between the 2005 [parliamentary] and 2009 [presidential] elections were squandered in terms of building up the knowledge and skill sets of people in the major stakeholder groups identified above. More attention and effort also needed to be spent on voter education, which was a recommendation contained in many of the observer group reports from 2005 (and [the first presidential elections in] 2004) but which was not funded or implemented.

EurasiaNet: Now there is talk of democracy perhaps not being the right form of governance for Afghanistan; talk of democracy being an "imposed" western notion. How do you view this?
Kippen: The whole point behind this process is to build strong democratic institutions and processes so that Afghans can build the kind of democracy that works for them. But first we need to make sure that these institutions and processes are independent and robust enough to allow Afghans to elect their representatives, as is their right under the constitution, without fear of intimidation or reprisal.

EurasiaNet: How do you look back at your contribution? Do you feel you were used to whitewash a bad process? Or do you feel you contributed to a more credible election? In the light of the charges leveled against the ECC, do you feel disappointed? Hurt? Misused?
Kippen: I am enormously proud of the work of the ECC, and in particular of the professionalism, dedication and contribution that all our staff (both Afghan and international) made last year. At the end of the day, the ECC did its job as defined under the election law (despite some fairly major challenges) and this should be a source of pride for all Afghans.

EurasiaNet: What are the long-term implications of this erosion of the credibility of the electoral process? On institutions? On governance? On the ongoing conflict?
Kippen: It just highlights the fact that building out sustainable democratic institutions and processes is a long-term endeavor.

EurasiaNet: What might be the best way forward from here?
Kippen: I think a new narrative is required to move forward. By this I mean that both the Afghan government and the international community need to develop a new approach and stop this blame game that has been going on since last fall. There needs to be a renewed focus and commitment to improving the process in advance of the next elections. The responsibility is a shared one.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS BREWS IN KABUL OVER NEW GOVERNMENT MEDIA RESTRICTIONS

2010-04-13T02:56:00.001-07:00

Eurasianet. March 3, 2010

Afghan journalists have a mixed reaction to a government ban on live broadcast coverage of Islamic militant terror attacks. Many in Kabul say the ban places Afghan media outlets on the slippery slope of state censorship. Some journalists, however, see the restrictions as a reasonable response to a set of threatening and extraordinary circumstances, while others are remaining silent out of concern that criticism of the government could invite official retaliation.

The Afghan Government’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), the nation’s intelligence agency, issued an order March 1 banning media from broadcasting live images of terror attacks. Officials justified the ban by arguing that live images of property damage and loss of life abetted the Taliban insurgency. Journalists violating the ban will be subject to arrest, along with the confiscation of their equipment.

The prohibition applies to both national and international media outlets. Its imposition followed a February 26 attack on two guest houses in the center of Kabul city that left at least 22 people dead and over 40 wounded. The insurgents stormed the guest houses and held off government security forces for several hours during the sophisticated and well-coordinated operation. Local media provided live coverage of the attack as it was playing out. The coverage was a PR disaster for the government, creating an impression that security forces were not as combat-capable as their Taliban opponents. The incident led to the resignation of senior police personnel in Kabul, although the resignations were not immediately accepted amid an ongoing official investigation.

Representatives of President Hamid Karzai’s administration have come out forcefully in support of the ban. Waheed Omar, a presidential aide, said the government wanted to ensure two things: "the protection of the lives of the journalists; and a mechanism that will ensure that the enemy does not use live broadcasts to plan, or to get instructions to their people at the scene, which makes not only the security forces vulnerable, but also civilians and journalists."

The ban is not the first attempt by the government to curb media coverage of the insurgency. Most recently, the NDS banned reporting on any incidents of violence during the polling hours of the 2009 presidential election.

The March 1 ban met with immediate criticism from journalist groups, including the Committee for Protection of Afghan Journalists and the Afghan National Journalists Union. Media-related non-governmental organizations, as well as a large number of media outlet owners and reporters, also came out against the restrictions.

"NDS, like most of security/intelligence agencies, puts its mission ahead of any other consideration. They [NDS officials] forget that they are bound to the same Constitution that is ensuring the freedom of information/expression" said Shahir Zahine the chairman of the Killid Media Group and a media activist.

Like Zahine, many journalists are basing their opposition on constitutional grounds. Article 34 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution specifically states: "Freedom of Expression shall be inviolable. Every Afghan has the right to express his thought through speech, writing, illustration or other means by observing the provisions stated in this constitution. Every Afghan has the right to print or publish materials without prior submission to the state authorities in accordance with the law."

"I don’t know why they [NDS officials] have instituted a ban that violates all laws," said Mujeeb Khalvatgar, a media activist.

In a possible prelude to a constitutional challenge, Zahine said he would instruct journalists working for the Killid Media Group to ignore the ban. Khalvatgar likewise stated that he was advocating non-compliance.

Acceptance of the ban, other journalists contended, could encourage the government to impose additional restrictions in the future. Ultimately, some worried, the Karzai administration may harbor desires to snuff out independent media voices.

"I think the media should not accept the ban" said Waheed Hashemi, the executive director of Nai, an Afghan media group supporting free media. "This time they want to ban live coverage. Next time they will say don’t report at all on the attacks."

Not all journalists are so adamantly opposed to the NDS restrictions. Some say that government worries about the impact of such images are legitimate, but add that officials are not addressing those concerns in the proper way. Barry Salaam, who heads a radio station, Good Morning Afghanistan, said that "NDS has a valid point to make, but they don’t know how to make it." Salaam added that it was important for Afghan media outlets to ensure that they do not inadvertently become propaganda mouthpieces for anyone, including the Taliban. "We must protect the very basis of freedom of expression and should not endanger it by irresponsible reporting."

Salaam said media outlets had to be careful in covering security-related issues, and report only "as much as our audience needs." Khalvatgar, however, argued that Salaam’s position could open the door for self-censorship. "It is not what the audience needs to know, but what they have to know. It is not a need, but an obligation."

Some media outlets are wary of taking a public position for fear of attracting the ire of the security agencies, or being denied future access to government information. "The Afghan media already have problems in accessing information and it will become more difficult to get access. The NDS can create problems for us, especially in provinces where they can stop us because they are armed" said Danish Karokhel, the director of Pajhwok an independent Afghan news agency.

Karokhel also expressed concern that the NDS restrictions would create an uneven playing field between local and international media outlets, since foreign journalists may well ignore the ban. US officials have questioned the wisdom of such reporting restrictions, and have indicated that they will raise the issue with Karzai administration officials.

Moby Capital, a media group that owns the hugely popular outlets Tolo TV and Arman FM, has yet to take a position on the restrictions, said Mohammad Abdullah, a lawyer and host on Tolo TV. The head of Tolo news, Mujahid Kakar, was reported as saying that any order concerning news coverage in Afghanistan should come through the Ministry of Information and Culture. Without commenting on the pros and cons of the restrictions, he was quoted as saying that any government order that appeared to contravene the Constitution was problematic.

The Ministry of Information and Culture itself has remained silent on the controversy. The new information minister, Sayed Makhdoom Raheen, is largely seen as more supportive of media independence.

Media activists said they intend to convene meetings of journalists over the next few days in an attempt to formulate a unified response to the NDS restrictions. "We, as media actors, need to get together and made our point to the parliament/government and to the public. We need to reclaim the space that is our due and is given to us by law" said Zahine.

Tattered parachute

2010-04-13T02:53:00.001-07:00

Himal, March 2010

Afghanisation’ has emerged as the buzz word from the London Conference on Afghanistan, held in January, one of only six international conferences held outside Afghanistan since 2001 to determine the country’s future. Following the gathering, it is now being claimed that the Kabul government has laid out its priorities for the first time. Henceforth, goes the argument, governance in Afghanistan will be Afghan-led, security will be ‘Afghanised’ and Kabul will take the lead in the process of reconciliation and reintegration with the armed insurgency. But to long-term observers of Afghanistan, the ‘new’ emphasis sounded very much like the old scriptures. Is this sudden emphasis on ‘Afghanisation’ just a coded reference to an exit strategy?

In fact, it was London and the same Labour government that, in 2006, hosted a conference that initiated the policy document called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). While far from perfect, that blueprint was and remains the seminal document identifying Afghanistan’s needs. It was finalised, adopted and endorsed by the international community in 2008 in Paris, along with pledges to route more funds through the Afghan government, allow Kabul to determine priority areas and plans for spending, and build and strengthen institutions that would allow Afghans to govern themselves. In other words, ‘Afghanisation’.

The supposedly new aspects at the 2010 London Conference were thus not the Afghanisation plans. Rather, the fresh issues revolved around a timeline for beginning the handover of responsibility for security to Afghan forces, allowing for the withdrawal of international troops. A ‘peace and reconciliation’ programme that would create the conditions allowing for this withdrawal was also an important consideration – sounding suspiciously like an exit strategy, rather than the professed long-term commitment. Western countries have tried to minimise the impact of their intention to withdraw troops by saying they would first build up the Afghanistan’s police and army forces. It is clear, however, that the troop-contributing countries are loath to wait until these two bodies are fully up and running. A week before he hosted the London Conference, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared before the US Senate to emphasise that “however much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan … local community-based initiatives are inevitable.” He concluded that the international community would need to consider supporting the latter initiatives in some circumstances.

This ‘new’ peace and reconciliation/reintegration strategy smacks of the same expediency – a chance to allow the international community to depart gracefully. In these instances, ‘reintegration’ refers to plans to buy off Taliban foot-soldiers who, it is felt, are in the insurgency mainly for economic reasons; while ‘reconciliation’ is seen as a settlement with the leadership of the Taliban based on a series of political concessions, which have not been defined to date. There is certainly little new in the reintegration proposal, as a national commission has been attempting to do just that since 2005, with limited success. Similarly, political reconciliation with the Taliban leadership remain nebulous, with the militants clearly maintaining that the Afghan state, in its current form – designed as a democratic Islamic republic with a modern Constitution and equal rights for all citizens – is unacceptable.

Worryingly, many influential sections within Western policymaking have begun questioning whether a ‘Western-style’ democracy is suitable for a ‘tribal nation’, while paying rhetorical homage to the Afghan Constitution. One hears such rhetoric in drawing-room conversations amongst internationals tasked with constructing policy for the country. A concrete example, however, is the emphasis on traditional justice mechanisms from the most influential partners. In a strategy document released by the US government at the end of January, President Barack Obama’s administration stated that it was “neither necessary nor effective to replace traditional justice mechanism with formal institutions”, adding that it would “help create space for traditional justice mechanisms to re-emerge in areas cleared of the Taliban”. While it is true that the formal justice system is not accessible to the majority of citizens currently, the traditional justice mechanisms based on customary law are deeply problematic. The Pashtunwali code, for example, includes the use of women as barter to settle debts, resolve disputes and as retributive payments. This is not only in the case of criminal law, but also in civil disputes. Laws also allow for retributive killings of family members of the person who has committed a crime.

Writing recently for the respected Afghan Analysts Network recently, Anders Fange, the country director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, argued that one of the two fundamental mistakes made by the international committee was its “obsession to impose an essentially western state model and political organisation, completely ignoring the fact … that Afghanistan is a predominantly traditional society where a more unpretentious version would have been more appropriate and sustainable.” Fange argued that the loya jirga system of local gatherings, which would appoint representatives for decision-making, would probably have been better than the general elections. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that traditional mechanisms, which were only partially representative, have been vitiated by years of war,
with community leaders being sidelined or subverted by the ongoing conflict and the emergence of money and muscle power.

This reading also does not even recognise that the current form of democracy in Afghanistan does not resemble any Western-style democracy, nor even any democracy in Southasia. As things stand, the Afghan system forbids participation by political parties, while its combination of system of single, non-transferable votes, along with its multi-seat constituencies, is designed to ensure political fragmentation and non-representational politics. The rights enshrined in the Constitution, the laws as well as the criminal and civil codes are not yet understood by the majority of those implementing them. In these circumstances, the contention that Afghanistan has had too much, rather than too little, democracy seems designed to allow Western |countries to look the other way while a beleaguered government in Kabul compromises on hard-won human rights and civil liberties.

On the next train out
If evidence were needed of the West’s short-term focus with an eye firmly on the door, it is clear in the stated goals of the ‘civilian surge’ made public by the recent US strategy paper, in which Washington states that it intends to pour aid into provinces where its troops are based, as well as use civilians as “force multipliers”. Both of these intentions run contrary to the best principles of aid delivery and humanitarian assistance, which must be independent, neutral and driven by needs, as underscored by the UN’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) for Afghanistan for 2010, launched in November 2009. According to Robert Watkins, the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Afghanistan, the plan had received only two percent of promised funding by mid-February. The HAP map, which identifies the needs according to area, clearly shows that the provinces most in need of humanitarian assistance are not the ones being identified by the international community for aid.

NGOs working in the field have also repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the militarisation of aid. Past experiences have shown that the use of military resources for delivering aid and humanitarian assistance, as well as the use of civilians to further military objectives, has endangered the role of real humanitarian personnel, in addition to developing non-sustainable projects. Those focused on short-term benefits, including perceived short-term gains such as the militaristic efforts at winning hearts and minds, have ignored this plea. In fact, the trend towards short-term spending with an emphasis on the pursuit of military and political objectives is likely to deepen.

Meanwhile, the UN, which has a coordinating role in Afghanistan, has been unable to exercise its muscle. Indeed, it remains in a state of unprecedented crisis following the unseemly wrangling over the August 2009 presidential elections. While the spectacular falling-out between the UN’s top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his deputy, Peter Galbraith, ended with the acrimonious departure of the latter, the fissures have helped those not keen on a strong UN role. The UN’s freefall during the elections has, however, only attenuated a crisis caused by confusion over its broader role and functions. Its political mandate, which includes supporting the Afghan state-building project, has mired the organisation’s country team in the political chaos, eroding its ability to play a neutral role in the intensifying conflict.

This crisis goes far beyond the remit of the country team, however. A stronger UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) depends partially on the skills of the UN leadership within Afghanistan, but even more so on the ability of the UN leadership in New York to give its mission some teeth. That has been singularly lacking. In his hunt to find a successor to the beleaguered Eide, who is expected to leave at the end of February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could do no better than appoint an official, the Swedish diplomat Stephen De Mistura, who first turned down the job. Clearly the last thing the UN team in Afghanistan needed for its morale was a reluctant envoy to lead them.

The UN’s role is likely to be further circumscribed in the near future. Presenting the HAP, the UN has admitted that increasing insecurity has meant that there would be greater dependence on NGOs and other non-UN actors to deliver humanitarian assistance. Decreasing access and diminished authority, following the chaos of the August elections in which the UN was in a supporting role, has compromised its ability to play the role of politically neutral referee – and the Afghan government has taken advantage of this. On 17 February, President Hamid Karzai signed off on an ordinance that rescinded the UN’s right to appoint independent members to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the only body that successfully challenged the electoral fraud in the August elections (see Himal December 2009, “Is it over?”).

The UN is in a catch-22 situation. While a strong envoy might help to re-energise the organisation’s mission in Afghanistan, it would almost certainly be rejected by the Karzai government. Following the worst attack on the UN, on its guest house in Kabul city in October, in which five staffers and lost their lives, the organisation withdrew (temporarily, it said) over 600 staffers. Asked about the impact of this withdrawal, President Karzai has said that it would have “no impact”, adding “they may or may not return. Afghanistan won’t notice it. We wish them well wherever they are.”

Increasing hostility between President Karzai and the international community has turned him from an international favourite into a barely tolerated partner. Having created and backed a system in which all power is centralised in the presidency, the international community is at a loss now that President Karzai is no longer amenable to their suggestions. Under the circumstances, instead of creating institutions and processes that could balance the sharing of power and decentralise administrative authority, there is a danger that the international community, especially the US, might be headed for more quick-fix solutions. Indeed, written into its stabilisation strategy are proposals for the direct finding of select governors and ministries. While this could well help to bypass a recalcitrant President Karzai, it will end up creating parallel structures of governance and multiple sources of concentrated power, thus further deepening the reigning culture of poor accountability. These individuals, paid directly by the donors, are likely to be answerable to the main funders and not to Kabul, further weakening any effort to build institutions. Yet for those looking for a quick exit, that could prove to be the answer rather than the problem.

Tattered parachute

2010-04-13T02:53:00.000-07:00

LOYAL POLITICAL OPPOSITION FEELING LEFT OUT IN THE COLD

2010-04-13T02:52:00.000-07:00

Eurasianet, February 18, 2010

Violence in Afghanistan pays and offering the criticism of loyal opposition does not. So thinks Abdullah Abdullah, the losing presidential candidate in Afghanistan’s 2009 election. In an interview with EurasiaNet in Kabul, Abdullah derided Afghan government plans to contain the Taliban insurgency, complaining that new policies could end up undermining democratization and increasing the chances of renewed inter-ethnic strife.

Abdullah -- who has maintained a low profile since losing to President Hamid Karzai in 2009’s fraud-marred presidential vote -- was in Kabul recently to launch a movement that will press for a wide array of reforms, including the establishment of a genuinely independent election commission and the promotion of broader representation of ethnic minorities in government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Abdullah asserted that the legitimate demands of those who had chosen to oppose Karzai administration policies by using non-violent, democratic means are now being ignored. To compound the indignity, the international community does not appear interested in addressing this issue, he added.

"There are groups like the Taliban that have opted for violence. [What about] those who don’t want to use violence as a means of [securing] their rights? What are their choices?" Abdullah asked. "If the international community watches that and doesn’t do things that are needed, then what is left?"

"There are a few thousand people [insurgents] who are fighting, but there are millions of people in this country who have many other priorities and demands," Abdullah continued. "One of those demands for example is for an independent election commission. This government ? [is] talking about bribing the Taliban and bringing them back. So you see this imbalance and the international community is also witness to this imbalance."

The reconciliation strategy developed by the international community and Afghan government is severely flawed, Abdullah contended. Any reconciliation has to be localized, he said, adding that ideas about "a broader reconciliation" were "an illusion." Ideologically, Taliban leaders are "not there to be part of the democratic system, but to destroy it, and bring it down and replace it." He questioned why the international community appeared to lack an institutional memory about the Taliban’s behavior in power during the 1990s. "They have to explain it" he said.

As for the tactic of offering payments to rank-and-file insurgents to lay down their arms and renounce violence, Abdullah is skeptical that it can work. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
He hinted that such payments might do more to destabilize society than they would to curb violence.

"Buying the Taliban [is] really, really dangerous and can lead to insecurity" he said. The so-called reintegration payments could have the unintended consequence of creating "a new marketplace." In such an environment, people would have an incentive to find guns and go into the mountains in order to claim reintegration money, he said. Abdullah also wondered if Afghanistan’s infamously corrupt bureaucracy had the capacity to properly administer a reintegration program.

During the Taliban’s time in power in Kabul, Abdullah was a leader of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, which provided the main armed opposition to the imposition of the radical Islamic movement’s social agenda

Currrently, non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan are being marginalized, Abdullah asserted. He pointed to the fact that key cabinet and administrative positions are being filled by a disproportionately high number of Pashtuns. "This is too much for the country. The rest of the people are being ignored," Abdullah said. He stressed that he was not trying to speak on behalf of any single ethnic group, but was merely trying to act as an advocate for greater inclusiveness in the political process.

Abdullah claimed that leaders of armed insurgent groups, such as the notorious Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had successfully used violence to gain bargaining leverage. Kabul is now swirling with rumors that negotiations are underway to bring Hekmatyar into the government. If that happens, it would only enhance the Pashtun domination of the levers of power, Abdullah asserted.

These days, Abdullah commands an influential following within the country’s parliament. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the legislature has obstructed Karzai’s efforts to appoint his cabinet. Many appointees are still awaiting confirmation, and Abdullah admitted that a group of 50 or so MPs (out of the parliament’s 249 overall members) who are fiercely loyal to him had played a key roll in blocking the president’s strategy.

"We decided what to do and got what we wanted - more or less," Abdullah explained. "Our decision was not to vote for the cabinet. We knew we don’t have an overall majority, but it (our decision) was important in the rejection of 70 percent of the ministers."

Until recently, Abdullah had been reluctant to try to form his own political party. But now he is touting a group of parties and interest groups that calls itself the "Coalition for Change and Hope." He said the coalition, which has formed a secretariat, would contest the next parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2010.

On February 17, Karzai signed a decree to remove the international presence from the Electoral Complaints Commission, an institution that blew the whistle on some egregious examples of fraud during the 2009 presidential vote. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Abdullah maintained that unless better, more expansive restraints were placed on incumbent authorities, electoral fraud would become an institutionalized practice. "I will still encourage them [members of the Coalition for Change and Hope] to participate [in the parliamentary elections] because this is the only process that I believe in, the democratic process, but I hope that we will get it right," he said.

Civilian Deaths Mar Start of Offensive in Afghanistan

2010-04-13T02:50:00.004-07:00

Sphere, AOL, February 14, 2010

The spectacular ground assault by 15,000 international and Afghan troops in southern Helmand province enters its third day amid early challenges and growing concern among Afghans about the offensive's goals and the chances of achieving them.

Operation Moshtarak (which means "together" in the Dari language) claimed its first civilian casualties on Sunday when two rockets fired at insurgents by NATO troops missed their target and killed 12 people.

International troops have come under intense fire in the town of Marjah, the offensive's prime objective, and are encountering Taliban mines, improvised explosive devices and boobytraps there and in the nearby center of Nad Ali.

The civilian casualties included 10 members from one family, Afghan President Hamid Karzai's office said. Karzai had urged international forces before the operation began to "exercise absolute caution to avoid harming civilians" and "to continue to consult the local people, fully coordinate their actions and to avoid using air power in areas where civilians can be at risk."

The top commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has made reducing civilian casualties a priority, apologized to Karzai for the incident and suspended use of the rockets responsible.

Former Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who was Karzai's rival in August's presidential elections, described the assault in Helmand as "necessary" and "the right part of the strategy."

"Without changing the momentum and turning the tide against the Taliban militarily, one can only expect worsening of the situation," he told AOL News. But Abdullah added that the operation's success depends on the follow-up.

"It is for the Afghan government to win the trust of the people so that people are not afraid that the Taliban will come back; so that they are not faced with Afghan officials who are worse than the Taliban," Abdullah said. "Re-grouping (of the Taliban) does not happen automatically but with bad governance and injustices it might happen."

Drawing on his own experience in fighting a guerrilla war -- Abdullah was closely associated with the Northern Alliance -- he said insurgents need sanctuaries where they can rest and get medical care. In this case, Abdullah said, those hideouts are in Pakistan -- and they need to be tackled.

But the first objective is to win the hearts and minds of Afghanis, and McChrystal is hardly alone in noting that avoiding civilian deaths is key to that process. Haroun Mir, director of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), called that "a challenge" for the international forces.

Orzala Ashraf, an activist who has been working on women's rights and human rights issues in Afghanistan for more than a decade, warned "if there is the death of even one child inside Helmand, they will be responsible for that death."

Ashraf also questioned the strategic value of the operation, suggesting that the Taliban would merely melt away into the surrounding areas.

"Are these districts up in the air without any connection to the neighboring areas? Are the Taliban surrendering? They will be killed or they will escape and they will continue to fight," Ashraf said. She also predicted the Taliban would retaliate by striking elsewhere as they had done in the past.

There has been skepticism across the board about the Karzai government's ability to establish control over the region after the military phase of Operation Moshtarak ends.

"In the aftermath, will the Afghan government be able to provide services? Or will there be corrupt officials who carry out vendettas instead of providing justice? Will President Karzai act differently this time? We don't know," said Mir, who felt the operation could either become an example of success or a "failed case."

The cost of the failure would be high indeed. The ratio of international and Afghan forces to the Taliban -- 15,000 troops compared to an estimated 1,000 Taliban fighters -- has not gone unnoticed in the Afghan public.

"This is a show," said Ashraf, expressing an opinion that is shared by others in Afghan politics who did not want to be quoted. Some feel the military surge is geared more toward the domestic audience in the U.S. and Britain than to the realities Afghans face.

The sheer extent of the operation, and the imbalance of forces on the two sides, raises the stakes on failure, Ashraf points out. An unraveling of military gains in the two small districts now being contested would give a huge boost to the Taliban. More significantly, it would shift public perceptions, giving Afghans the idea that the Taliban can win even in the face of overwhelming odds. That makes Operation Moshtarak a must-win engagement for the joint Afghan and international forces.

DECODING REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION

2010-04-13T02:50:00.003-07:00

Eurasianet, February 9, 2010

"Reintegration" and "reconciliation" are two buzzwords that are driving stabilization efforts in Afghanistan these days. But the terms mean different things to different stakeholders in the process.

"Reintegration" denotes the laying down of arms by rank-and-file Taliban militants in exchange for guarantees of safety, immunity and employment. It rests on the rationale that many Taliban grunts are motivated not by ideological or theological factors, but are instead driven to fight by economic necessity, i.e. poverty. According to Mohammed Masoom Stanakzai, an Afghan presidential advisor and vice chairman of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, the reintegration process must address three issues: guaranteeing the security of those Taliban elements who lay down their arms; providing them with economic livelihoods; and ensuring they do not rejoin the insurgency.

"Reconciliation," meanwhile, refers to plans to hold talks with insurgent leaders - or elements driven by ideological motives -- with the aim of trying to reach a political settlement that could put an end to the fighting.

Newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool (formerly the national security adviser) claimed on February 1 that the international community had, for the first time, backed Kabul’s vision, which includes both political reconciliation and reintegration components.

But some observers suggest Rasool may have been jumping the gun with his assessment. It is true that the reintegration concept enjoys broad international support, but the same cannot be said for President Hamid Karzai’s notion of reconciliation, which he sketched at a January international conference in London. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012910.shtml

Despite general agreement on the need for some sort of political reconciliation at some point, there is still no consensus on many aspects of a process to find a political settlement. At a security meeting in Munich on February 7, Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the United State would not speak directly with Taliban representatives at this time, but he did not dismiss the Afghan government’s efforts to reach out to militant leaders who have no affiliation with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.

Western leaders have referred frequently to the need for an "Afghan-led" reconciliation process. But their calls have concealed an inability to agree on the process’ basic parameters. For several years, Karzai has issued calls to all insurgents and their leaders to "return home," naming specifically Mullah Mohammed Omar. Yet the Taliban supremo remains outside the pale of potential negotiating partners for the US government.

The diverging views of the US and Afghan governments were on display at the London conference. There, Karzai was touting his plan to create a "National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration." Western leaders, meanwhile, pledged $140 million to an Afghan-led "Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund" that conspicuously avoided initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation.

Even the reintegration initiative is fragmented. The United States, for example, insists on forming its own parallel Taliban-reintegration fund to be administered by the Defense Department, via American commanders in the field. This program, dubbed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund, could potentially complicate Afghan reintegration efforts, especially through duplication of effort.

At his February 1 news conference, Rasool tried to play down tactical differences between the Afghan government and the international community. He maintained that the peace process could unfold in two stages: reintegration could be pursued vigorously, while the second step, the process of talking to the Taliban leadership, could proceed cautiously, in close consultation with the international community.

A central element of Karzai’s reconciliation plan is the convening of a grand peace jirga, or tribal council. Such a concept appears to be flawed, however, in that it assumes that the Taliban movement has a well-developed, top-down command & control structure in place. Scholars and political analysts doubt that the Taliban is so unified. It is a broad movement incorporating bands of militants with disparate agendas, they add. The de-centralized nature of the Taliban leadership makes it difficult to engage the movement, as any representatives that attend discussions would have difficulty making the claim that they speak for all militant elements.

Beyond the engagement question, the Afghan government must address some significant structural issues before the stabilization process can expect to bear fruit. Among the big-picture notions that Afghan leaders must clarify are; what values will define a post-war Afghan state?

Afghan women’s rights advocates in particular are worried about the possible implications of reconciliation efforts. Many believe that the Karzai administration would be willing to curtail women’s rights in order to placate ultra-traditionalist Taliban leaders. To alleviate this concern, any debate about the Afghan government’s potential negotiating partners should be accompanied by discussion about what kind of government might reconciliation efforts produce.

DECODING REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION

2010-04-13T02:50:00.001-07:00

Exit west, enter chaos

2010-04-13T02:47:00.001-07:00

Times of India Crest Edition, February 6, 2010

Kabul will once again be the backdrop of an intense power struggle. The West wants a power-sharing deal between the Taliban and Karzai, but Karzai doesn’t really stand a chance When Nadir returned to his homeland from the West, following the collapse of the Taliban, one of his first ventures was a restaurant at one of the most popular picnic spots frequented by Afghans. Sitting there and sipping tea, overlooking the waters of the placid lake, it was easy for him to believe that his dream of peace and, perhaps , prosperity was possible. Well, that dream died several years ago.

The restaurant had to be abandoned , not because of the worsening conflict or the resurgent Taliban, but because of the threat from a local commander (who still calls the shots in the area; Nadir's name has been changed to ensure his safety).

While 'strategic imperatives' and the 'war against terror' occupy much of the space in the mental map of Afghanistan that observers outside the country carry around with them, for Afghan citizens the daily diet of violence comes in myriad forms.

Large pockets of southern Afghanistan face the brunt of the intensifying conflict between the progovernment forces and the anti-government armed groups.

In many other areas, the threat emanates from the local commander, the predatory muscleman or the rapacious leader. It also comes from a police force and an army, both of which are under-trained , underpaid and lack effective command and control structures . Terror comes as well from international troops trying to flush out the insurgents through aerial bombing . Remarkably, too, the unraveling of social, political and economic structures has vitiated the lives of Afghan citizens.

Though suicide bombings and mountain warfare encapsulate the most common public images of the country, detailed surveys of Afghans reveal a contrary picture. In an Asia Foundation survey last year, 17 per cent said they had directly experienced some form of violence in the previous year. Of this group, only 9 per cent said they had experienced violence from Taliban.

Worryingly, an equal proportion said they had experienced violence from the international military forces, while another 7 per cent attributed the violence to actions of the national police and the national army.

An overwhelming proportion said they were victims of crime and lawlessness . The survey, it must be underlined , does not record actual occurrences , but the perceptions of Afghans.

An overwhelming focus on 'stability' in the past eight years has led to the neglect of the needs of Afghanistan's extraordinary citizens as predatory individuals were put back in power for quick fix solutions, and pernicious practices tolerated in the name of strategy.

Now, it appears likely that the desire of influential western troop-contributing countries to make a hasty exit will result in sacrifices of hardwon rights, civil liberties and democratic practices.

'Reintegration and Reconciliation' and 'Afghanisation' are the new buzz - words, most recently bandied about in the London Conference, where western nations laid out their plans to begin handover of security operations to Afghan forces.

Despite paeans to the Constitution of Afghanistan, civil society groups fear that even the minimal rights to life, liberty, equality and safety for all sections of the population that have been won at great cost, remain extremely vulnerable and may be the first point of compromise.

The signs are already there. The initial signals include rearming of communities to ensure quick and cheap 'security' - even though it was the population's hatred for armed militias that had earlier led the way to the rise of the Taliban; increasing rhetoric about the suitability of 'Democracy' for the Afghan temperament, even though Afghans have had their own brand of participatory decision making for thousands of years; and a focus on supporting 'traditional justice systems' , which, women fear, will revert them to customary law practices that are biased against them. The constitution, the government and the parliament have proven themselves inadequate defences against a growing trend of conservatism that is dovetailing smoothly into an ideology of political compromise that might save the face of the West as they look for an exit.

You only have to ask the brave Afghan women who took to the streets to protest against a Shia personal law introduced by the government that necessitated submission to the husband in bed and permission for leaving the house. Or, the young student and journalist, Pervez Kambakhsh, who now lives in asylum - after he was sentenced to death (the sentence was commuted to 20 years and he was finally pardoned by the President) for downloading an article on the role of women in Islam. Or the women who ran away from violent abusive marriages only to find themselves in the Pule Charkhi prison outside Kabul for having violated social custom.

Most countries have taken decades to develop and strengthen jurisprudence that reflects basic human rights and values. But Afghanistan could well be on the brink of a path of reversal.

If further rights are eroded through a combination of increasingly violent conservatism in Afghanistan , the growing impatience of the West and the refusal of regional countries like India to take a stand, it will all have been done in the name of the new magic words - 'Afghanisation' and 'Afghan leadership.'

Exit west, enter chaos

2010-04-13T02:47:00.000-07:00

KABUL OBSERVERS DOWNBEAT ON LONDON CONFERENCE

2010-04-13T02:46:00.000-07:00

Eurasianet, January 29, 2010

Observers and humanitarian aid workers in Kabul are giving lackluster reviews to the London conference on Afghanistan.

Participants at the London gathering on January 28 touted a peace and reintegration program that hopes to induce Taliban militants to lay down their arms. To do that, foreign donors and the Afghan government rolled out what they described as a $500 million Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. Skeptics have already dubbed it the Taliban Trust Fund.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai stoked some controversy in London with an appeal for a so-called "peace jirga," or broadly inclusive reconciliation conference, which would seek to engage the Taliban leadership. US and NATO officials are at present reluctant to reach out to top-tier militants. The London conference also mulled a timetable for the transfer of security responsibilities from foreign forces to Afghan military and police units.

In Kabul, the London conference results generated little enthusiasm. Instead, analysts remained concerned that the country’s fragile democratization process was being undermined by the international community’s preoccupation with a questionable security plan. To some, Western leaders seem more concerned about setting a timetable for withdrawal, something that would resonate with domestic political constituents, than with establishing a realizable and sustainable development blueprint for Afghanistan.

"The London conference was not about Afghanistan, but about [UK Prime Minister] Gordon Brown’s reelection campaign," said Aziz Hakimi, a political analyst who heads an NGO working on building civil society capacity in Kabul.

For many in Kabul, the most divisive issue discussed in London was the peace and reconciliation plan. Women’s groups and human rights activists offered the most vocal criticism of what they perceived as an attempt to forgive and forget the Taliban’s past behavior.

Prior to the conference, a meeting of Afghan women facilitated by UNIFEM and the Institute of Inclusive Security demanded guaranteed protection of women’s rights in all reconciliation initiatives. The group expressed concern at reconciliation proposals and the lack of consultation and consideration of the needs and views of civilians. A statement emphasized that there should be "no compromise on human rights" and that any reintegration should be based on "justice and respect for human rights."

A female delegate in London, Arzo Qanih, one of two civil society representatives at the conference, told the gathering: "Women in Afghanistan are critical partners for peace. Women’s engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery: it is a critical precursor to success."

Waliullah Rahmani, director of the Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies, suggested that the Afghan government’s security agenda could have ominous implications for civil society development in the country. Achieving "security by any means and at any cost" could result in the sacrifice of hard won civil rights attained at the cost of human lives, he said.

"The Taliban do not believe in the concept of citizenship and democracy and human rights and security will come at a cost. This is not good for the entire population. A broader approach is required," he added.

Hakimi, the Kabul NGO activist, criticized the reconciliation fund, saying, "the international community talks about corruption and then wants to make payments to the insurgents. Is this not bribery?"

Hakimi added that paying insurgents to lay down their weapons was a simplistic approach. "So far Karzai has been mute on the political claims of the Taliban. The whole policy is very fuzzy," Hakimi said.

Meanwhile, Taliban leaders weren’t exactly leaping at the opportunity to engage the Afghan government in a political dialogue. One major Taliban group, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, lambasted plans for reconciliation. Western powers "announce that they will provide money, employment and opportunity to have a comfortable life abroad, for those Mujahideen [holy warriors] who agree to part ways with Jihad. They think that Mujahideen have taken up arms to gain money or grab power or were compelled to turn to arms. This is baseless and futile," read a statement posted on the Internet on January 28.

Other Taliban representatives indicated that militant leaders were adopting a wait-and-see approach.

It’s unlikely that many key Taliban elements can be coaxed to sit down at a negotiating table, said Rahmani of the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. "It is necessary to have a strategy to deal with different groups in different ways. The top-ranking Taliban is irreconcilable."

Kabul-based observers were also skeptical about the idea that Afghan government institutions would be able to assume responsibility for the country’s security in the near future. Rapidly expanding Afghan military and police forces would likely dangerously undermine command-and-control capabilities. "I am not sure the Afghan army will be ready to take over the role," said Hakimi.

Shahmahmood Miakhel, chief of party at the United States Institute of Peace in Kabul, said the London conference’s success or failure would be determined in large measure by how the Karzai administration "progresses on governance. Both [improvements in governance and security] need to happen at the same time."

London Conference to Focus on Afghan Security

2010-04-13T02:45:00.000-07:00

AOL News KABUL (Jan. 26) – There is plenty of substance on the agenda of Thursday's one-day conference on Afghanistan in London. The assembled U.N. and NATO officials, as well as foreign ministers including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, are expected to endorse a recent agreement on a substantive increase of Afghan National Security Forces and set timelines for beginning to hand over security responsibility to them. They may well hash out a concrete proposal for political reconciliation with the Taliban. But looming over the proceedings will be memories of previous international conferences on Afghanistan – including one in London in 2006 and another in Paris in 2008 – that have seen little or no follow-through.

Thursday's London conference is meant to dispel differences within the international community on the approach toward Afghanistan, which came to a head during the election period. The United Nations, with the support of the European Union, had already proposed a conference in Kabul following the new government's election. But France, Germany and the United Kingdom, under domestic pressure not to spend more money and human resources on a nonperforming government under President Hamid Karzai, wanted a forum to put concrete demands on the Afghan government, leading to London in January with a Kabul conference mooted in spring.

The London agenda that has emerged will center on security concerns and specific military strategy. Participants want to spell out a security strategy that will enable the major troop-contributing countries to give their voters a clearer sense of when their forces can start withdrawing. But before that can happen, according to plans endorsed by President Barack Obama last month, 30,000 more U.S. troops and 7,000 from allied countries will deploy in Afghanistan. On Tuesday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged to increase her country's military presence there from 4,500 to 5,000 troops.

An agreement endorsed in Kabul last week after tough negotiations between the Afghan government and donors calls for more than doubling the Afghan National Security Forces, from 191,000 now to 400,000 in five years. That effort will require more money and more trainers from Afghanistan's partners, and the British government hopes to secure commitments for both at the conference.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has suggested that Afghan forces must be ready to take the lead in "at least five provinces ... by the end of 2010," but it is far from clear whether an actual number of provinces will be spelled out at the conference, let alone specific provinces named – even though those decisions have a direct bearing on any contemplated troop withdrawals.

The Karzai government is expected to table a policy that would allow reconciliation with the "Afghan" Taliban, an effort recently endorsed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander of U.S. and NATO troops in the country. Karzai will also call for renewed military operations across the border in Pakistan and ask Western donors to pay into a fund to enable cash payments to reintegrated fighters.

"Those Taliban who are not part of terrorist networks, who are the sons of the Afghan soil, and who are in thousands and thousands, they have to be reintegrated, and they are welcomed to be integrated," Karzai said at a regional conference in Istanbul on Tuesday.

Development and governance have also been cited as themes for the conference, but concrete, measurable steps on those issues will be tougher to secure, much to the regret of many experts. "The focus on governance is long overdue," said Rachel Reid, Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch. "As long as there are known rights abusers and people associated with criminal activity in public office, the government will fail to win the trust of the people. Similarly, there can be no half measures from the international community, who are bringing pressure upon the government to reform, but are still failing to audit who it is they are enriching and empowering in Afghanistan."

Many Afghan civil society groups, including defenders of women's rights, are concerned about the process of reintegrating Taliban forces into society, Reid said. "Those who do not wield guns should not be excluded from these important decisions," she said.

Civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations are not invited to the conference itself, but have met in their own forum in London earlier this week. Many of them believe earlier conferences have seen little follow-through. In 2008, for instance, leaders endorsed the Afghan National Development Strategy, which Ashley Jackson of Oxfam International said "does prioritize the needs of Afghanistan but does not seem to be on the agenda right now."

"An international preoccupation with military strategy has deflected attention from building up civilian institutions and developing the economy," the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, a respected research organization, has concluded. The organization expressed the hope that the London and Kabul conferences would lead the international community to commit itself to building public institutions that are legitimate in Afghan eyes, something that had been "too long neglected in preference of quick-fix and military solutions."

Welcome to Hotel Silk Road

2010-04-13T02:43:00.001-07:00

Hard News January 2010

It was the famous potato crop of Bamiyan's valleys that helped Hiromi Yasui build her hotel. The central highlands of Afghanistan produces little other than a good crop of potatoes and almost everything she needed to build her hotel in Bamiyan town had to be imported into the province - building materials, furniture, and furnishings for the hotel that now looks across the potato fields onto the famous Buddhas - or what remains of them in the crumbling niches in the sandstone cliffs.

Transporting the goods was no easy task. Though the distance between Kabul, the capital, and Bamiyan town is a mere 237 km by the safe road across the Shiber pass, it is a backbreaking journey of 10-14 hours in a four- wheel drive, across a rutted track that jolts you up and down. The other southern road, through the Haji Gak, is shorter (177 km) and has seen many ambushes. It is used only by the brave or foolhardy. Neither road is asphalted, but is cratered, pitted and often stony with enormous wear and tear on the vehicles. Carrying materials into Bamiyan is expensive. To get concessional rates, Hiromi hired the trucks carrying potatoes to Kabul which would return empty to Bamiyan. Even so, it took all of four years as Hiromi and her husband scraped together the funds to build their dream hotel. And even when the furniture did arrive in the last year, most of it was broken, unable to survive the back-breaking drive.

Though put squarely on the international map by Taliban's decision to blow up the enormous Buddhas in 2001, Bamiyan remains an impoverished area with little in the way of development. Populated largely by the Shia Hazara community, who have traditionally faced social segregation, political marginalisation and economic deprivation, Bamiyan has no industry and till recently did not have even a kilometer of asphalted road. While internationally it was the destruction of the Buddhas which drew opprobrium, the Hazaras of Bamiyan's valleys had faced horrendous violence at the hands of the Sunni Taliban who were intolerant of the Shia community. There were several brutal massacres in which hundreds of Hazaras lost their lives and had their entire villages burnt down. Today, several mass graves stand mute testimony to those events though they attract little attention.

Post 2001, there have been plenty of projects for economic development, but the lack of an economic base and infrastructure due to years of neglect has meant that these small projects have remained limited in their contribution. However, Bamiyan continues to draw tourists and the provincial government has been keen to develop eco-tourism for some economic benefits for the local population.

The Buddha niches are still the main draw for international tourists. Though the graph of violence in the country has seen a sharp increase with the resurgence of the Taliban and other armed anti-government groups, Bamiyan remains relatively safe and largely insulated from the ongoing conflict. Combined with a local culture that is far more accepting of outsiders, Bamiyan allows foreign tourists a relaxed holiday and has become a must-see on the itinerary of foreigners working in Afghanistan or the small number visiting the country purely as tourists.

While the number of international tourists has seen a decrease over the last two years, what makes Bamiyan special is the large number of Afghans visiting it each year. The summer months sees busloads of tourists and pilgrims who flock to the province which is replete with folklore, legend and history. Three hours away from Bamiyan town are the spectacular Band-e- mir lakes which were recently declared the country's first national park because of their unparalleled scenic beauty and rich biodiversity. Here too, the land is replete with the legends of Hazrat Ali, a revered figure among the country's Shias. The formation of the series of crystalline lakes is attributed to him as is the slaying of the local dragon which lies in a massive rock formation an hour away from Bamiyan town, its long and large crevice seen as the wound caused by the sword of Ali, while its small hot water geysers spout the dragon's tears.

Historically, the area was also home to the Shahr-e-Gholghola or 'city of shrieks'. The city, where the king's daughter betrayed her father to Genghis Khan, saw all inhabitants slaughtered by the Mongol invader. The daughter was not rewarded for her treachery but met the same fate as the other inhabitants.

It was Hiromi's visits to Bamiyan and the lack of facilities, she says, that convinced her that a clean hotel with facilities measuring up to international standards would be a good investment as well as a contribution to her adopted country. A woman of many parts, Hiromi is a Japanese journalist and photographer who fell in love with Afghanistan during her many visits to the country beginning in the 1990s. In 2002, this relationship was further cemented when Abdul Saboor, a Panjshiri who used to work with visiting journalists, fell in love with her and wooed her. "He used to take me out on dates for mango juice near Karte Parwan (a Kabul locality dominated by the Panjshiris) where his house was. You know there are not so many ways one can date in Kabul. Dating was so difficult and we had to do it secretly. Slowly, I fell in love. He was so honest. Finally, there was no way to continue so we decided to get married."

This was in 2003. Hiromi and Saboor went to Turkey and married there, with Hiromi converting to Islam, before returning for a ceremonial wedding reception that was muted - by Afghan standards. She also took the Afghan name 'Mursal' (Rose), the name that all Afghans know her by. Intercultural marriages often run aground on the dry sand of cultural differences, especially in Afghanistan, where conservative cultural mores prevent women from participating in public life. However, Hiromi has deftly negotiated her space within the conservative culture, adapting to Afghan customs while keeping her independence as an individual.

There were few ties to Japan with both of Hiromi's parents having died when she was young. Her sister and a good friend, whom she visits every year, were not surprised at her decision to marry. "I was outside Japan for the better part of the year and they expected me to marry a foreigner. They were just a little surprised it was an Afghan."
"In the beginning it was difficult. He used to be angry with me and I did not know why. For example, I would be speaking to a man - just speaking, you understand - and he would be angry. I would ask, 'why are you angry'? I thought: What is happening? But over time, he understands me better. Even now he sometimes gets angry. But he is not like other Afghan husbands. He knows me. He knows I am Japanese, not Afghan. He says, 'If you don't have a job you won't be able to live in Afghanistan'. He accepts that I need to work."

"I also think I succeeded because I know Afghan culture very well. I had begun learning the language when I would travel to the Panjshir during the time of the Taliban to report on the country. I stayed in Panjshir houses and in the evening I would be talking to the women there." Hiromi now is so fluent in Dari, the most widely spoken language in Afghanistan, that she can converse easily, do business and even administer the occasional scolding without missing a beat. Those are skills that were essential when she moved professionally from being a journalist to an Afghan businesswoman.

If it was hard work building the hotel in Bamiyan, which she named the Silk Road, it had been hard to keep it going as well. Hiromi works with locals teaching them how to cook the exquisite Japanese cuisine and runs a small crafts shop where she sells cloth and artifacts made by Bamiyan women. Teddy bears in traditional Afghan clothes, colourful swatches of cloth woven by the women, modern jackets with delicate traditional embroidery, beadwork and a host of other crafts.

To find women to work with her, Hiromi travels into the remote side valleys of Bamiyan province. "Those working in my hotel came from some of these valleys and they knew who needed work and who was poor. I would confirm their stories and then see if the women had the skills to learn the work." Most of the women were the breadwinners of the family, and with the work they did with Hiromi "all of them were able to buy land and two even build houses on it" she says.

While the women have exquisite traditional skills passed on for generations, they had no access to the market either to buy the raw materials - threads, beads, cloth, or for selling their products. And this is where Hiromi forms the bridge. Indeed, procuring raw materials takes considerable effort and she often travels to Pakistan and India to source it. "See, this cloth was from the Khadi Gramadyog in Delhi. I buy the thread from the Kinari Bazaar in Chandni Chowk. I just get into a rickshaw and travel through the inner lanes of old Delhi. It is so crowded."

It is not just handicrafts that are a challenge. Bamiyan hardly grows any fresh vegetables and there is no regular supply for the extensive Japanese, Afghan and continental food that Hiromi serves in her hotel. "We go down to the bazaar and see what vegetables are available and then plan the menu for the day. Sometimes, when I desperately need something, I go directly to the farms and buy it from there."

For the Maki sushi, Hiromi brings in seaweed paper from Japan, some of the special sauces and even cleaning material for her hotel. Now she can source some of her supplies in Kabul - like the dried Shitake mushrooms and sesame oil which were not available when she first came here.
Bamiyan's severe winter, blocked roads and heavy snowfall has meant that Hiromi shuts down the hotel from December to mid April though she continues paying salaries to her staff to help them survive through the harsh winter months when costs increase and fuel is needed to keep warm. This year, however, several of them travelled with her to Kabul. As a part owner of Gallerie which showcases the crafts of five Afghan entrepreneurs, Hiromi opened a small crafts shop and restaurant in the heart of Kabul.

There are small differences in working in the two places. Kabul has fresh vegetables throughout the year and most things cost less. In comparison with the hotel where there would be a fixed number of guests, Kabul has customers wandering in at will requiring quick and fast service, something her Bamiyan employees are slowly getting used to.

There is Atifa, a fresh faced 26-year-old, who is already the mother of three children. Atifa is from the remote Panjao district and wants to study. She is happy to be in Kabul because the environment back home did not encourage her ambitions. There is Qadir, who is 24-year-old and had studied upto class 6. The manager of Gallerie helps him study after-hours.

Though Japanese cuisine with its delicate and fresh taste is starkly different from the rich oil heavy Afghan cuisine, the employees of Silk Road have learnt to like it, being forced to taste it while cooking. So has her husband. Hiromi looks shocked when asked what she eats at home, insisting that she cannot eat large quantities of the rich Afghan food. "My husband also likes Japanese food. He likes crab, shrimp and would you believe it, he even likes Miso soup!"

For customers in Kabul, the opening of the restaurant has been a moment of celebration, a chance to get away from the rich cuisines that are served even in international restaurants. Though the restaurant's cuisine and prices puts it beyond middle class Afghans, the 'internationals' and elite Afghans provide a steady customer base. Old customers from the hotel stroll in greeting Hiromi by name. "We missed you in Bamiyan the last time but the food was great," says one, paying perhaps the greatest compliment to Hiromi's ability to transfer her skills to her employees. "Earlier, they would work hard, but just do what they were told," says Hiromi. "They would not think for themselves and could not do anything without orders. I told them you have to learn to think for yourselves. With these skills you can one day open your own restaurant."

Hiromi expects that the restaurant in Kabul will stay open even when she returns to Bamiyan to yet again open her hotel in the spring of 2010. But she also expects most of the Kabul restaurant's work to be home deliveries and take-outs. "People are not going out as much as they did because of the insecurity."

As violence has worsened, internationals working in Kabul city are often subjected to lockdowns and restricted travel. Many areas are declared out of bounds; travel can be limited to essential travel from work to home, or require a convoy of armoured cars. The UN downsized its presence by 600 following the attack on the UN guest house and it is unclear whether it will be restored to its original size.
Hiromi misses some things about Japan, chiefly, the fresh raw fish, sushi, Udon and Ramen Noodles, and also Japan's famous hot springs. The first day in her hometown, Osaka, requires a good sushi meal, sometimes even at the airport.

However, her identification with Afghanistan is so complete that she does not expect to leave the country even if the situation gets worse, though she continues to hold a Japanese passport. "Here, I see people develop, and grow. You can see the changes when people make their lives better. It is not like Japan. Why would I leave if the violence got worse? I am a journalist. I would report on it. I fell in love with this country and then I found my husband here. When I go to Japan, I miss my house here," says Hiromi.

"Now this is my country and Japan is somewhere to travel to."

Welcome to Hotel Silk Road

2010-04-13T02:43:00.000-07:00

AFGHANISTAN: ARE US TROOPS COMING OR GOING?

2010-04-13T02:42:00.000-07:00

EURASIA INSIGHT
December 12, 2009

In Kabul, US President Barack Obama’s strategic vision for Afghanistan seems to be sowing confusion and skepticism.

In his December 1 address, Obama announced an increase of 30,000 troops -- with deployment to be completed by mid-2010. He also emphasized that American forces would begin to wrap up operations in Afghanistan in July 2011.

Given that reinforcement numbers had leaked out in the days before the speech, the impact of the troop surge announcement was relatively muted in Kabul. Local attention focused mainly on the withdrawal timeframe, as well as on the lack of attention that Obama’s speech gave to civilian-related issues and economic development.

By establishing a deadline for the start of a military drawdown, many local observers worried that Obama was setting the stage for failure. The general impression is that Afghan security forces will not be ready starting in 18 months to pick up the slack left by departing US troops.

"The question I have for Obama is: if they could not do the job in eight years, how can they ask the Afghan government to do the job in 18 months?" asked Shukriya Barakzai, a member of the Afghan parliament.

Sandeep Kumar, an international working with the UNDP on police reform and development, echoed Barakazi’s concern "What is the 18-month time frame based on? We don’t know yet. If this is about training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, then this will have to co-relate to the requirements of the training facilities, length of training period, and generally reaching a point where the security forces are able to carry out independent operations."

Dr Abdullah Abdullah, the main challenger to President Hamid Karzai in last summer’s highly contentious presidential election, expressed support for the troop increase. But he questioned whether the Afghan government would be ready to assume responsibility for the security in two or three years, his spokesman stated.

In an interview with EurasiaNet conducted prior to Obama’s speech, Russia’s ambassador in Kabul, Andrey Avetisyan, expressed discomfort with any deadline for the departure of international troops. "I am afraid a date spoils the whole thing. When you have a date you relax and just wait for the date," Avetisyan said.

While skeptics were plentiful, Obama’s plan found some support in Kabul. UN representatives welcomed the new strategy, with a spokesman saying the body viewed it as a "long-term commitment."

"It is good there is a timeline because you have to set yourself ambitious targets," the UN spokesman said.

Haroun Mir, a political analyst and founder of the director of Afghanistan’s Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), was among the Afghan experts who were modestly encouraged by Obama’s speech. "The situation can change even by the end of 2010 if there is good governance and justice delivered along with the military surge," he said.

Mir expressed the belief that Obama would not withdraw troops in large number right after deploying them at considerable cost, adding that his 18-month timeframe was probably geared toward his domestic audience. The summer of 2011 would roughly coincide with the opening of the 2012 presidential election campaign season.

While Obama’s 18-month timeframe was only indicative of a cap on the number of US forces to be deployed, and the speech provided no specifics on the number of troops to be withdrawn in July 2011, some American analysts said the president would have to withdraw a substantial number of soldiers in order to be seen by the American electorate as keeping his promise.

"If Obama is to stick to his commitment, he will have to draw down his troops in sufficient numbers (after July 2011)" said John Dempsey, who heads the US Institute of Peace’s Kabul office.

Dempsey said he worried that the July 2011 withdrawal announcement might send an encouraging message to the Taliban and other radical Islamic elements, who might now choose to bide their time until US troops start leaving. "It certainly could give them some sort of hope" Dempsey said.

In a bid to allay concerns that the United States might cut and run from Afghanistan, Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta and US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry met with local journalists briefly. They pointed to the facts that the United States is opening a consulate in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, and that another consulate is planned for the western hub of Herat, as evidence that the US will maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan.

Beyond the withdrawal issue, Barakzai, the Afghan MP, voiced disappointment that Obama’s speech lacked substantive mention of humanitarian assistance and support for institution building, both of which are necessary for any transition to be successful.

Rachel Reid, Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch said there were no short-cuts to security. "There is no magic number of US troops that will bring security to Afghanistan," she said adding "what matters is what the troops are there to do, and how they can enhance a long-term strategy to improve Afghans’ human rights."

Kumar also emphasized the need for a multi-pronged approach saying that "the Afghanistan situation is impacted by not just external factors, but also internal issues of civilian casualties, narcotics, governance and rule-of-law."

"There has to necessarily be a multi-dimensional approach," Kumar continued. "The real success of the surge in military troops announced can only be felt if there is a more focused convergence of military, political, governance and development approaches."

'US repeating Soviet mistakes'

2010-04-13T02:36:00.000-07:00

Al Jazeera, December 2, 2009

For the first time since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, and the subsequent fall of the Najibullah government in 1996, Russia says it is ready to play a greater political and economic role in the country it formerly occupied.

It has co-operated with Nato and other western deployments, opening up transit routes for international forces and initiating bilateral co-operation with Kabul.

Andrey Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan, says Moscow supports the continuing presence of international troops in Afghanistan. However he worries that the international community, especially the US, are committing the same mistakes made during the Soviet occupation.

Al Jazeera interviewed the Russian envoy at his country's new embassy in Kabul.

Al Jazeera: Russia has maintained a low-key presence in Afghanistan for the past few years. Is it preparing to change that approach and move toward a new role in this country?
Andrey Avetisyan: Indeed, we have been playing it kind of low-profile for the past eight years possibly because Russia was looking for its place in the modern Afghan situation. Our firm resolution was, and still is, that Russia is never going to be involved in Afghanistan militarily. We have been waiting for a moment, a good chance to come back to do other things.

This moment seems to have come because in Afghanistan we see, at last, not only fighting but efforts to revive this country, to rebuild its economy ... to do something for education.

These are positive developments because we have been telling our Western friends you cannot win in Afghanistan by fighting terrorism alone. Of course, we support this fight against terrorism and drug-trafficking because the flow of drugs affects Russia a lot. It affects us more than any other country because a lot of it goes through Russia and stays there.

How has Russia supported the so-called war on terror and what changes would you like to see in that effort?

We support the international forces in Afghanistan. We are not interested in their defeat because otherwise we will have to deal with this problem in the future and I think it is in our common interest to join forces.

We have opened transit routes through Russia for example; we train some Afghan police and we are thinking of increasing that number. We are ready to provide Afghanistan with all possible assistance here.

I don't think military victory is possible in Afghanistan in the sense of a conventional war or traditional war, like the Second World War and such. In the end, international forces will leave Afghanistan but the war or the fighting will not stop immediately. Our common responsibility and common goal is to prepare Afghanistan and Afghan security forces to stand and fight alone and to complete this task without an international presence.

The time has not yet come for this because the Afghan army and police are yet to be increased in numbers and should be trained.

Why has Russia has been critical of the attempts to impose Western-style democratic institutions and of the pressures exerted on the Karzai government during the elections?

The democratic institutions need to be supported more than ever and more so in Afghanistan than in any other place because it is a young democracy.

We provide such support for example in increasing relations between parliaments.

But you are right - we were quite critical during the election period because we are sure that the Afghans must not be pushed too hard. It must be done step-by-step. Slowly. You can't have elections in Afghanistan as neatly as in Finland, for example, because the situation is different. But some people wanted to have it in a classic Western style.

Afghan society is so different from elsewhere that one must understand or at least try to understand this before trying to go too far in imposing democratic principles immediately.

Was this one of the things Russia learnt during its invasion years – trying to impose too much without understanding local conditions?

That was one of the mistakes. Unfortunately, as we say to our American partners, they are repeating the same mistake. Which is a pity, because they have an advantage to learn from our mistakes. But many mistakes are repeated. We are not very happy about it because we are now partners.

They are more or less applying the same approach as the Soviet army in the 1980s - holding towns and some bases without widening the influence. We are not talking only of military but political influence as well to the countryside and provinces. They have provincial centres in all Afghan provinces, but unfortunately little else.

But the new Western approach of protecting civilians is, I think, a step in the right direction.

International forces have also been talking of withdrawing to urban areas and protecting ten population centres.

Avetisyan says Afghan police and the army must be strengthened to stand alone
The idea to withdraw comes inevitably because nobody can stay here forever but another mistake that must be avoided is to leave Afghanistan without preparing and establishing effective and functioning power structures. Otherwise, this war can be fought for another 10 or 20 years and when international forces leave, the problems will remain.

Building institutions, effective power structures, effective government, which is representative of all political forces in Afghanistan - that is what is needed. Without these in place, the international community cannot leave.

So is Russia comfortable with an open-ended international presence?

I would not say it is open-ended. The moment will come when we all feel that the government is quite capable to do without the international military presence.

Should there be a date for withdrawal as some people have suggested?

I am afraid dates and deadlines spoil the whole thing. When you have a date you relax and just wait for the date to arrive.

Are you comfortable with the anticipated increase in Nato and Isaf troops?

I think, and this is my personal opinion, that some increase is needed to improve the situation now, in the short term. If in the short-term period the international presence manages to improve the military and political situation, then it will be easier to build the power structure, economy and other important things. So strategically before withdrawal some tactical increase is needed.

Is Russia uneasy about a US military presence in Central Asian countries which have traditionally fallen under Moscow's sphere of strategic influence?

We do not divide the world into spheres of influence. We are all engaged in this counter-terrorism effort together. So we don't see this presence as a threat to us because we are contributing to a common effort. I don't think it is a problem.

Are you worried about the military situation in northern Afghanistan?

That is why I said we are not interested in international forces being defeated here because we understand that this threat is a threat to our security as well. Maybe even more than other countries far away because we feel ourselves as neighbours of Afghanistan even though we do not share a common border.

We are very interested in stabilising Afghanistan and ready to help in that endeavour.

There is now a lot of talk about reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban and other anti-government forces.

Reconciliation and reintegration are two different things. Reintegration is when we speak about soldiers and field commanders and such who possibly fight for money or because they don't have other things to do; for example, someone whose house was destroyed by mistake by the army or someone else and is now seeking revenge.

If these people see prospects for themselves, for their families to live normal lives, they can be reintegrated and this must be encouraged by the government.

Reconciliation is a possibility. If we take the Taliban, for example, there is a possibility for the leadership to enter the political stream. Well, in the future it is possible. But it is a very delicate and slow process. It should be a slow process. We must not rush it.

It cannot happen next year. Because it is difficult to come to an agreement right after fighting. Some time has to pass. But they are all Afghans and in the end they have to find ways to reconcile.

It is a difficult process, however. What Russia is clearly opposed to is removing some people from the UN sanctions list and bringing them here. We must have serious reasons for de-listing and it is a very difficult process.

The UN Security Council's al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions committee - set up in 1999 - has a list of names of people considered to be linked to either organisation. Reviewing this list and taking some names off the list is now being considered as one important initial step toward reconciliation with members of the Taliban.

This proposal has been mooted earlier by those encouraging these reconciliation talks including the go-betweens. Taking any names off the list requires consensus of all 15 committee members, including Russia. What is Moscow's take on this?

We do not see a very serious effort yet. If in the future everybody agrees this is going to be positive device and that it will help Afghanistan and its people to return to normality without killing each other, then we could support it.

This is obviously not the time to do de-listing; but as I have pointed out, the process is step-by-step and must be first started by the Afghans themselves, not by New York or Moscow or Washington.

And [President Hamid] Karzai openly invited them to reconcile and called them 'brothers'. This is a good step forward.

Afghanistan’s elections went on and on, but offered more questions than answers

2010-04-13T02:31:00.001-07:00

Himal/December 2009

"It ain’t over till the fat lady sings,” was the refrain of a veteran journalist, one of many who descended on Kabul like a flock of migratory birds to cover Afghanistan’s 2009 presidential elections, which stretched from August through early November. It was one of several visits that this particular journalist had made in the course of those three months, marred by fraud, cover-ups, manipulations and negotiations, and the scribe had just stepped out of a press conference in which the Independent Election Commission Chairman, Azizullah Lodin, had declared the election of President Hamid Karzai. The question that begged an answer was: Who exactly was the fat lady?

Was it the Independent Election Commission (IEC)? Or the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which has had occasion to lock horns with the IEC? The United Nations, which had an internal meltdown related to the elections? The Western countries dominating the international allies of Afghanistan – or the US alone? Or perhaps it was the main contender, Abdullah Abdullah? In fact, the proverbial fat lady has metamorphosed and mutated into various forms even as differing, and often contending, interests (within and outside Afghanistan) have shadow-boxed against the backdrop of Afghanistan’s electoral exercise.

A year earlier, the elections were being projected as an opportunity of change that would bring hope to millions of Afghans disenchanted by the lacklustre pace of development and deteriorating security. As it became clear that there was no real contender to Karzai, the rationale for the elections changed, becoming a ‘constitutional requirement’ that would allow Afghans to express themselves. For the international community, it became a much-needed step that would justify their engagement in an increasingly unpopular venture.

Yet as the process moved closer to the polling date, it became clear that the conduct of elections was likely to be severely compromised by the lack of security in large parts of the country, and the failure to establish stable processes and institutions overseeing the elections. While a vigorous election campaign saw a spurt of zeal amongst candidates, voters and the international community alike, early reports of widespread fraud on polling day soon demolished enthusiasm, turning the elections into a tug of war between various powerful interests. As the waters got increasingly muddied, the premise of the elections changed from one about voters to one about deals between contending interests.

The final announcement by the IEC of Karzai as the winner followed a series of convoluted twists and turns, and ultimately left more questions than answers. Though the pro-Karzai IEC bowed to international pressure and invalidated over a million votes for the incumbent president, it also set an unhealthy precedent with the selective application of the decisions of the Complaints Commission, thus flouting the electoral law. In addition, it accorded to itself the power to declare a candidate elected despite the absence of an over-50-percent majority as required by law, rather than referring this grey legal area to judicial interpretation. Yet rather than taking a nuanced position on the flaws of the elections, the international community (including the US president and the UN secretary-general) have endorsed the actions of the IEC – going so far as to laud the Commission for upholding the rule of law and the Constitution.

Schisms everywhere
The murkiness surrounding the final phase of the election has left a lasting impression of the Karzai government’s lack of legitimacy, which is taking place at a very dangerous moment in Afghanistan’s fragile security situation. In the absence of a robust and credible state structure around which the people could rally, they are likely to drift towards the armed opposition for a variety of reasons, ranging from disenchantment and alienation to fear and the need for safety.

The election exercise also drew to a close with the international community more visibly fractured than at any time since 2001 on the issue of how to deal with Afghanistan. The UN experienced unprecedented crisis as a result of the bitter fallout between its top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his deputy, Peter Galbraith. The organisation has found it difficult to recover from the episode. This disarray was compounded by the unprecedented and deliberate brutality on the UN residential compound, where the Taliban slaughtered aid workers in their beds, hunting them down as they tried to escape and mowing down anyone else in the way. Relocation and expatriation of hundreds of UN workers and the continuing lack of political direction has now created both insularity and a siege mentality within the UN. Recovering from this will take resources and leadership, both of which are in short supply; and the expectations on the ground are of a much more muted, restricted and contracted UN presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

There are also deep divisions within the larger international community on the political, military and development approach required to deal with the deteriorating situation. While President Barack Obama’s drawn-out deliberations on the number of troops he will deploy to Afghanistan may come to an end by the time this magazine hits newsstands, that debate is symptomatic of a much larger and deeper malaise: the lack of clarity and coherence in the goals of the international community on Afghanistan. Constantly shifting goalposts and calling for exit strategies are compounded by the inability to look beyond short-term measures. Yet another ‘conference’ and ‘compact’ are now on the anvil as a response to the urgent crisis. What is certain is that the elections have resulted in a deep schism between the international community and the Kabul government. Anti-foreigner rhetoric is being used deliberately by a section of Afghanistan’s polity to paper over its own shortcomings, a tendency that is likely to grow in the coming months as the political crisis deepens, which is bound to happen.

Amongst the issues that lie ahead in the next few weeks and months is the matter of talks with the Taliban. For now, the discussions have remained very vague, with a host of critical questions remaining unanswered. Who will the Afghan government negotiate with, for instance, and who will be outside the pale? How much pressure will the international community bring to bear for a reconciliation deal? Other uncertainties include speculation on whether the fighting will intensify with increased number of troops deployed by the Western countries? How many warlords who rely on money and muscle power will be accommodated in the government? How will the issue of the massive corruption that is eating at the state institutions be curbed? Will the increasing conservatism of the Kabul establishment be accommodated further in the polity? How will anti-foreigner hostility be played out in the cities and villages of Afghanistan? How long will the Karzai government be able to last with the multiple pressures and a weaker president?

The inaugural speech by President Karzai on 19 November did not yield much of a sense of hope on these issues, lacking both eloquence and a broad vision for the next five years. Delivered in front of an audience that had many international dignitaries – including President Asif Ali Zardari, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Iranian Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi and an assortment of foreign ministers – President Karzai appeared embattled, and his speech was little more than a list of issues that appeared to be reactions to the different pressures on him.

Stronger opposition
Indeed, while the elections have left President Karzai more enfeebled despite being reaffirmed as president for a third term (the first being when he was selected by the Loya Jirga to head the transitional government between 2001 and 2004; the second, his election in 2004), it did throw up a stronger opposition that coalesced around the main electoral contender, Abdullah Abdullah (see accompanying interview). Despite losing at the hustings, the elections have enabled Abdullah’s return from the political wilderness to which he had been thrust following his unceremonious removal from the position of foreign minister by President Karzai in 2006.

Abdullah, a smart and astute politician, stepped out of the election process at a point designed to give him maximum political leverage. While Afghanistan’s political system, which concentrates all power in the presidency, limits his ability to participate in governance at the moment, he currently wields sufficient influence to shape future political events. While some among his political group are itching to assume positions of authority, Abdullah has publicly maintained that he would like to introduce political reform that would strengthen institutions and democratise power.

Abdullah’s ability to do so will depend largely on his ability to shape the opposition – especially within Parliament, which nurses an animus against the government for restricting its authority and powers with the government’s refusal to accept some of the parliamentary decisions. Though the Parliament has been too enfeebled to take constructive action, it can block the government effectively, especially if President Karzai wishes to appoint new ministers and new legislation, as he has promised, since both require parliamentary approval. While the first potential confrontations will occur in the next few weeks, parliamentary elections next year could give Abdullah a chance to rally an opposition around himself. Until now, however, his political bloc is a loose confederation of interests, rather than a political party with a clear agenda; further, the ban on the participation of political parties in the elections makes it difficult for any political formation to strengthen itself.

In the weeks after the declaration of Karzai as the winner, one thing that has become assured is that the uncertainty that accompanied the electoral process will continue long after the elections. The stability of the Karzai government remains in question, as does the commitment or direction of the international community. This leaves ordinary Afghans confused, after an electoral exercise that was supposed to deliver stability. However, such unpredictability is not new to Afghans. A new report by Oxfam documents Afghans talking about the experience of the last three decades of conflict. An astounding 76 percent of respondents said they had been forced to leave their homes, many of them several times, while 43 percent said they had had property destroyed during the war. The recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment by Kabul’s Central Statistical Organisation reveals that nine million Afghans, estimated at 36 percent of the population, are still unable to meet their basic needs. Both of these reports underline the unrelenting violence and its costs – a price that has been borne by ordinary Afghans, notwithstanding the transitions in political power.

Aunohita Mojumdar is contributing editor for Himal Southasian.

Afghanistan’s elections went on and on, but offered more questions than answers

2010-04-13T02:31:00.000-07:00

Abdullah doesn't see failure, but a new beginning

2009-11-15T03:43:00.000-08:00

Published: 13 November 2009

NRC Handelsblad International Edition

Abdullah, a former foreign minister and presidential candidate who dropped out of the runoff vote in Afghanistan, is setting up a political party to lead the opposition against president Karzai.

By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Abdullah Abdullah, Hamid Karzai’s main challenger, had just returned from a weekend in the Panjshir valley. He went there after he withdrew from the second round of the presidential elections in Afghanistan which should have taken place last Saturday. The run-off was subsequently cancelled and Karzai was named the winner, despite the accusations of large scale fraud against his campaign team.

"Winning and losing depends on what you stand for," Abdullah told NRC Handelsblad. "It was the right decision for me to run, and against all odds. I knew what the government and the IEC [Independent Election Commission] were about. People are more hopeful now. I consider this a new beginning rather than the end of a process, for my views and goals and visions for the country.”

Abdullah didn't get much rest while he was away. Supporters have been beating a steady path to his door ever since the election and this has not diminished since the declaration of Karzai as the ‘elected’ president by the country’s IEC.

'Careers are not based on a long shot'

As Karzai struggles to meet competing and often contradictory demands from his political supporters and the international community, Abdullah is quietly laying the ground for a new political party that will function as an opposition to the Karzai government. Though administrative power in Afghanistan is centralised in the hands of the president, the opposition - mainly through parliament - can play the role of spoiler to some effect and block the government. Parliament, for which elections are planned next year, has to approve ministerial appointments and new legislation.

In his house in Kabul, Abdullah denied the the elections were a defeat for him. "I don't think so, political careers are not based on a long shot. I think this movement will continue with more vigour."

Asked about the possibility of anti-election protests turning violent or people joining the Taliban in his home province of Panjshir, Abdullah said: “I am aware of the feelings and emotions in this regard, not just in the Panjshir valley, but in different parts of the country. It is not just about the outcome; even during the campaign a lot of people saw it was not a level playing field. Then the elections. And then the fraud. And then the way the announcement was made by a body which did not have the mandate and also lost its credibility during the elections. For a lot people it sounds like unfinished business.”

Movement should develop into party

"When the final illegal decision was made, I received calls from many parts of the country. People were ready to take action. Of course I strongly rejected all those ideas. Later I heard people were prepared to make a second round impossible, if elections had gone through with just one candidate. That would have been a big setback to the democratic process. I was very clear that I didn’t ask for a boycott and I said it was for the citizens to judge it. Unfortunately we are in this situation that people cannot express their view even through non-violent, legal actions."

Abdullah himself is currently engaged in discussions with a wide variety of political leaders. His movement will “eventually” become a party, he said. "Towards the end of the election process the movement started gaining momentum and filled the vacuum which has been there for some years.”

He agreed that there are some amongst his supporters who may want to join the government for positions of power. “It is possible, but the number of people who want to join the movement will be much greater.”

He ruled out joining the current government or even advising it. Instead he will “call for reforms, for upholding rule of law. We need an independent election commission, we need an independent judiciary, we need changes so faith of the people in the process has to be restored.”

'Leadership which proved itself change-proof'

Abdullah is critical of recent charges of foreign interference by Karzai's supporters. Without naming any group or individual he called it “a dirty game which is being played here”. The international community, according to Abdullah, “did well by standing by the [electoral] process to the extent possible". However, he said, it missed the point on May 22, when Karzai's term ended officially but no interim-government was called for. Abdullah said that made it possible for Karzai's supporters to use government means for his campaign and voter fraud.

"The international community had the opportunity to stand by the people of Afghanistan. The legitimacy of the process could have been assured. Apart from that, there was very little the international community could have done. Now there is a dilemma: calls for change and a leadership which proved itself change-proof.”

“I think the international community is in a difficult position. I do understand the dilemmas, but the problem is we do not have another five years to deal with it like when M. Karzai was elected last time. In only two or three years it will be decided whether the deteriorating course will continue or be stopped and reversed.”